A Social and Legal Analysis of the Secondary Boycott in Labor Disputes by Kovarsky, Irving
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1953
A Social and Legal Analysis of the Secondary
Boycott in Labor Disputes
Irving Kovarsky
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1953 Irving Kovarsky
Recommended Citation
Kovarsky, Irving, "A Social and Legal Analysis of the Secondary Boycott in Labor Disputes" (1953). Master's Theses. Paper 1082.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1082
A SOCIAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
or 'l'HK SECONDARY BOYCOTT 
II LAn DISPUTES 
• 
A '!'h.sis Sulllll1tted to the l'acult7 ot the Institute ot Social 
and Industrial Relations ot Lo)"Ola UniversitT 
iD. Partial lultlllment ot the Requirements 
tor the Degre. ot Master ot Social 





Irving Koversky was born in Chicago, Illinois, on August 27, 19l9. 
He was graduated from Minley High School, Chicago, Illinois, June, 
1936, an~ from the Chicago-Kent College of Law, June, 1942, with the degree 
of Bachelor ot Laws. 
From 1942 to 1945, the author was in mUitary service. From 
October, 1945 to April, 1946, he was engaged in the print. practise of law. 
From April, 1946, to the present, the writer has been employed b.r a tederal 
government agency. He began hiB graduate studies at Loyola UniverSity in 
February, 1951. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. HISTORICAL ASPECT OF THE BOYCOTT. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
II. AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EVALUATION OF THE BOYCOTT. • • • • • • • • 17 
A. Charaoteristics ot the Secondary Boycett. • • • • • • • • • • 17 
B. The Need tor the Seoondary Boycott. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 
C. Material or Commodity Seoondary Actions • • • • • • • • • • • 28 
D. The CommUDity of Interest Between the Primar)" and Secondary 
Em.ployer. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 32 
E. Cooperation Be~een Unions. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 33 
F. The Labor Trend and the Secondary Boyoott •••••••••• 35 
III. STATE AND FEDllRAL LAWS AND DECISIONS •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 38 
A. Introduction. . 38 • 
· 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • B. The Dootrine of Conspiracy. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 41 1. England • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 41-2. United States • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 44 C. Coercion. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 47 D. The Constitutional Proteotion _f.Basin.s. • • • • • • • • • • 50 E. The Anti-Trust Laws • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 53 F. State Law • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 58 
IV. A SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION TO THE WAGNER ACT. • • • • • • • 71 
V. THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 81 
A. Disoussions in the United States Congress • • • • • • • • • • 81 
1. Abuses Noted by Management. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 82 
2. Labors Position • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • A9 
3. The Congressional Out1aok •••••••••••••••• 91 
4. The Expert Viewpoint. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 95 
5. A Summary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 95 
B. The Constitutional Aspect • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 98 
i ... 
.. 'Y 
C. The Act and Its Interpretation. ... • • • • • • • • • • • • .103 
1. The Jurisdictionsl Aspect • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • lOS 
2. A Labor Organization Defined. • • • • • • • • • • • • .107 
3. The Tyoe of Inducements Nor Proscribed. • • • • • • • • lOS 4. Agency. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .109 5. The Independent Contractor. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 110 6. Suite for Damages • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 112 
7. Is There a Strike? • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 114 s. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 116 9. Section 8 (b) (4) (B) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .121 10. Section S (b) (4) (C) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 123 D. Primary or Secondary Boycott. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .126 E. Effect Upon sta te Law • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 145 
VI. AN EVALUATION OF SOLUTIONS TO THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT PROBLEM •• 148 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 159 
CHAPTJ!R I 
HISTaUCAL ASPECT OF THE BOYCOTT 
The tera "bo.ycott" belongs to contemporary historr but the practice 
and use was tamiliar to ancient civilization. The word "boycott" today is 
frequently used in association with disputes between labor and management but 
the method was well known, in uany variations, to the societies ot old. An 
example thereof was the Pharisees shunning the Publicans as being socially 
:tnrerior. After the rule ot Clisthenes ot Greece, unsuccessful political 
claimants were ostracized by the l'>4tople as a method ot indicating party 
preference. In a sense, those who were excommunicated fro. the Roman Church 
during the middle ages were also boycotted. 1 A boycott was imposed in the 
year 1.327 by the people residing in Canterbury', England, against the local 
monks, be ing determined not to frequent or 1nba bi t the prior t s home nor to 
purchase any of the food or drink sold upon mODBste1"7 propert)". 2 
B.1 traCing the earlier forms ot the contemporary boycott beck to 
the beginning ot modern lndustl."Y, it can be readily noted that the pu..'''1ishment 
inflicted upon masters, journe)'Jl8n and apprentices tor the viola tiona ot 
guUd rules was similar to the present day boycott. It a master was guUty 
1 Harry W. Laidler, BoYcotts and the Labor Struggle, New York, 
1914, 27-.30. 





ot breaking a guild rule, the hired help was forbidden to labor tor him. The 
master was denied the privilege to appear at meetings and was forced to sell 
his Products at a dietlnce trom the other members in good standing. If jour-
neymen were tound guilty of rule infractions, they could not be employed and 
vere pursued by circulars (or untair lists) announcing the breaohes ot rules, 
thus preventing the offenders from obtaining gainful employment.:3 It should 
be noted that the boycott was used to maintain discipline within the guild 
wheress the modern day weapon i8 used to benefit the hired hand. 
From about 1700 to the nineteenth century, in northern France, the 
boy-cott was a popular weapon of the termer to be reckoned with. Farm 
tenants in the Picardy area would pay the landlords a premium as rental, and 
because ot the increased rent, olaimed the privtlege to occupy and 8ell the 
occupancy right at will. The landlords were denied the right to lease, sell, 
or evict tenants against their will. Although this right vas in conflict 
with French law, the tarm tenants felt justified because they paid certain 
premiums tor the land, many times against the desires ot the owners. It the 
landlord refused to recognize the unwritten law, the aggrieved renter would 
inform allot his neighbors and the farm vas boycotted by the entire country-
side. Farms could not be rented and a new tenant vas denounced S8 a land-
grabber. In many instances, physical attacks were made upon the property. 4 
:3 lW., 17. 
4 R. E. Prothero, "French Boycott and Its Cure", Nineteenth 
Ceptm, XXVIII, November, 1890, 778-785. 
"Boycott", Thp New Larned History, Springfield, Mass., 1922, 11, 
1109-1112. 
.. 3 
There are reports of boycotts in tQe early history of the United 
states alld examples thereof are the Bostoa Tea Party, slave __ de products 
marketed bT the abolitioaists, teaperaace societies and cOllsumer leagult8. 
The origia ot the term "boycott" is interesting. For -1l7 years, 
the peasant population of Ireland had bee. unjustly and hee.i1,. burdened by' 
the British .obilit,. and land owing class. The land conti.catiol'lS al'ld 
settlemel'lts in Ireland which followed the revolutions of 1640 and 1688 lett 
the landlord. ia Irelaad the absolute _sters of the soil. There being DO 
mode ot livelihood but agriculture open to the working papuletio., they were 
glad to get a farm at allY rel'lt without the legal bel'lerit of the usual 
covenant. protecting the lessee ia accordsDce with established British pre-
cedent. HoldiDg as a teunt ... t""",,1ll, the occupant was completel,. at the 
merc,. of the landlord or his ap.t. He was cOllstaDtl,. subjected to -117 
rule. which controlled his lire, tall117 relatiol'l!, land el'lclosure aad other 
arbitrary dogma i. which he had little or l'1O .oic8. The Irish stock had 
furl'lished British politics and the Briti.h civil aDd military .erTice with 
'118.,. capable and hard-vorking sernllts. Yet, prior to the Boycott mcidel'lt, 
no improvement had bee. _de in the condition ot the Irish Catholics since 
the use ot "Moll,. Maguiriam" aad the aedsaiDatio. of landlorda alld bailifra.' 
'l'he fundamental derect of the Irish land teaure ves that it placed the greet 
bulk of Ireland under the arbitrary govermaent of a .-11 class ot citizens 
437-38. 
, "The Genesis of Boycotting", %be Natio., XXXI, December 23, lSSO, 
.. 4 
who had no responsibility to the peasant by custom or law. 
Me.,. terms were confiscated, the payment or starvation wages a 
common practice and homes taken ava,. b,. legal sanction. From 1872 to 1877, 
there was an a\Ferage ot 500 e\Fictions a year. During 1879, the total 
doubled and 1,000 people were driTen trom their homes and liTelihood without 
an,. other industr,. available that could absorb this economic group. The 
n1ight of those concerned, born to the soil and without the necessary educa-
tion to pursue another occupation, linked together with the inertia ot 
society in general showing little desire to move, was intense. And the 
famia. of 1S78 gaT. the land-owning class an o'Pport~it,. to clear their 
estates ot the occupants, especially the peasant who was outspoken. 
With such historical backgroUlld b m.ind, one can rationally explain 
the conduct ot Captain Boycott with greater UDderstanding and clarity. He 
has become a figure representing unjust exploitation and yet he is merely a 
symbol tor thought and action whioh had existed Oil a natioll8l 1eTel. Captain 
Boyoott was a land agent for Lord Erne in County Mayo, Ireland, in the dis-
trict ot Connemara. 6 He is described as beiag brutal, toul....,uthed and 
arrogant. All of his tenaBts were compelled to stand with hats in their hand 
when passiag on a road. Inside his ottlce, the worker \I&S told to stand as 
tar as possible trom Boycott's desk.7 Evidently, the Oaptain held the peasant 
6 Barr,. W. Laidler, 0R.cit., 33-36. 
7 Arthur D. Vinton, liThe History of Boycotttngtt, Magaziae or 
Western RistoU', V, December, 1886, 2ll-224. 
s 
in utter conteapt. 
During the summer of 1880, th.e prevailing market wage for faM 
labor was sixty-two cents per day for the male and thirty-seven cents for 
the fe.le. CaptaiJl Boycott offered the wage of thirty-two cents tor the 
male and twenty-four cents for the female. The peasantry refused to accept 
and for all practical purposes forced Captain Boycott together with his 
family and servants to attempt the harvest of the crops prior to spoilage. 
With but a ffJW hours of labor, the newly recruited farm hands were exhausted 
and forced to quit since the rigorous labor was tar too diffioult, es~eially 
for those not conditioned by physical 1abor.8 Mrs. B07cott, who vas respected 
by the teunts and raM hands, pleaded with them and the peasants were 
finally induced to return to the fields. On the very next dS7, the tenants 
were presented with notices of evictioD by a formidable array of eighteen 
constables. With enthusiaSM, the constabulary managed to serve three 
notices of eviction, after which the outraged tenants called 8 large mass 
lIeeting to stop Captain Boycott. aad his legal aids. The leaders of the 
peasantry managed to iDduce the servants, herders and drivers for the Captaia 
to dessert, probably indicating that their ecoaomic interests were one aDd 
the _me and that force would be used it necessar:r. 
Because of the iaf1uence of the landed geatry, the British govern-
ment sent a relief expedition consistiDg of seven regiments of troops and an 
additioR81 group of fifty hands were hired at the request of Boycott. Thus, 
SHarry W. Laidler, Bonott, and the Labor Struggle, 23-26. 
6 
the orop was harvested at a oost I18ny times in excess of the actual cash 
. 
vslue. 
To aid the cause, local storekeepers vere enlisted in su~rt ot 
the peasants. For e:xample, vhen Mrs. Bo)"Cott veDt into tow to purchase 
bread, the storekeeoer refused to make the sale because the people could not 
stand that "baste of a husbaDd of hers aay longer." 9 Thus the early devel-
opment of aidiDg the principles engaged in the controversy through secondar,r 
souroes (the local storekeepers) can be readily seeD. 
It is interesting to note that only the influence of an Irish 
nriest, Father JOM O'Malley, kept Ca;:>t&1n Boycott trom death at the hands 
of the peasants. Father OIMally managed to coDceal Boycott at his perish 
10 
until the necessary arrangements were made to secretly remove the latter. 
James Red'P8th and the same Father 0'*1ley are credited with being 
the first to use ftbo)"Cott" as a descriptive term. 11 While the two were in 
e horse and carriage duriDg the year 1880, Father O'Malley, in casual conver-
sation, mentioned that social ostraciSll, as a'P1)lied to a ltuld-grabber, was 
not a fitting descriotive nhrase. He supposedly stated that the action taken 
against land-grabbers should be called a ftbo)"Cott." Thus, a word was~oined 
that has since become famous in labor annals, although originally intended 
to apply to the land-ovning groU1'. 
9 Arthur D. Vinton, Magazine of Western Histon, 214. 
10 Ibid, 215. 
11 ~, 215-16. 
• 7 
Redpath appears to be the first p~r80~ to use "boycott" as a noUB 
in vriti~g. He deseribed the use thereof as follows. 
It a landgrabber comes to town and wnts to sell a!l7thing, don't 
do him any bodUy harm. If you see a landgrahber going to a shop 
to buy- bread, or clothing, or eyen whiskey, go you to the shop-
keeper at o~ce, do~'t threaten him - J.st 8ay to him that under 
British law he has the undoubted right to sell his goods to any-
one, but that there is DO British law to compel you to buy 
another penny's worth from him, a~d that ;rou vill Myer do it as 
lo~g as you liye. 12 
The famous Panell gaye similar sdyice to other groups duri.J1g the same his-
torical period. 13 
The mechanics of the boycott vere simple. The so-called obnoxious 
perso~ weB placed under a ba~ and sel"'Y8Jlts and other types of laborers refused 
to toil for the guilty person. He couldn't get liyery serYices, herders nor 
blacksmiths. Cattle and other types of stock vere sometimes driYen from his 
land. Another aid to the boycott proper took shape in the form of threaten-
ing and abusiye letters making lite miserable and intolerable for the land-
owner, sometimes requiring legal protection. Police can often dispel Yiolence 
but they obviously caBot farm the land. 14 
Shortly after the dispute with Captain Boycott, the weapon W88 used 
by the Irish tend League and it 1188 contemplated that there would be diffi-
culty in controlling this tactic. 15 
12 1!d4, 213. 
13 Richard Barry O'Brien, Life of Parnell, Londo~, 1899, 236-37. 
14 "'l'he Genesis of Boycotting", The Nation, XXXI, 4.37-.3S. 
15 nid., 438. 
• 8 
In ISS5, on the American scene, the first reports are available 
concerning secondary boycotts after the origin of the term. M8~ concerns 
doing business with the New York Tribune were boycotted during the year to 
force them to desist from advertising in the Tribune. Amongst those concern. 
boycotted were Rogers, Feet and Compall1, R. H. Macy and Compa~, the Royal 
Baking Powder Compe~ and many others too numerous to mention. In Pittsburgh, 
the boycott took an opposite tura when sundry newspapers were boycotted for 
publishing advertisements of J. Keutmsn and Brothers, with whom the union 
had a dispute. The Fifth Avenue Hotel was boycotted when disinterested third 
persons were waylaid and re'4uested to go elsewhere at the penalty of belag 
boycotted in their various businesses. Ia addition, circulars were allO 
distributed. 16 
The primary boycott has been permitted whereas the secondary bo)r-
cott has been restrained and declared illegal by courts. Often the distinc-
tion betweea the two is difficult. Essentially, the primary boycott ia 
directed against the employer with whom the union has a dispute whereas the 
secondary boycott is used against companies who engage in commerce with the 
primary elIl'Ployer. For the sake of clarity and common understanding, it is 
noW' Decesaary to define a secondary boycott. Charles O. Gregory has stated 
that, "A secondary boycott occurs when a group of e.'Ployees refuse to remain 
at work for an employer, DOt because of any complaint o'\'er their standards 
16 Ihe NatioD, XXIV, December 24, lSS5, 526-27. 
9 
under him but bee.uee he persists in d.elin~with a third person against 
'!r1hom they have some grievance." 17 Millis and Montgomery have said that, 
"The primery or ai-tlmle boycott is one in which the aggrieved party resolves 
not to patronize a firm or firms or its product and appeals to its triends 
to withhold their patronage. The usuel boycott is one in which, in addition 
t.o the above, coercion, loss of bus:J,nes8, etc., are resorted to or threatened 
to cause third ~rties to sever business relations." IS Websters Inter-
national Dictionary (2nd Edition, Unabridged) t defines s secondary boycott 
es, "'l'he boycott of (t.) by an orgea:Jsed group (8) to compel a third perty 
(C) to abstain trom doing II! thing for which (A) has no direct responsibility." 
Seli~n ssys, ttA boycott in labor disputes may be defined as a combination 
of workmen to cease all dealings with another, an employer or, at times, a 
fellow worker, and, ususlly, also to induce or coerce third parties to cease 
such dealings, the purpose being to persuade or force such others to comply 
with 80me demand or to punish him for non-comnliance in the past." 19 
Wolun calls 8 secondary boycott, Ita combination to ",ithdraw pstronage tro. 
a nerson in order to force that person in turn to withdraw petronage from a 
person or firm with who1l the union was primerily at odds." 20 Rothenberg 
17 Charles O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, New York, 1946, 120. 
IS Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Organized Labor, III, 
New York, 1945, 5g3. 
440. 
19 Edwin R. A. Seligman, Princiu1es of Economic!, New York, 1929, 
20 teo Wolman, The ~!tt in American Trade Unio.", 14. 
10 
eta tes that a secondary boycott is "a movement by which an individuel or 
group or persons seeks to compel an ellU'>loyer to whom they mayor may not stand 
in the proximate relationship ot employees, to accede to their demands in 
matters affecting or arising from. the reciprocal relations or dealings 
between the employer, employees and demandants by seeking to induce persons 
dsaling with the employer to discontinue their commerce with him." 21 Miny 
times, the secondary boycott is similar to other industrial weapons used by 
labor organizations, such ae the sym:path)r strike. There isn't any olear 
distinction between a syDlpStby strike and a secondary boycott when there ~s 
a sympathy strike being conducted against an employer having no direct 
interest in the dispute and a secondary boycott prosecllted by pickets who 
are not ellployees of the primary employer. 
Miny secondary boycotts are waged by picketing. Under such con-
ditions, one can disoover human picket lines, sometimes public rallies, an 
occasional meeting, many sips, posters and other siJRilar devices being used. 
Should a group ot employees walk out against an employer being picketed to 
a Id another laboring group, this would be correctly termed a sym:pa thy str i'<e. 
Thus, it becomes important to correctly derine the exact type of union 
pressure being invoked. 
Boycotts, in early Allerioan history, appear to be e device used as 
B supplement to strikes who success were in doubt. In 1809, a cordwainers 




strike in New York W58 precipitated by employers who attempted to have their 
goods manufactured in other shops and consequently there were many strikes 
instigated by the employees of other employers who had refused to oerform 
serTice. upon the "unfair" good •• 22 In Philadelphia, during the year 1827, 
the tailors called a strike, causing the master tsilors to subcontract their 
work to others. In sheer desperation, the strikers managed to persuade the 
employees of other master tailors to reruse to perform any services upon the 
orders received from "unfair" firms. 23 The journeymen stonecutters of 
New York in la30 imposed a boycott upon convict-cut stone when they refused 
to work upon such material. 24 A boycott was used against the master batters 
of Baltimore in the year 1833 because of a cut in wages, although this was a 
pr~~ry boycott imposed upon a particular commodity. 25 
Prior to the year lS80, the use of the boycott was snoradie and of 
minute importance. The first concentration 8a an effective wesnon of labor 
was under the sponsorship of the Knights of Labor. 26 From 1880, the 
popularity of the weapon greW' by leaps and bounds because of many neW' labor 
ga ins. First, there was solidarity within the Knights of Labor so the.t the 
22 Leo Wolman, The Bgycott in Amerioan Trade UnioW!, 43-72. 
23 "Third Annual Report of the United states Commissioner of Labor" 
House Executive Dooument" IIIII, 10. 1, Part 5, 50th Oongress, 1st Session, 
1122. 
24 New York Sentinel and Workins!!n's !d~ocate, July 3, lS30, 3. 
2~ J. R. Commons, H. L. Summer and others, Dooumentary History of 
Amerioan Industrial Sooiety, VI, Cleveland, 1910, 100. 
26 Leo Wolman, The Borcott in American Trade Unionl, 24. 
.. 12 
boycott could be applied extensiTely and by' a large group. On a semi-
political leTel, within the various unions, leaders were hesitant to call a 
strike since dues eollected froll members bad to be 1lsed to support a strike 
which vas distasteful to the rank and f'Ue. Then again, 8 boycott was 
becoming simple to administer because of the growing urbanization. In 
addition, there vas an increasing division of' labor making it easier for 
employers to replace strikers - semi-skilled and unskilled workers could be 
emoloyed as skilled hands were no longer in such grest need. Thus, through 
lack of' choice, the boycott was brought to the front 8S an eff'ectivs weapon. 
On the dramatic plane, attention was drawn to the power wielded by labor 
through solidarity by disclosing the effectiveness or the boycott. And last 
but not least, the cost of a boycott was negligible in comparison to a 
strike. 
During the year 1880, boycotts were called by local organivations 
belonging to the Knights of tabor. 27 Recognizing the power of such an 
industrial weapon, the Knights of' tabor convened in t~e year lS85, and adopted 
two rulee granting local, district and state assemblies the right to initiate 
boycotts that did not .trect other areas. If other localities vere affected, 
tha Executive Board of the Knights of Labor could initiate the boycott. In 
the year U~~7 the r.nights of Labor established e. separate entity within its 
framework to exclusively develop matters concerning the boycott. Although 
27 ~, 27-2A. 
13 
• 
no tangible written proof oan be found, the ~nights probably employed the 
boycott 8S their principle m.eans of Aggression. 
The New York Bureau of Labor statistics recorded 1,352 bo,ycotts 
between the years lSSS to 1892. 28 It appears that most of these boycotts 
were called by the Knights of Labor with a high degree of success. 
From 1892 to 1900, the Knights ot Labor, aa an orgenizetion, lost 
muoh of its power and as a result the use of the boycott wanot as extensive. 
After 1892, organized labor had obtained a substantial following and fou:rd 
it necessary to wield the weapon with caution as oourts were generally 
enjoining its use. Although the boyoott was not used as frequently against 
the usual adversaries, a new foe had arisen and boycotts were im:posed upon 
products made by trade unions affiliated with the American Federation ot 
Labor. Here, we find the forerunner of the present day jurisdictional 
dispute. Thus, the Knights of Labor, h lSSS, boycotted the Fuller, Warren 
Stove Company because the employees belonged to the Iron Molders t Union. A 
dispute al.o arose between the Knights and the Cigar Makers International 
Union in l8~ when the Knights ordered all cigar makers who were members of 
the Knights of Labor to withdraw from the Cigar Maker' 8 Union. 30 After the 
order, the Cigar Maker's Union boycotted the cigars bearing the label of the 
Knights of Labor and the Knights retaliated by boycotting the cigars which 
28 :the Rev Larned Hilton, II, 1109-1112. 
29 teo Wolman, The Boycott i9 American Trade UniOnS, 29-30. 
30 E. R. S,edden, "The Trade Union Label", John Hopkins University 
Studies, II, sere XXVIII, no. 2, 17-19. 
.. 14 
bore the label of the Cigar Makers. When 8 elothing firm in 1896 replaced 
cutters belonging to the Knights of r~bor with members of the Garment Workers 
Union, the Knights of Labor imposed a boycott upon the J'l"oducts manufactured 
by the clothing concern. 31 When the Brewery Workmen's Union boycotted a 
Roohester brewery because the company employed members of the Knights of 
tabor, the Knights, in 1887, boycotted those breweries employing members of' 
the Brewery Workmen's Union. 32 
The boycott vas made use of in the railroad industry during the 
years 1885 to 1895. 33 In le85, the Knights of Labor refused to move any of 
the rolling stock belonging to the Union Pacific. In 1894, during the 
famous strike of the American Railway Union, Dehs, the leader, was imprisoned. 
The union vas an organization consisting of all branches of employees in 
the railway service. "hen the employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company 
went on strike, the American Railway Union supported the strike, liind ordered 
all of its members not to york upon any train where & Pullman car waa 
attached. Soon, strikes arose in other companies because of contracts to 
haul Pullman trains. When Debs was imprisoned, the union was shortly there-
sfter dissolved and the railroad boycott became an inconspicuous weapon. 
From 19S1 to 1890, the Am~rican Federation of Labor played a minor 
31 Journal of Knights of lAbor, April 9, 1896, 2. 
32 Ibid, April 29, 1887. 
33 Leo Wolman, The Boycott in American Trade unions, 32-33. 
.. 15 
role in the use of the boycott. 34 Arter 1890, the AFt spearheaded the 
drive that forced the Knights of Labor into oblivion using the boycott as 
a principle means ot aggression. With the virtual disappearance ot the 
Knights ot tabor in lA95, the boycott was seldom used. The AFT .. was now e 
major influence and WI'! extremely conservative :1.n the use of the boycott. 
In tact, the Executive Council of the AFt during the 1995 convention, noted 
the shortcomings of the boycott. 35 The AF14 foresaw a marked loss in the 
effectiveness of the boycott if it remained uncontrolled because of the 
incressed onDosition to the lIse thereof by the (Jublie and adverse court 
decisions. 
strike statistics available in the United states betysen lSSl and 
1905 disclose en lncrease in the total number of strikes during thi.s period 
but a slower increase in pronortion to the growth of industry in general. 36 
As the boycott is often an auxiliary weapon to tht" etri.ke, it can. be assumed 
that the use of the boycott increased when the number of strikes increased. 
From the data available, severel conclllsi.on!'! et'.n be drE!'t:Tn with 
reference to the historical Bsnects of the boycott. Where unions 9rperienced 
difficulty :In gaining new memhl'!rs or ",here e wst supply of non-un1on lebor 
34 ~, 33-35. 
35 Proeeedings of the Fourteenth Annual Convention, 1~4, 25. 
36 "The statistical Aspect of the Strike," Bureau of Labor Statis-
tic •• 'l'velfth Report, Wisconsin, 1905-1906, 75. 
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is available and a strike is called, the boyc:ott vas also used. With the 
inability of unions to regulate conditions conoerning the employees ot 
manufacturers, the boycott was applied to prevent the sale ot the product. 
The boyoott historically emerged when the organiUition of the labor toroe 
was difficult and wben the breaking of a strike woe s1mole. 
CBAP!.ER II 
AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EVALUATION OF 'l'HE BOYCOft 
The boycott, as conducted by organised labor, bas been practised 
almost exclusi'Yely in the United States. A study of the boycott in Germany 
disclosed that it vas JIlOst frequently used tor political pUl'J)Oses. 'or 
example, inns were boycotted because rooms were refused tor meetings to the 
Social DeDlOcratic party. In England and Switzerland "unfair lists" were 
published in labor disputes. 1 A1thoUCh there are instanc •• ot secondary 
boycotts in Europe, the weapon became an American institutioD because .r the 
frequent UN b7 labor. Due to iJImIature union leadership, indi'Yidualistic 
peoples, and ada.nt emplG)"ers, one can understand wbT the boycott became 8 
l'8rt ot the American heritage. Matur1t,', in labor relations, was and is tar 
more e'Yident upon the continent than here. 
A. Qhara9ter~,t19s ot the S,oondaa Boyoott 
"!'he bo7cott was seldom used in the United States in such channels 
ot industry 8s engineering, iron 1I8nutaoturing or in tho •• trade. which 
ohiefly concerned themsel ... e. with oontacts and were not tor the general or 
1 teo Wol1lan, Tht Bono," ia Amtrioan Trad, tlptoH, 41. 
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retail market. According to available evide~ce, most of the boycotts were 
practised in the fields ot mass consumption. And since the boycott could 
only be eftectively used where large populations gathered, most ot the 
action occurred in the highly industrialized areas. During the year 188S, 
one hundred and ninety-six bO,yootts were recorded ot which the state of New 
York alone had t1fty-nine. 2 '!'he boycott is definitely an urban character-
istic. 
To be etfective, the working population must be well organized 
(except when used tor organiza tiona 1 purposes), numerous, and a s already 
indicated, highly localized. Where the laboring community is a closely knit 
intimate assembly, the boycott is waged by collective efforts motivated by 
a colleotive conscience. ot course, this is an ideal situation and such 
homogeneity ot purpose is seldom attained. Where labor is scattered, the 
secondary boycott is characterized by weak individual eftort and is seldom 
successful. For example, mining towns contain a large peroentage of organized 
labor composed ot people in close contact with one another. One can see such 
solidarity by noting the strong demand tor products with union labels. Here, 
a secondary boyoott would be successful. 3 
To etfectively promote the secondary boyoott, unions, in many 
instanoes, will appeal to specialized groups tor their aid. In 1895, in a 
2 John Burnett, "The Boycott as an Element in Trade Disputes", 
tconoll!c Journal I, 1894, 163-173. 
3 Aaerican Federationist, June, 1900, 172. 
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dispute il'lVol..,ing the Rand-Mc1lall,. Printing Qom.p8.D7, the union concerned 
discovered that the largest -purchasing class of the com.pany's products vere 
public officials and educational institutions. 4 A bo,ycott appealing to 
the public appeared to be useless, thus foroing the union officials to exert 
pressure upon the political organizations who had the necessary influence or 
were doing business with Band-McNal1.7. Upon occ.sion, the labor movement 
will seek the aid of organised farmers a. great service CBn be rendered 
against such firms as the International Harvester C0Jll,)8221 who manufacture 
farm. implements. When a boycott was deolared against the Studebaker Manuf'ac-
turing Company, engaged in esseablillg wagons used on tarms, it VIlS suggested 
that farmers could aid br demanding tair wages for those empleyed br the 
compliD7. 5 foday, the appeal br unions would possibq be _t with resut-
ance. 
The intonatioD cited leads to the conclusion that bo7Cotts, in 
general, are ItOst etteoti..,e when a lar,a portion ot the products produced br 
the primary or secondary e.ployer are consumed b.r communities ot labarer. 
and where there are lar,a special groups ot CODtJWIft1"8 vho teel that labor caD 
bring eftecti",e nre.sure ot a political or econoaio na ture lIpOll thea. 
A further 8aaqsis of the character of the market i. neces_17 to 
explain when the bo7cott can be used sucoes.tully. It the market or 
4 l.l'!W, June, 1895, 64. 
s ~,June, 1895, 63. 
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consumers consist primarily of union people and s,ympathisers, the secondary 
boycott has a grellter chance of success. Thus merchandisers selling bread, 
newspapers, hats, cigars, beer, clothing and other necessities and 108X-
pens i.e lururies to the public ha.e been frequently and effectiTely 
boycotted. 6 Commodities primarily sold to the upper middle classes and the 
higher income echelon ere generally ~ssed because there can be little 
sympathy for others unless the action taken has publicity or is considered a 
soc ial duty. 
Another market characteristic to be considered is whether the 
article is purchased by the male or the female member of a household.. It 
has been said that women, being closer to the home and not directly engaged 
in the business world, would not have as great emotional solidarity as that 
found among lIS les who are "in the same boll t." 7 The proof of this theor.y 
would be difficult as many more women today, even those married, are supple-
menting family income in the business area and education is accorded in 
almost equal doses to both sexes, which was not in eTidence in earlier years. 
Another element to consider is the frequency and regularity with 
whioh the unfa 1r articles are consumed. If an article ot popular consumption 
enters into daily conversation, there wUl soon emerge a strong support by 
the general "public for the union cause, since the oonsumers are generally 
6 Harry W. Laidler, Boycotts and the Labor Struc«le, 160. 
7 lh!!I!, 161. 
21 
.. 
people in the S8me economic status and recep~ive to pleae froa unions. 8 
The monopolistic characteristic of the unfair product i. another 
element to be accounted for as part of the market analysis. If there is 
difticulty in obtaining a duplicate of the article made or lll8rketed by the 
primary or secondary employer, it becomes difficult to appeal to the sympathy 
of the general public, especially if the article is a necessity. 9 
An additional aspect is the packaging and distinguishing features 
of the article in question. If a product does not carry the name or brand 
of the organization with which the union bas the primary dispute, it beoomes 
more difficult to trace the goods and obtain public sym.pattv. For exslllple, 
should a union have 8 dispute with the 'Whirlpool Oompany, manufaoturers of 
washing machinss, secondary pioketing of the Sears~oebuok stores, who carry 
the Whirlpool washer under the S88rs~oebuok trade name ot Kenmore, might be 
ineftective. 
The final market oharacteristic indicated herein concerns the type 
of eompetitive products. If there are two producers of the 88me item, one 
made by the unfair enrployer with whom there is a labor dispute and the other, 
tor example, by prison labor, the general public many be reluctant to purchese 
the alternate product made by the prisoners. Here again, -prioe is an 
important f'ector. Prison-m.ade products, today, are of' little importance and 
g Nev York Bu1"!!U of' Statistics of Labor, Third Annual Report, 
1~~5, 334. 
9 Harry W. Laidler, Boxcotts and the Labor Struggle, 163. 
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hence there is little necessity to explore $he problem further and the 
example was only intended to indicate that an acoeptable substitute must be 
offered to the publio before the boyoott will have a possibility of succeS8. 
otherwise, the public may oontinue to purohase the boyootted article. 
There are many other factors to be reckoned with when oonsidering 
the use of a seoondary boycott. First, the union must be strong. As a 
tactical problem, the union leader must oonsider his strength as compared 
with the opponent as does any professional soldier. As an example, witness 
the success of secondary boyootts oonducted by the powerful building trades 
10 
unions upon items not sold directly to the masses of working people. 
Here, suocess can only be aohieved if the union is powerful 8S the products 
involved are not directly consumed b.Y the general public. Then, the union 
leader must oonsider the sympathies of the secondary employer. It, for 
example, the secondary boyoott is being conducted against the use of child 
labor, the neutral employer would have to capitulate more quickly to union 
demands because the s,ympathy of the public would lie with the union. Should 
the boycott be conducted for e reduction in working hours trom eight to five 
a day, the secondary employer will find public opinion against the union 
goal and he will tend to hold out longer before acoeding to the demands made 
~ organized labor. Another item to consider is the general business condi-
tions at the time the secondary' action is being contemplated. If there is a 
10 n14, 161. 
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ready or expanding market, the secondary emplO1er is not conoerned with one 
eustomer and seeks to pro~uoe and sell as much as possible. Thus, he WIlnta 
no union interference and is more psychologically ready to comply with 
union demands. If business is bad and there is no ready market for his 
product, the neutral employer can financially afford to wait longer before 
capitulating to union demands. Another factor is whether there is favorable 
pnblieity for the secondary boycott. Using child labor again as an example, 
newepapers, radio end television, even though generally prejudiced in favor 
of employers and nrosnective advertisors, would be more sympethetic :In the 
reporting. The attitude of courts and legislators is an imnortant element 
and this problem vi11 be more thoroughly reviewed in later,ohapters. Then, 
the longer a boycott lasts, the less possibility there is for success. 11 
After a lengthy period of time has elapsed, sUpporters become lukeWllrm. 
especially if there i. a personal inconvenience attached to the union aotion. 
The last faotor oonsidered concerns the strength of employers assooiations. 
For eXEmple, the stove Founder's National Defense Association agreed that, 
amongst its member:!, !lOne would give employment to another member of • union 
originating 8 boyoott. 12 There ere also other means and methode available 
to capital to control the devestating effects of boycotts. 
Hbtoriea1ly, unions were weak and the threat of or an actual 
11 Ibid, 165. 
12 Leo Wolman, The Boyoott in Ameriean 'I'rRde Unions, 39. 
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strike failed to disturb the serenity of manY. an enrployer. If a strike vas 
called, it was generally 8 simple problem to replace the strikers with new 
employees,. Slowly, labor organizations realized that they had utterly 
neglected to use their 'Powers 8S consumers and the effect of pressure upon 
persons and industry not direotly involved in the dispute. The burden of 
calling a strike to improve legitimate working conditions is p~chologically 
and tactually placed in the hands of labor. Thus, all public repercussion 
snd rancor will be let loose upon union organizations, though nossibly not 
at fault. If pr:lmery boycotts are resorted t.o, the employers' profits can 
usually be reduced without publlc resentment against unions. The secondary 
boycott involves the same form of' argument, although in all probability, 
there will be greater resentment than that found when 8 union conducts a 
prim&ry boycott. 
Organized labor, 813 any other type of' enterprise, ieI cognizant of' 
cost. In comparison to 8 strike, which otten involves union membership sub-
sidy and loss of' dues, the boycott is 8n inexnensive weanon, having 8S good 
or better en ef'f'ect than the strike. During en economic crisis, il"respectlve 
of' the cost, the boycott is a better choice than a strike since unions are 
generally less T)owerf'ul than during periods ot economic prosperity and the 
employees will not have fear of' the loss of' their jobs should the boycott 
tail. MAny Atrikes faU because neither the union nor its members can atford 
to continue a lengthy period of unemployment or possibly could not even 
financially afford the initial monetary outlay to promote the strike. In a 
boycott, the union members oontinue to work ~nd the union 'has le8s expense 
and les8 antagonism from the rank and file union member. Today, under the 
Taft-Hartley, there are speoific circumstances under whioh the union would 
be guilty of an unfair labor praotice should +trike or bo;ycott be u8ed. 
orten, the advice ot legal cOUDsel will guide a union in the determination 
of whether to use a strike or boycott, the salient feature being which tactic 
would pOssibly be permissable under the federal law. There are also many 
state lavs to consider in the deoision as to when to boycott or when to use 
8 strike. 
B. The Ne,d tor the Stgondsty Boycott 
Most industry is oonducted beoau.e ot 8 soo1.81 need, real or stim-
ulated by advertisement. 'When persons supplying such demands violate • 
social lav having greater importance than the manufactured article, then, 
upon occasion, the demand ceases and society attempts to put the ottender in 
place. Thus, the public is a partially etfective damper upon offensive or 
greedy organizations. 13 The boycott, primary or secondary, in such 
instances, has an eduoational aspect, acquainting people vith the issues or 
the infringement of rights. The seoondary boycott, in most instanoe., must 
be carefully used as an advertising medium because the press general1:r 
advances the employer's position and the faots vill be portra:red sympatheti-
453. 
13 "Boycotts", Illinois Bureau ot §tat18tiol of Labor, 1886, 446-
cally to picture the invasion of the rights of an innocent neutral employer, 
not a party to the dispute, who has been greatly wronged. 
The seconda17 boycott is essentially the same as the blacklist which 
had been used b,y employers to keep union men or women from securing renum-
erative employment with other business concerns than that which the union 
had a dispute with. 14 Although the blaCklist is of little ilIportanee today, 
it va s onee an employers weapon to be reckoned with and superior to the 
seeondary boycott because at its secrecy, whereas the boyeott is more or lellls 
dependent upon favorable publio opinion. Furthermore, although the secondary 
boycott may be malielous in t~t the union is seeking revenge for a real or 
fancied wrong, experience, as indicated in legal decisions, has found such a 
motive exceptional. Not seldom, the objective 1s a legitimate labor achieve-
ment, although the means used, the secondary action,mB.Y be Ulegal. WMn 
the employer uses the blacklist, the purpose is to drive the worker out of 
industry as a lesson to the individual or more often as an e.mple to other 
workmen. 'The element of malice is perhsns more prevalent in the blacklist 
than in the secondary boycott. 
Many studies have advanced the theory that when nevspapers were 
few and the coverage given to labors point of view scant, the use of pickets, 
primary or secondary, served a usefulourpose by informing the public that 
there was a dispute, maintained group morale and aided strikers in keeping 
14 Millis and Montgomery, Organized Labor, Vol. III, 596. 
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their jobs.' 15 It is currently argued that Qoverage by newspapers, radios 
and t$levision are today unbiased and fair to labor making the use of picket-
ing an obsolete labor maneuver, especially where the action 1s secondary_ 
A recent investigation, conducted b,y the Federal Communications Commission 
for almost four years, disclosed great room for doubt as to the unbiased 
reporting b.Y the advertising media. 16 When a radio license is issued, there 
ere anecitic stirmlations made, one being the im-oert1el preserrtatlon of news. 
The lete G. A. R.ichards, who died several weeks before the Oommission render-
ad a decision concerning the revocation of his radio licenses, owned three 
50,000 wett stations in 1.08 Angeles, o 1 eve land and Detroit. 01ete Roberts, 
8 news commentator, W8S appointed head of the KMPO newsroom in Los Angeles 
in 1947 and was subsequently fired because he had stated that Ganersl Douglas 
MacArthur had a tremor in his hands at a time when the General was being 
boomed as a presidential candidate. A charge was brought by Roberts that 
Richards had always issued instructions to slant and distort the news in order 
to 'Oromote his tl-riwte views. Evidence disclosed that Richerds once wrote to 
one of his station managers that the 010 vas 8 menace to society. Should 
there be a depress ion or a gree t change in noli t1ca 1 ph ilosonhy , there is 8 
strong possibil1,ty that unions vill be even more unfairly blasted by a large 
15 ~rerman Feldman and Harry P. Bell, "Picketing: Its Use and Abuse" 
Annals of the American AcademY Vol. 248, November, 1946, 97-109. 
16 Edmund Lawrence, "Radio and the Richards Case", H!tper l , Mae-
.!!D!, July, lQ'52, ~2-ff7. 
segment of the agencies pruveying -unbiased" ,news. Under such conditions, 
only time viII tell whether the secondary boycott should be outlawed as 
being an obsolete tactic and no longer necessary to the welfare of unions. 
g. M!lterial or Cg1Dlllodik §ecop.dan Action! 
Secondary ~ycotts can be classifed as material or commodity 
actions. The essential difference between boycotts on materials And that on 
commodities is that the tormer can be used effectively by organh;ed labor 
whereas the latter is essentially an 8~peal to heterogenoue as~emblies of 
consumers. 17 The salient ehlinctfllristie of the boycott on materials is its 
appeal to unions, the 'Purpose being the organized disa'Ooroval of certain 
implements and materiels with which men and women work, supposedly constitu-
ting a menace to the weltare ot 1a bor. Here, union men vUl refuse to use, 
handle, or work uoon unfair material",. For example, those enmloyed in the 
construction industry will frequently refuse to install certain articles 
menufaetured by non-union shops. The boycott, in such an instance, helns to 
proTide 'Work for union members or Is in synroathy with fellow workmen. His-
torically, the material boyoott manitested itself in such fields of commeroe 
88 prieon-lIIflde goods, goods or tasks made or finished by new Dl8ch1nery and 
in embargos unon products made by oo~titive unions or imported from foreign 
17 teo Wolman, The BOIcott in American Trade nnio»~, 73-74. 
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countries. 18 The boycott on commoditie. is-applied when the articl. is 
ready for consumption by the general public and is not intended for further 
producti .... us.. As a practical matter, mst of the latter VPe boycotts 
until the ArL-CIO schism, were of little importance since law8 w.re passed 
regulating the use and sale of prison-made products; the strength of unions 
aud education has, in mluJ;Y instances, disclosed a more liberal attitude 
toward the adoption ot Jl8chinery; and the growth ot the national union has 
done away. to some degre., with boundar,- lines when -.terial is transported 
from another localit,y. 
However, not all of the material boycotts can be traced to these 
sources. Frequently, union mUlbers will boycott articles -.nutactured by 
workmen recei ... ing low wages and who are unorsanized. In New York Cit7, 
oarpenters employed in the building trade industry are complete orsanized 
and ususlly vell-peld and protected. The woodwork shops, on the other band, 
until recentl,.. vere tar trom being completel,. unionized. If a general 
oontraotor purchased doors and window trames trom a non-union mill, the 
building trade union ofticials would not1t,y the contractor that the non-
union product would not be installed. Because of union strength and the 
general vork-together poliC7, the contractors would capitulate to union 
demands. The woodwork mill can onl;y preserve its established market by 
18 lk1a, 44-47. 
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employing union help and the general contractor fac •• business diffioulties 
should he resist the union. The carpenters union, oould show that the non-
union mill, by operating on lower than union standards, presented a contin-
uous competitive haurd to unionized woodwork IlUls snd employees directly 
engaged in the building trades beoause of a wage ditterentisl, fringe 
benefit., hours, etc. In most instances, wages and benetits al';"e less in the 
unorganized shops than tho.e which are unionized. The union then concludes 
that the contraotor who purchases non-union trim profits by supporting sub-
union labor standards. A further economic interest is indicated since ma!l7 
of' the older carpenters vill seek employment in the woodwork shops for suoh 
rea sons a s less travel, vea ther, year round employment, eto. These rea sons 
are frequently cited by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners to 
justifY seoondary action. 19 
It is only fair to note that the building trades unions have used 
material boycotts for such diversified reasons as a display ot power, union 
expansion and a tear ot competitive organiutions. For example, the pre-
fabricated home which is made piecemeal in a factory and shipped and 
assembled at the construction site, presents a probln ot loss ot work tor 
the established AP'L building trades unions and a shift in power, in some 
instances, to another competitive union. By politically controlling buUd-
ing codes, the use of prefabricated homes has been stopped in many large 
19 Charles O. Gregory, tabor and the Law, 123. 
cities where the need for housing remains acute. ot course, local builders 
seeking to keep competition outot the market aid the unions in their 
etrorts. In Chicago, dry-wal1 construction is limited and the plastered 
wall remains in use though the former process is successtully used throu,hout 
other perts ot the United States, including suburbs of Chicago. Thul, the 
union is able to keep its members employed and another competitive or~ni-
zation is k.,t from gaining power and membership. 
Unions sometime. request other labor or~nizations to use the 
ID8terial boycott. The International Cooper. Union requested the Painters 
and Decorators Union and typographical Union to bar the use ot paint., oila 
and inks contained in non-union barrels. 20 The Metal Polishers Union in 
1911 requested the American Federation ot MUsicians to ule instruments 
bearing the union label. 21 The Textile Workers of Deuville, Virginia, 
requested unionized garment vorkers in overall and shirt factories to boycott 
the products ot an unfah- southern Dd11. 22 However, allot these request. 
vere disregarded and it appears that the boycott only flourishes between 
unions whose work 1s more or less intimately connected, such as in the con-
struction trad'., or if the other union will be in a similar position to 
20 tzoeeedings ot the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the A. F .. 
ot L., 1899, 99. 
21 the JourMl (Metal Polishers), NOTober, 1911, 17. 






extend suoh aid at a later date. 23 
D. The Community of Interest Between the Primary and Seoondary Emplmr 
-
Another probleM to eonsider in evaluating the use of the boyeott 
is the eommunity of interest between the prineipal and seoondary employer. 
It should be noted that the fortheoming discussion is one of economics and 
legal detinition and precedent is not being weighed. In the examples cited 
below, oourts would possibly not find a sufficient relationship and degree 
of oontrol between the primary and so-called neutral employers so ttet a 
secondary boycott eould not be justified. 
The Allis-Chalmers foundry, in an attempt to dereat a strike called 
by its molders, subcontracted many molding jobs to different roundries in 
the Middle West. Employees or the subcontractors, members or the same inter-
national union to which the strikers belonged, retused to 'Work on any of the 
items sublet by the Allie-Chalmers Company. It has been argued that the 
action ot the union should not be classified as a typical secondary boycott 
because there is a real community or interest since the labor standards 
adopted by' the 'Drincipal employer was being promoted by' the subcontractors. 24 
Furthermore, the subcontractors become primary employers in the dispute by' 
23 Leo Wolman, The Boycott in American Trade Unions, 57. 
24 Charles O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, 125. 
completing the molding jobs. An organization as large 8S Allls-Chalmers, in 
its negotlations, tends to aftect the wages of others in the same indust1'7 
employed by other concerns. 
A similar situation might exist when a large non-union printing 
establishment such as the Donnelly Printing Company' in Chicago would seek 
the aid ot unionized oompetitors in completing contracts during the seasonal 
peaks. It the union ordered its members in unionized shops not to complete 
the work sublet by Donnelly's, one could present a valid argument tor the 
justification of a boycott. Donnelly has, for many years, avoided unioniza-
tion by many means although meny people employed are union members. There 
is an obvious threat to the veIl-being of all union printing members should 
an organized shop accept contracts from Donnelly_ During -periods ot 
depression, with work being scaro. and unemployment high, there is a definite 
corollation between the amount of work let to non-unionized shops, increased 
because of substandard employment conditions, and the number ot unemployed or 
part-time workers in the union plant. 
E. C09pm~3-on Between UnioR' 
Another category ot secondary pressure ineluded in the realm of the 
secondary boycott is that action undertaken by labor-union councils. 2S The 
2S ,I2M, 127. 
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building trade. oounoils, such 8. found in Dc!inver, Colorado, oomposed ot all 
of the craft unions ordinarily engaged in the building industry, ino1uding 
brioklayers, e1eotrio fane, plumbers, painters. m.etal workers, etc., are a 
good example ot the labor-union oouncil. Although eaoh is genera11,. .. 
separate oraft entity, by agreem.ent, should the eleotrioians call a strike, 
the other assooiated orafts will not work if a strike is csl1ed or should 
non-union e1eotricians be employed. The tactic described 1s not the conven-
tional type of secondary boycott a8 the action called by the counoil i. 
sim.ilar to a aympath;y strike. Courts have prevented such action by union 
counoils on the theory that all of the unions composing the building trades 
councils he". no economic interest of their own to promote. In theory and 
in oractioe, there is a definite oommunity of interest between the oraft 
unions in the building trade. sinoe any .ing1e grouo may be in need of 
similar aid at a later date and are orten engaged in labor upon the same 
site. Today, it 1s true that most building trade unions are organized on fl 
craft basis but there is always a possibility that at a future date a reorgan-
bation may take p1aoe on an industrial basis. Suppose that a C.I.O. 
industrial union oontrolled the labor market in the building trades and the 
electrioians were in"ol"ed in 8 dispute 0"81" a legitimate labor ga in. Then, 
the dispute would involve all construction workers trresl'eotive of the 
partioular skill sinoe all would belong to the same union. Then, 8n1 boyoott 
action taken at the oonstruction site would be primary and hence permi.sable 
in various jurisdictione. 
For the sake of argument, assume th~t an electrioians strike was 
called to prevent the general contractor from installing electrical fixtures 
made b.r 8 non-unioD plant. Such action would, in most jurisdictions, be 
contrary to law or public policy_ Yet the interest of the building trades 
electricians to which the shop electrioians belong could justit,y the union', 
use of economic pressure. As long as unions in the building tndes remain 
associated along craft lines in councils, lt would be difficuit to legally 
justify the use of' II! boycott. Yet, using the industrial form of organization, 
the Bame type of union coercion ",ould be permissable as being primar:,y 
activity_ 
Eft The Labor Trend ape! the S.copdan Bonott 
An investigation of the trend of industrial disputes is necessary 
to f'ull.v explain the secondary boycott. During the years 1916 to 1921, an 
average of 105,625 persons annlJslly out of each million of our industrial 
wage earning nopulation either struck or was locked out by employers. From 
1926 to 1930, the number was reduced to ll,S4l ~er million persons. ?he 
explanation for the reduction 1s !imple - the prosperity betveen the years 
of 1923 to 1929 was accompanied by relative price stability and an increase 
in real wages. In addition, the 20's saw the emergence of 8 new and subtle 
form of industrial relations. For exsmple, witness the growth of company 
unions, old-age pension plans, stock ownership by employees, recreational 
aetiviM.es end many other such similar devices. During this decade, the 
labor movement itself was less aggressive. The direct organizational activity 
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of the Art had slowed down and unions, generally, were content to merely 
hold that which they had achieved. In fact, it apttesrs that prosperity and 
oompaDT progl"ams had robbed the labor movement of its emotloDfll1 appeal. On 
the opposite aide of the ledger, the 1920's disclosed a highly concentrated 
business drive gl"eatly enhancing the power of capital with relative 1e8S 
importance being attached to the labor movement. In addition, laws govern-
ing the various jurisdictions and the federal government were more favorable 
to capital and it became apparent that labor giants were necessary to or.n-
ize workmen in similar gigantiC structures. 26 The secondar)" boycott became 
necessary to permit unions to grow and equal the power wielded by industry. 
From 1930 to the effective reorganisation undertaken by the 
Roosevelt administration, both industry and labor suffered. The Norris-
LaGuardia and Wagner Acts greatly aided labor and the membership increased 
tremendously. ilJith the advent of the CIO, many of the basic industries and 
industrial giants were organized tor the first time. When World War II came, 
by necessity, labor difficulty was at a m1n1mUlll. There were so fev active 
labor disputes that they are hardly worth mentioning. Although John L. Lewi. 
and his coal miners were involved in one fracas which reoebed a great deal 
of unfavorable publicity, most of' the unions and their leaders cooperated. 
After the war, due to many factors, the truce between lebor and lMD8gemant 
26 H. M. Dot,., II The Trend of Industria 1 Disputes", J ollt'pal or tht 
berican Statisticsl Association, XlVII, June, 1932, 16g-172. 
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vas at an end and the secondary boycott vas used, in many instances, unwlse17. 
with the 1947 amendments to the Wagner Act, a new era in labor history had 
begtUl and the secondary boycotts were now prohibited as being an unfair 
praotice in industries effecting interstate commerce. MBn.y states passed 
similar and even more restrictive regulations. 
The necessity for labor legislation, including the regulation of 
secondary action, wes an indioation of the tremendous gains made by labor. 
Economioally, it became questionable if labor needed the use of such a tactic 
88 the secondary boycott. In most instances, it was argued, there appeared 
to be other means available to unions to achieve legitimate labor gains with 
greater social acceptability than secondary aotion. With faTOrable laws and 
fair administration, there appears, in most instances, little need for the 
unregulated secondary boyoott. However, should there be a less favorable 
administration and an economi.c crisis, it is possible that labor could again 
find itself in the 88me position it oooupied prior to the Wagner Aot. Under 
such conditions, there mray again be need to eqU61ize the power between labor 
and management and the secondary boycott would become sooially desirable to 
aid the union cause and generally inorease purchasing power. 
CRAP'l'D. III 
S1'A.TE A.NI> FEDERAL LAWS AND DECISIOlfS 
A. Inkoduetiop 
-
The change in sooial conduct during the past tev gefterations hal 
been great and became necessary 'because ot nUlHrous technologieal develop-
.ents. Although machiDe improvement WIle rapid and eOllstant, sooial dnel-
opment tended to be slover and ma~ communities were confronted with the 
neceseit)" ot formulating new rule. ot conduct. !here was and remelns a 
definite lag between teehnolo.,. and the .ocial scienoes. 
As a general prop.sition, .ociety-, as observed in world history, 
has been able to control the behavior ot its members 'h1 the tormation and 
develoDment ot informal regulations. The bod,.. of rule., otten called 
custom, has been large and the division between intormal regulation and the 
law has often been imperceptible. So rapid has the rate of change been 
during the past tev generstions that the communities have been unable to 
await the development of informal controls and customa as a method ot oon~ 
trolling hu.n behavior and business relations. Consequent17, an enormous 
development of tormalised legal codes became neeesaa1"1 whioh, in turn, 
inoreased the number ot court decisions and their influence. !he tirst halt 
38 
·)9 
ot the twentieth century bas been one ot the -great law-making periods iD 
history. The United States, being a young country by comparison with others, 
would naturally be in the forefront in the total sum of statutory regula-
tion. However, it is important to note a change from previous historical 
eras. Instead of laws developing from accepted custom, which is the usual 
procedure, many statutes were enacted before society had time to reach an 
opinion as to the necessity for control and the most acceptable mean8. The 
tield of labor law in general has been one specific area in which such 
hurried and irrational action is most evident. Earlier theory, generall,. 
tormulated by economists and accepted by the legal profession, was laisles 
taire, the thought being that the groups or individuals concerned would best 
provide for themselve8 and a strict Ithands-otp peli.". would achieve the best 
results. With union growth through the span ot years, the thought \188 that 
collective bargaining would provide the neoessary intormal regulation and 
control so that legislatures continued with the "hands-otP poli.".. A Tery 
important tactor often oTerlooked or ignored vas that collective bargaining 
could not develop a code of equality and moral jWltice untU the bargainers 
themselves had some standard criteria developed as a guide which in turn 
must become generally accentable in the community. 
Turning trom abstract thought, society, otten overlooked by the 
contestant8, has a definite interest in labor disputes and particularl,. in 
boycotts since the settlement of disputes i8 often at public expense. Thus, 
formalized control became necessar,y since adequate social controls in the 
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field of labor relations, and specifically of secondary oo)"Cotts, were neTer 
developed or eTen attempted in some instences. Although the general pulse 
today i~ one of informal regulation OTer labor difficulties b.f allowing the 
develo?Ment of collectiTe bargaining, bf necessity, many areas in labor must 
be controlled through legialation and court decisions. Since Americana are 
considered to be aD individualistic group, it is a paradox that such aversion 
to regulation necessitated the deYelop.ent of stronger controls, OTer such 
labor tactics as the boycott, then are found in le88 individualistic nations. 
By necessity, state and federal legislatures stepped into the arena early in 
American history and controls were attempted oyer many weapons used bf 
unions, amongst them being the secondary boycott. 
Many individuals have telt that the "hodge-podge" known 88 labor 
law could have been more realistic had the courts ot law attempted to under-
stand the problems ot labor economics instead of using formalistic theory in 
rendering opinions. As an example, _ny courts tormerly denied the existence 
of trade unions through the use of established legal dogma and suits had to 
be brought aga inst individual members. EYen today, the courts and legisla-
tors conTenientl,. forget or deny the basic conflict between management and 
labor. Neither side has been very scrupulous in the choice of weapons 
during an open conflict and periods of peace are nothing more than an armed 
truce. Employers have used such instruments of persuasion as the blacklist, 
the lockout and anertising against employees and their unions. The unions, 





strike and the boycott. Unfortunately, the courts failed to understand the 
basic cause of the diffioulty and instead of reaohing the carcinoma through 
radical surgery, it was allowed to metastisize. 
B. The DoctrYae of CORSRV!OY 
---
The laws governing boycott. can be traoed back to English law, as 
1s true in all legal jurisdictions in the United States with the exception 
of Louisiana and California. From necessity, the following discussion will 
annly to general lepl principles and labor problems and not the boycott 
proper although the same rules apply. The doctrine of conspiracy vas used 
as a method of controlling union growth. The theory nrcwides that acts, 
lawful when done by an individual, could become iUegal when committed by 
tv. or more persons. The 'basic idea behind this dootrine was that concerted 
action by an organi,..ed group m.ight have an ill effeot U'DGn sooiet,.. In 
several cases that arose in the tailoring industry, individuals were indicted 
for criminal conspiracy against a master tailor and the 111egal combination 
Wls the gist of action. 1 The courts in effect held that every man may work 
It what "rice he pleases but a com.bination setting the price was a crime. 
1 Xing v. Eccles, 1 Lea Cr. Cas. 274, 1783. 
Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10, 1721. 
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!he Engliah Parliament in 1799 and '1f\OO ressed the C()mb1nstions 
Acts which clearly embodied the -principles ot criminal conspiracy. 2 Due 
to the change in the industrial climate and the doctrine or labaes taire, 
the Englbh laws relating to trade and labor associations were ohanged 
during the years 1824 and 1825.:3 The 1824 legislation 4 re'Pealed the 
Combinations Acts and permitted workmen to organize without the resr or 
nrosecution ror conspiracy. Due to a series of strikes, the Act or 1825 
restored the oommon law dootrines, although not all of the controls, aDd 
etiminal law conspiracy charges vere again being fUed. 5 In the case or 
King v. Bykerdike, 6 a charge or conspiracy vas made in that injury vas in-
tended to the ovners ot a colliery and employees were m"tn'ented from wrking. 
The vorkers, it appears, had threatened a strike unless certain men were 
discharged from the mine. The court held that the action taken by the 
employees was a criminal conspiracy and persons had been deprived of their 
nrivilege to remain gainfully employed. 
In summe.ry, the English 18v, prior to 1824, held that comb1ne.tions 
2 39 George III, Chapter Sl. 
) 6 George IV, Chapter 129. 
4 A. G. Taylor, Labor Problems and Labor Law, New York, 1950, 374. 
5 6 George IV, Chapter 129. 








of workers for legit11ll8te union purpose. was .11legal and crimil1al. From 
1824, unions were legitimate. A. conspiracy at common law being a combine-
tion of two or more to effect an 11legal purpose, the illegality of such 
purpose or means being found in the cooperati .... effort of the laboring 
element. Since 1825, the statutory law has not specifically stated that 
attempts to better working conditions were illegal. However, such acts 
remained illegal in the purpOse before 1825 and in the means used from 1825. 
The reasons generally advanced for the illegality of concerted action by 
organized groups was that these were a violation of personal rights; a direct 
injury to society, trade was restrained; and the use of large numbers coerced 
others to agree to DUlY unfair stl-oulations. There apnears little doubt that 
the use of a secondary boycott would have been criminal because the combin-
etion and then the means would not have been permissible. 
Legislation in England sponsored during 1859 legalized the peace-
lul persuasion of others to abstain from or to cease work. The law in 1871 
provided that combinations were not illegal merely because of a restraint ot 
trade and the act of 1875 held that the test of illegality of a combination 
was whether the acts, if done, would be 111egal if committed by an. individ-
ual. 7 Thua, unions could no longer be held criminall,. liable although civil 
suits were permitted. 8 
7 Clifford Brigham, "Strikes and Boycotts as Indietable Conspir-
acies at Common Law", American Ley RevtIY, January-February, lSS?, 41-69. 
8 Taff-Va1e Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Society or Railwy Servants, 
A. c. 426, 1901. 
The English common law also developed the doctrine of restraint of 
trade as certain agreements were held to be illegal if they restrained 
competition or created a monopoly. Such contracts vere generally held to be 
against the best interests ot society and eventually the theory was applied 
to unions. This concept va s embod ied in the sta tutes ot a number of sta tes 
8S ve11 as in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in the United States, 
2, United State. 
In the United States, legal decisions followed the English common 
lav closely. In People v.Melvin at al, 9 the state of New York convicted 
the defendants under the doctrine of conspiracy when a combination of journey 
men cordwainers agreed not to work for an,. person who would employ non-union 
members. A strike had been threatened and the court mede a finding of a 
criminal conspiracy. In People v. Trequier, 10 journeymen hatters were held 
criminally liable on the charge of conspiracy because a single hatter was 
prevented from working and because of a refusal to vork tor an employer 
unless a non-union batter vas discharged. Forceful opinions concerning con-
spiracy were written in the cases ot Master Stevedores Association v. Walsh 11 
and State T. Donaldson. 12 In Commonwealth T. Hunt the tirst important 
9 2 Wheeler's Cr. Cas. 262, lSlO. 
10 1 Whee1er's Cr. Cas. 142, New York, IS23. 
11 2 Daly 1, New York, 1887. 
12 32 N.J. 1;1, 1867. 
decision was rendered holding that associations of workmen were not 8 crim-
inal conspiracy per see 13 However, the means and the end result attained 
bad to be justified legally. 
In 1872 and 1876, statutes were enacted in the state of Pennsyl-
vania which did away with the theory of criminal conspiracy. 14 In 18Sl, 
the state of Illinois as part of the penal code stated that it was a crime 
to oommit any act injurious to c01llDlerce and the boycott, if used, would be 
a crime. 15 At this particular period of history, boycotts were specifically 
outlawed 8s a cOmllOn law conspiracy. Other courts bad admitted that the 
ultimate object ot the boycott might be legal but the immediate result was 
injury so that the law could not go beyond the immediate effect. Other 
judges pronounced the boycott illegal not merely because ot injury but 
because the injury was accompanied by malice without justifiable cause. It 
was argued that a combination of two or more greatly increased the power for 
evil and made malicious action possible. 16 The first case in which the 
word "boycott" was used in an American legal decision 'Was that of state v. 
3. 
13 4 Met. III (Mass), 1842. 
14 ~ightlyts Purdon's Dil!!l, I, Section 213, and II, Section 
15 Digest Laws, Chapter 69, Section 13, l8Sl. 
16 Commonwealth v. Judd. 2 Mass. 329, IS07. 
State v. Glidden, 8 Atl. S90 (Conn), lSS7. 
State v. Rowley, 12 Conn. 101, 1837. 
Glidden, decided by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 17 The 
defendants were members of a printers union and had attempted to compel a 
publishing company to discharge certain nonunion men so that there was a 
strict union shop. Other unions aided and the complainant lost a great deel 
of patronage. The court held that the union invaded the right of a person 
to engage in a business and vas, in addition, an unlawful infringement upon 
the rights of non-union workmen s:tnc~ the defendants action deprived the 
laboring element of employment. The law of criminal conspiracy was applied 
because actual force or threats or intimidation was used. 
Because of irreparable injury, a suit for damages could be brought 
or a court of equity could issue an injunction or both remedies were avail-
able. In 8 parallel caee to state v. Glidden, the defendants had circulated 
hendbills requesting all persons to withdraw patronage from the plaintiff's 
newspaper and, in addition, sent letters to patrons requesting them to with-
draw all advertisements. IS The court permitted a suit because the action 
taken constituted a conspiracy. 
In the case of Hopkins v. Oxley stave Compan,y, the defendants, 
members of a coopers' union, requested a manufacturer ot barrels and casks 
used to pack meats and other commodities to stop using a certain machine for 
17 S Atl. 890, 1881. 
1891. 
18 Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical tJnion No • .3, 45 Fed. Rep. 1.35, 
47 
• 
leoping barrels. 19 When the request was re~used, the defendants, together 
with other members of the Trades Assembly, a federated labor organization in 
Kansas City, boycotted the manufacturer. The news of the boycott ws pub-
Bshed and Swift and Company ws given notice. The court held that action 
taken by the union ws a cons-piracy and issued an injunction because an 
attemot to stop the use of machinery was illegal since progress was hindered. 
The elements of combination and malicious intent were necessary to 
hold a boycott illegal 8S a criminal conspiracy. To establish the element 
of malice, the desire to injure the boycotted business should be legally 
conspicuous and -perhaps the -primary' moM.ve. Here, the court had to look to 
the intent ot the union although it was otten admitted that there was present 
an element to better working conditions. In the Glidden and Oxley Stave 
cases, the respective courts found elements ot malice even though questions 
of improving the conditions of labor were involved, the courts holding that 
the nrimary objectives were to destroy going concerns. Obviously, it is 
difficult to decide in any particu18r ease whether the element of malice was 
present and es-pecially whether it was paramount to the legitimate motive ot 
bettering working conditions. 
C, Coercion 
Another condition which caused the courts embarrassment vas that 
19 83 Fed. Rep. 912, lA97. 
of coercion. A man's business is a property Tight aDd entitled to the T>r0-
taction of' the law. 20 Thus, a person can carry on a business in a lawf'ul 
manner a s he sees fit. And if a person is "Out in rea eoM ble fear of' his 
business, the law allows him redress if an unlawf'ul action was perpetrated 
or three tened. 
MOst of the earlier decisions found the use of violence, threats 
of violenoe or phy'sical foree. However, it was not necessary to orove actual 
violence - intimidation was present if good reasoning b.r the ordinary person 
in a similar situation was overcome. 21 Some courts held that an actual 
threat need not be made if the attitude assumed b.r s union was intimidating 
and could be established b.r the circumstances. 22 The use of' the word 
"boycott" was held to be sufficient evidence ot coercion. 23 Other courts 
have gone so far as to hold that the imposition of f'ines upon union members 
who refuse to engage in 8, secondary boycott 'I.ras coercion. 24 Because unions 
800n discovered that courts would not tolerate violence and force, they 
attempted to resort to intimidation and coercion without a~ use of' force and 
1894. 
1898 
20 Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 30 Atl. Rep. S8l (New Jersey), 
21 Beck v. Railway Protective Teamsters Union, 77 N. W. 13 (Mich), 
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 1900. 
22 roster v. Retail Clerks International Protective Assn., 78 N.Y. 
SUPPa 860, 1902. 
23 Brace v. Evans, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 163, 171, l8g8. 
24 Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1, 1m. 
peaoeful boycotts were substituted. As the person boycotted \ISS oompelled 
beoause of a fear of injury to his business to accede to terms, the Courts 
held that coeroion and intimidation supplied the illegal mesns. In a sense, 
coeroion was present but it was of the type which oompelled one merchant to 
low his prices in order to meet the competition of his competitor. It \ISS 
not the type of force which, under the law of consPiraoy, was regarded as an 
II illegal means" in reference to boycotts because the best legal authority 
considered such means illegal only when the acts were a tort per se. 25 
It has already been stated that the mere aot of oombining consti-
tuted an illegal means beoeuse the old or imina 1 law oases held that the mere 
combination was the gist of the action. Although it was true that sots when 
committed b.Y 8 combination of persons may change their character to the 
extent of making them more offensive and harder to resist, it was also true 
that the individual worker was ineffective and, under some circumstances, 
one individual could cause more harm than any number of persons combined for 
that purpose. However, in neither oase is legal coercion or intimidation 
present and there was no reason to find a combination ipso faota changing the 
character of an sct which would be legs 1 if done b.Y one person. Many author-
178. 
25 Joel Bishop, Bishop's Qriminal Law, I, 1913, Chicago, Section 
Hon. o. M. Hilton, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, III, 1912, 
Rochester, Section 1337. 
Ities held that the mere e::dstance of' a comb1hation was not a conspiracy. 26 
In Vegelahn v. Guntner, 27 Justice Holmes, piior to his elevation to the 
united States Supreme Court, stated in a dissenting opinion: 
It Is plain from the slightest consideration of' practical af'fairs, 
or the most superficial reading of industrial history, that free 
competItion means combination and that the organization of the 
world, now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might and 
scope of combination. It seems to me rutile to set our faces 
against this tendency. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I 
thil'lk, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental 
axiom of society, and even the fundamental conditions of llfe, 
ere to be changed. One of the eternal conflicts out of which 
life is made un is that between the effort of every man to get 
the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised 
under the name of capital, to get his services for the least 
possible return. Combination on the other is necessary and 
desirable counterpart, if the battle 1s to be carried on in a 
fair and equal way. 
In New York, a court refused to issue an injunction against the distribution 
of circulars when there vas no proof of violence 28 although the use of 
violenoe could be enjoined. 29 
D. The Constitutional ProtectiOn of Business 
1901 
Thus, the gradual di8apt>earance of the illegal combination theory 
26 BOM *nutacturing Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 1S93. 
Ert£ v. Produce Exchange of Minneapolis, 79 Minn. 140, 1900. 
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 1996. 
27 167 Mess. 92, 1896. 
28 Cohen v. United Germent Workers ot America, 72 N. Y. Supple 341, 
29 Rourke v. Elk Drug Co., 77 N. Y. Supp. 373, 1902. 
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led the courts to further search tor a new method ot controlling the boycott, 
vhich could injure business. It is interesting to compere such doctrines as 
caveat emptor and tree eompetition with the 1av controlling the labor boycott 
at this period. Although unrestricted business and the purchase at one's 
risk short ot legal traud could spell ruin to a business man, the courts 
accepted thBt 8S being healthy tor the national economy, vhereas the general 
va1fere of the masses, who are generally the ~orking ~opulation and in need 
of protection, could not use the secondary boycott because it ruined business. 
Mgny casual observors llPOn the American scene, ot foreign extraotion, have 
noted that 'lie Amerioans have an aristocracy of business men who are generally 
worshipped and protected whereas an aristocracy ot hereditary nobility, often 
no different, i8 trovaed upon. The decisions rendered by courts to the end 
of the nineteenth century would generally bear out such a contention. Dictum 
began to appear in a number of cases exoressing the thought that property 
was entjt1ed to protection as guaranteed by the constitution and the courts 
owed a duty to protect this right. 30 Thus, although the unions vere no 
longer illegal as an entity, the notion deve100ed that the end to be attained 
vas not socially desirable. 
Although it can be conceded that a right to property and the 
corresponding need tor protection does exist, it never did follow that the 
30 Davis T. Zimmerman, 36 N. Y. Supp. 303, 1895. 
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right was absolute. Any business suffers injury through competition and 
hence to show that a union inflicted injury upon a business, it should have 
been shown that the means used or the end sought was not justified by trade 
competition. If a person exercises his rights properly, his action is 
legally permissab1e although another person may suffer a loss thereby. On 
this ground, "trade boycotts· used by business men and corporations were 
regarded as lawful. There are many instances in which a wholesaler or an 
association of manufacturers refused to supply good to a retail dealer for 
one reason or another. 31 The same reasoning should have applied to boycotts 
at this turbulent period of history when benefits were being secured for 
members and unions were fighting for their existence. Although third persons 
vere requested to aid, this alone should not have been outlawed, because, 
using an analogy, business men are always taking away customers from. another 
and the boycott had the same effect. 
In addition, many business men filed complaints in courts of equity 
requesting injunctions. In most jurisdictions, a request for extraordinary 
relief was to be denied without looking at the merits of the case if the 
olaintifr did not come to court with "e1een handsn and there was no irrepar-
able injury. As many concerns used any Ileana available to stop the organi~-
31 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 1893 • 
. Macaulay v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255, 1S95. 
Brewster v. Miller's Sons Co., 101 Ky. 36S, lS97. 
Webb v. Drake, 52 La. Ann. Rep. 290, 1m. 
tion of their employees, including violence, ~t seems inconceivable that the 
complainant should have "clean hands". 
The law, as it generally existed in 19m, was that the rights of 
business were not absolute and any damage done as the result of a boycott 
\l8S not unlawful per se • .32 However, such orotection disappeared when un-
lawful means were used and a cause of action accrued to the person or corpor-
ation suffering a 10ss • .33 When there was no legitimate labor interest but 
a boycott was used malioiously, an action could be brought by the injured 
party regardless of the use of legal means. 
E. The Anti-'l"ru,tLaw. 
With the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust 18w in 1890, another 
phase had begun in labor relations which has been thoroughly reviewed ~J many 
experts. However, some discussion is necessary as the secondary boycott was 
legally stopped by a doctrine which 1s generally conceded today was intended 
for large business organizations who stifled the competitive sales market. 
'l'he first attempt to enforce the Sherman Act against a union came before the 
.32 MUrdock, Kerr & Co. v. Walker, 152 Pat st. 595, 1~3. 
My Maryland Lodge No. 186 v. Adt, 59 Atl. 721, 1905. 
Meyer v. Journeymen stonecutterts Asstn., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 1S90 
Karges Furniture Coo, v. Amalgamated W. L. U. No. 131, 75 N. E. 
877 (Ind.), 1905. 
33 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, lS7l. 
Ertz v. Products Exohange of Minneapolis, 79 Minn. 140, 1900. 
Dickson v. Dickson, 33 La. Ann. Rep. 1261, 1981. 
Graham v. st. Charles Street Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. Rep. 214, 1895 
Doremus T. Hennessy, 176 III 60S, 1898. 
Lowe v. California State Fed. of tabor, 139 Fed. 71, 1905. 
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federal court in Boston. 34 The court deoid.a thet Congress did not intend 
to suppress boycotts and strikes through the Anti-Trust law. In one of the 
most famous oases, the Danbury Batters, 35 the unanimous opinion was deliv-
ered by Chief Justice Fuller, to the effect that labor unions came within 
the uurview of the Sherman .lot. The decision has been legally analyzed many 
times but the social aspeot has been often negleoted. D. E. Loewe and Company 
were manufaoturers of hat~. The proprietor, Mr. Loewe, had risen in social 
prestige from that of a wage earner to that of a small business operator, 
His factory was not unionized but union men were supposedly employed on the 
same basis as non-union help. Technically, such polioy is termed an open 
shop. When the union unsuccessfully demanded a olosed shop, Loewe and 
Company was boycotted and other oonoerns, beeeuse of union pressure, refused 
to engage in business with Loewe's. The Amerioan Anti-Boycott Assooiation, 
organized in 1902 for the purpose of stopping the use of boyeotte, finanoed 
the court expenses to bring the case before a legal tribunal. 36 After the 
court held the union liable under the Sherman Anti-Trust law, Lyman Beeoher 
stowe visited Danbury, Oonnectieut, and interviewed ten ot the men who were 
found guilty of a restraint of trade. 37 One elderly person, whose home had 
34 u. S. v. Patterson, 55 Fed. Rep. 605, 1993. 
35 Loewe v. Lawlor, 200 TJS 274, 1908. 
36 The Out1oo~, Vol. 75, Sept., 1903, 191-193. 
37 Stowe, "Paying the Penalty in Danbury", The Outlook, Vol. 110, 
July 14, 1915, 616. 
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been attached to satisfy the judgment, could not raise sufficient funds to 
send his daughter away for tubercular treatment. t.,rhen the sui.t was brought, 
the union men selected 8S defendants vere those who owned some property and 
consisted mainly of the older members who were more industrious and frugal. 
It is interesting to note that the bank aocounts and prooerty of the defend-
ants were attached for 8 period of twelve years before the final deoision was 
render~d. 
When Woodrow Wilson was nominated as the Democratlc candidate for 
president of the UnUed states, one of his campaign pledges was to modify 
the Sherman Act so that labor unions would not fall within the restraint of 
trade law. The result was the Clayton Act passed in 1914 which was hailed 
by labor leaders as the emanci;::l8tion of lmions from legal shackles. The 
joy, however, was short-lived. In the OSSEl of Duplex Print:fng Press Company 
v. Deering, 38 the Machinists union was held to heve violated the Sherman 
Anti-Trust law irrespect.ive of the Clayton Act. The plaintiff sought 
injunct:tve relief and was one of four companies manufacturing printing 
nresses in direct competition with one another. Three of these concerns had 
accepted the terms proposed by the union, granting a closed shop, whereas the 
plaintiff continued to operate an open shop, with the employees working longer 
hours than those who had been employed in the closed union shops. Because ot 
3S 254 US 443, 1921. 
the unequal oompetitive features, two of the -companies who had agreed to the 
closed-shop and other union terms served notioe that the contract would be 
terminated unless the plaintiff was forced to accept the same terms. The 
union called a strike against the plaintiff but only fourteen employees 
heeded the call. The union then declared a boycott in New York ctty and 
customers were warned that the plaintiffs products should not be purchased, 
threatened a trucking company not to haul the plaintiff's products and 
notified repair companies not to repair the plaintiff's presses. In 1914, 
the plaintiff requested an injunction and was denied equitable relief by the 
lower oourt and the Circuit Court of Ar,-088.ls. These courts made a specific 
finding that secondary boycotts and other labor disputes no longer came under 
the Sherman Act because of Section 20 of the Clayton Act passed in 1914. The 
Sup~eme Court reversed the decisions given by the lower courts, holding that 
secondary boycotts were illegal and not protected by the Clayton Act. Justice 
Brandeis, in a di~senting opinion oonourred with by Justioes Holmes and 
Clarke, held that the Clayton Aot was intended to aid working people by 
equalizing the power between the unions and the employers. Justice Brandeis 
noted that those with a common interest can band together and refuse to 
support any business whioh attacks their standard of living. He was careful 
to distinguish between illegal boycotts which were conducted against a person 
and not a product and not united by a common interest but only by sympathy 
and those in which all _embers of a union by whomeyer employed refuse to 
handle materials which production weakens the union. 
The view that the Sherman Act applied to unions irrespeotive of the 
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Clayton Act continued until the Apex decision when the court held that labor 
activity did not constitute a violation of the Anti-Trust law unless compe-
tition was suppressed or national markets controlled. 39 Here, the court 
found that the union activity could not possibly have a SUbstantial effect 
upon the entire industry. United States v. Hutcheson also held that the 
Sherman Act did not apply to uniens. 40 
For purposes of organization, several union officials ordered the 
use of violence against three tur-dye1ng firms whose place of business was 
in New Jersey although the violence was directed against customers residing 
in New York. 41 Although the union activit,. vas admittedly illegal, the 
indictment under the Sherman Act was dismissed because the operators of the 
New Jersey firms ~id not bave a sufficient amount of business to substantially 
effect commerce. The government had contended that all secondary boycotts 
were prohibited under the Sherman Aet and reference was made to the Danbury 
Hatter and Duplex cases. Since the union ordered the use of violence, the 
prosecution contended that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts did not 
apply_ However, the court rejected t?is view and followed the reasoning set 
forth in the Apex Case. Thus, there seems to be required a substantial 
39 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 US 469, 1940. 
40 U. S. v. Hutcheson, 312 US 219, 1941. 
41 U. S. v. Gold, 11S F.(2) 236, 1940. 
effect upon the market should the courts eve~ abandon the findings in the 
Apex and Hutcheson cases that unions were not intended to come within the 
laws restricting trade. The cases under Section 8 (b) (4) of the Taft· 
Hartley, later reviewed, such as in the construction industry where the "de 
minimis" rule has been east aside. would be contrary to the Gold case in 
the consideration of federal jurisdiction. The principal objection to deci-
sions of this type is that a judicial or administrative tribunal decides 
whether there haa been an effect upon interstate commerce and such a deter-
mination is often an empirical question inYolving such variables as markets, 
prices, number of competitors, average amount of business done before and 
after competition, public pressure and the personal views of the judiciary. 
For sake of uniformity, it appears that a more definite standard should be 
created that will apnly to all labor problems. 
F. state Lay 
Most of the state courts prior to the Wagner Act declared that the 
secondary boycott was unlawful either upon the ground that the means consti-
tuted coercion or upon the broad prinCiple that one not a party to industrial 
strife cannot, against his will, be made an ally of the union for the purpoae 
of destroying the primary employer. 42 The rule so enunciated vas not 
1918. 
42 Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 1908. 
Haverhill Strand Theatre Inc., v. Gillen, 118 N. E. 671 (MBss), 
Purvis v. Local No. 500, U. B. C. J., 63 Atl. 585 (Fa), 1906. 
affected by the Clayton Act which only applied to interstate commerce. 
The minority rule permitted a peaceful secondary boycott holding 
that those on strike have a right to induce others to withhold their busi-
ness patronage from the employer by threatening a boycott against those who 
fail to do so. 43 In the Empire theatre case, the court held lawful a 
publication stating that all who patronize a theatre in defiance of a boycott 
would themselves be classed as unfriendly and subjected to a boycott in turn. 
Most of the strikes against secondary employers have occurred in 
three general types of situations. In the first category, there are those 
strikes against the UBe of non-union materials in the same or related crafts. 
The great majority of the cases falling under this classification have held 
that striking against "unfair" materials (not made by organized labor) by 
union members in the same or related crafts are contrary to law. 44 These 
43 Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 163 Pac. 107 (Montana), 1917. 
Lindsay &: Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 96 'ac. 127 
(Montana), 1908. 
44 Anderson &: Lind Mfg. Co. v. The Carpenters District Council, 
30B Ill. 48~, 1923. 
Mears Slayton Lumber Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenter Ie 
Joiners Union, 156 Ill. App. 327, 1910. 
Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 157 N. E. 82 (Mass), 1927. 
Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 114 S. W. 997 (Mo.), 1908. 
Booth Ie Bros. v. Burgess, 65 At1. 226 (N. J.), 1906. 
Purvis v. Local No. 500, U. B. C. J., 63 Atl. 585 CPa), 1906. 
Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International Typographieal Union, 
216 Pac. 358 (Wash), 1923. 
Huttig Sash &: Door Co. v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 363, 1006. 
Shine v. Fox Bros. fd.fg. Co., 156 Fed. 357, 1907. 
Irving v. Joint District Council, 180 Fed. 896, 1910. 
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courts have concluded that the strike sunposedly called against non-union 
material was rather a strike against a neutral who wes only remotely connect-
ed with the controversy. It should be noted that the primary employer, more 
often than not, brought suit - the neutral seldom comnlained. There are a 
few jurisdictions which have classified such secondary pressure as being 
legelly permis8sble recognizing the close aconomic relationship and unity of 
interest between members in the same or related crafts. 45 
Another classification concerns strikes against an intermediate 
emnloyer because of the presence of a non-union contractor on the site. To-· 
day, with industrial unions, there is a right to strike regardless of the 
occunatlon because all employees belong to the same union. But where member-
shin is on a craft basis, such as in the construction trades, most of the 
courts permitted such strikes. 46 There are, as usual, opinions to the con-
trary. 47 The New York Courts have been the leaders in permitting cooperative 
45 Meier v. Speer, 132 S. W. 9S9 (Ark), 1910. 
Parkinson v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 
Cal. 581, 1900. 
state v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C. 633, 1904. 
46 Grant Construction Co. v. st. Paul Building Trades Council, 161 
N. w. 520 (Minn), 1917. 
Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayer's rrnion, 101 ATL 659 
(Conn), 1917. 
Jett.on-Delke Lumber Co. v. Mather, 43 so. 590 (Fla), 1907. 
Seymour-Ruff & Sons, Inc. v. Bricklayer's TJnion No. 41, 164 Atl. 
752 (Md.), 1933. 
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 (F) (2) 2S4, 1934. 
47 Lehigh structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining 
Works, 111 Atl. 376 (N. J.), 1920. 
Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, 116 N. E. SOl (Mass), 1917. 
19S ( R. R. Kitchen & CQ.v. Local Union No. 141, I.B.E.W., 112 S. E. 
W.Va.),1922. 
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activity amongst trade unions in closely allied crafts. For exemp1e, in 
Willson and Adams Company v. Pearce, the building trades unions joined the 
teamsters in refusing to work on materials transported to the job by non-
union teamsters. 4~ The court, by sanctioning the strike, held that the 
loadin~ in the 8~pply yard and the unloading at the point where the building 
was being constructed was a ne~e8sary pert of the construction work. 
The third category of strikes are those against a secondary 
emnloyer by union members in unrelated crafts. Here, there is almost unan-
imous opinion that such strikes are contrary to law and good policy. In the 
Auburn case, 49 the Teall.sters had placed the plaintiff on an "unfair list" 
when it had refused to agree to a closed shop. The customers reached as 
secondary aids were such diverse groups as packers, butchers, ice dealers, 
plumbers, etc. The court held that a united front of unrelated unions will 
not be tolerated, the mere advantage to all of unionism was not a sufficient 
relationship. However, if there are direct dealings with the employees of 
the unfair manufacturer or contractor, boycott is pertdssable. 
With respect to secondary picketing, labor unions in the past, 
engaged in controversies with the primary employer, have found it necessary 
to secure public support and extend activities beyond the premises of the 
employer. The innumerable legel problems which stem from the racognition of 
48 191 N. E. 545 reNe Y.), 1934. 
49 Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 124 N. E. 97 (N. Y.), 1919. 
labors right to strike and bargain collectivefl.y has caused legal conft'lsion 
and many social problems. When labor has the right to strike, it follows 
that labor may picket to publicize its noint of view and gain popular support 
for the end result contemplated. But with the right to picket, such con-
troversial questions have arisen as against whom may the picketing be 
directed, what Is the area protected by the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech, and what are the rights of third parties? Thus, unions, especially 
in New York state, have picketed retailers who have no other interest in 
the dispute than the selling, amongst other products, those items produced 
by the urimary employer. Often, the picketing will be directed against e. 
neutral employer without calling a strike at the plant of the primary 
employer and the New York courts have sanctioned such picketing. 50 In 
Bossert v. Dhuy, 51 two e~loyers doing business with one another in the same 
industry, found the union employees of one employer refUSing to handle the 
goods nroduced by the non-union shop. The refusal to work did not extend to 
the employer of the unionized shop but only to the non-union product. The 
court held that under the circumstances, the refusal to handle tee non-union 
material \0188 not directed against the neutral employer but at the specific 
product and, therefore, permisssble. In another case, there was a cessation 
of business doalings between the primary and secondary employers i.n which the 
50 Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 157 N. E. 130 (N. I.), 1927. 
51 117 N. E. 582 (N. Y.), 1917. 
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union activity was not limited to the product of the primary emn10yer but the 
picketing extended to all of the neutrals business. 52 The oourt enjoined 
the picketing, stating that the action was secondary. These two C8ses would 
seem to illustrate the general rule in New York that if picketing and other 
methods of union pressure is limited to the product of the primary employer, 
then suoh pressure is legally condoned. If the secondary employer is 
picketed o~therwise harrassed by union nressure without specific 1L~itation 
to the produot of the nrimary emn1oyer, then the action taken is secondary 
and not permissable. 
In the case of Commeroial Window Cleaning Company v. Awerkin, 53 
the union nicketed various theatres whioh had entered into a contraot to use 
the plaintiff's window cleaning servioes. The court enjoined the pioketing 
becBuse it 'Was secondary and the adverse publicity might result in forcing 
the theatres to break a oontract with the plaintiff. In Stuhmer v. Korman, 54 
the union picketed with the placerds carried omitting the name of the second-
ary employer. The union had attempted to induce the neutral dealer to stop 
purchasing bread made at the boycotted bakery and appealed to the public for 
support by nosting pickets 1.n front of the non-complying stores. The decision 
in several earlier cases had held that ~icketing the produots of an unfair 
52 Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 1'4 N. E. 947 (N. Y.), 1919. 
53 240 N. Y. 797, 1930. 
54 193 N. E. 281 (N. Y.), 1934. 
emnloyer W89 nermissable when the placards m&rely extol the merits of union-
made goods and ask patrons to look for the union label and avoid the nurchaee 
of non-union products. 55 '!'he stuhmer csse d1dn(t fall witMn the category 
of nerm1ssab1e picketing beoause the street meetings and union attitude, 
contended the C01~t, indicated that the whole proceeding vas not directed at 
the nrimary employer but rather a~8inst the neutral stores. In the Blumenthal 
56 ee~es, the court found that the union activity vas direoted against the 
nroduct and not the dealer against whom the union had picketed. Since the 
union has the right to nersuade the dealer to discontinue relations with the 
primary employer, said the court, then there 1s no reason why peaceful 
pi~ketlng should be enjoined since the union is merely usin~ means to persuade 
prospective customers and generally that is the only effective means available 
to the union. 
In the finel 8Mlysis, both the employer and the union must turn 
for support to the public and specifically the consumer of the produot in-
volved in the dispute. Therefore, if picketing is to be successful, it must 
be 8np1ted at the critical point, the place of sale. But when the nicketinO' I: ~ ,III 
1s turned so as to cause havoc aga.inst one with whom the union has no just 
dispute, then the aetion is unnecessary and l"hould be restrained. 
55 Publie Baking Co. v. stern, 215 N. Y. Supp. 537, 1926. 
Englemeyer v. Simon, 265 N. Y. Supp. 636, 1933. 
56 Blumenthal v. Fe1ntuch, 273 N. Y. Supp. 660, 1934. 
Blumenthal v. We:ikman, 277 N. Y. Sum>. ~5, 1934. 
A novel and interesting situation wes presented in the now famous 
case of Goldfinger v. Feintuoh. 57 The union had not been sucoessful in 
organizing the poorly paid workers of a New York concern manufacturing the 
~~~orn meat products. The union began to picket the retail distributor of 
these nroducts, the banners only referring to the tlUkor" products. The 
manufncturer had attempted to get a restraining order but the oourt denied 
equitable relief. The osse arose when Goldfinger, a retail distributor, 
sought an injunction. The Court of Appeals of New York held in favor of the 
union stating that: 
Within t~e limits of peaoeful ?icketing ••• pioketing may be carried 
on not only against the manufacturer but against a non-union 
produot sold by one in unity of interest 'With the manufacturer who 
is in the saMe business for profit. Where a manufacturer nays 
less th8n union wages both it ilind the retailers 'Who sell its pro-
duots are in a position to undersell oomuetltors and this may 
result in an tmfair reduotion of the wages of union members. Where 
the manufacturer disposes of the produot through retailers in unity 
of interest with it, unless the union may follow the product to the 
place where it is sold and oeacefully ask the public to refrain 
from purchasing it, the union ",ould be deurived of a fair and 
proper means of hri.nging its plea to the attention of the public. 
Here, the boyoott ",as held to be allowable a8 only the "Ulcor" meats was 
."laced on the "unfairlt advertisements. Although it \ISs admitted thFt the 
nieketing would injure other parts of the retailers business, the boycott 
itself was not extended to the entire business of the nlaintiff and that was 
• risk that he took. 
57 276 N. Y. 2~1, 1937. 
'!'he law of Nev York appears to allow the use of banners carried bT 
oickets it merely directed against the unfair product; but if the retaUer 
himself is called untair, then the courts have enjoined the picketing. 
As previously noted, IIOst jurisdictions are contrary and lIOuld call 
the picketing ot a retailer with whom there was no dispute an enjotnable 
secondary action, inespaetb'e of what vas said upon the banners carried by 
the pickets. In addition, Nev York is one of the fev states in which the 
"unity of interest" test has been applied. the only other states which have 
paid "lip service" to the viev as expressed by the Hew York Court ot Appeals 
were nlinois, 58 Louisiana, 59 and Pennsylvania. 60 However, the California 
courts have taken a DlOst liberal attitude in the use of the boycott. In an 
early 08se, the plaintiff operated 8 hardware store and a building materials 
mill. 61 the unions, because of labor difficulty, boycotted the mill and 
hardware store. the court held tbs. t the refusal to use the pla intiff' 8 build-
ing _teria1s, though already contracted for, was lawful. In a later case, 
II 
the California Superior Court permitted the csrrying ot banners by 'Piokets ,III 
I'" 
58 Wagner v. Milk 'Wagon Driver's Union, Local 753,50 N. E. (2) 
865, 1943. 
59 Johnson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, Local Ho. 854, 
195 So. 791 (ta.), 1940. 
60 Alliance Auto Servioe v. Cohen, 19 At1. (2) 152, (Penn.), 1941. 
61 Parkinson Co. Y. Building '1'l"ade. COWlell of Santa Clara County, 





whioh oa11ed the distributor "unfair." 62 The oourt pointed out that a 
retailer could not be an innooent third party because through the purchase 
of DOn-union goods, he was placed at a oompetitive advantage. The retailer 
wasn't helpless in a situation such 8S indicated since he could merely 
refuse to handle the disputed product. 
Even though the New York courts have been liberal in their inter-
pretation of a secondary labor dispute, there is often criticisM in light ot 
stare deoisis. In the case ot stubmer v. Korman, previously reviewed, 1500 
bakeries had been selling "unfair" bread. The banner stated, "Demand Bread 
with the International Union Label." The Court granted an injunction stoppin 
the Dickating because ot coeroion and the overall intent appeared to be the 
destruction of the plaintiff's business. This decision appears to be con-
trary to New York law as the coercion was not violent or fraudulent and the 
banner merely requested the plaintiff's customers to purchase bread carrJing 
a union label. The sole purpose of the picketing was to organize the non-
union bakeries about the city of New York which is a legitimate purpose. 
In People v. Mueller, the Electrical Worker's Union Local Number 3, 
was involved in a labor dispute with a firm specializing in the installation 
of burglar alarm systems. 63 The complainant operated a retail men's turnish-
62 Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 106 Pac. (2) 411 (Cal), 1940. 
63 36 N. F.. (2) 206 (N. Y.), 1941. 
ing store and leased the alarm system from the firm with which the union ws 
hSving labor difficulty_ The union picketed the haberdashery shop and in a 
four to three decision, the court held that there ws a legitinBte labor 
disoute and the picketing ws not secondary. The issue was whether a retail-
er who lesses a burglary alarm system from a manufacturer becomes a perty in 
interest to the labor dispute? The court found the necessary nunity of 
interest" because of the maintenance cont.ract between the store keeper and 
the manufaoturer. The court found that the system had always been serviced 
by union help and peaceful picketing was guaranteed by the constitution 
regardless of the degree of intereat of the secondary party being picketed. 
It must be admitted that the New York court was gOing .fer to find a "unity 
of interest." 
In a sailer oase, there was a sale plus a servicing agreement of 
8 non-union t>roduot. 64 The court did not find the necessary dunity of 
interest" and differentiated this case from the Mueller decision beoause there 
the atan system vas only leased whereas in the present case the "unfair" 
~roduct was Bold outright. It appears that the pBssage of title 1s sufficient 
to take away any claim of "unity of interest" between the primary end neutral 
ellployers though services r.re subsequently performed by the primary elll'ployer 
tor the disinterested party_ 
64 People v. Bellows, 22 N. E. (2) 238 (N. I.), 1939. 
In a more recent case, the union concerned, during the year 1933, 
wss nermanently enjoined from picketing the customers of a firm which oper-
ated a non-union window cleaning service. 65 Fourteen years leter, the 
union sought to have the injunction vacated because the law of picketing had 
changed. The New York Court of Appeals dissolved the order quoting the 
eases of Goldfinger v. Feintuch and People v. Mueller, indicating that it 
would enlerge the area of picketing when there was evidence disclosing that 
the picketing of the primary employer at his place of business was ineffective 
This case extended the principle to include third persons who are more 
loosely connected with the primary employer than found in most of the "unity 
of interest" cases because the original theory required that the two ~rties 
be in the same line of business. There seems to be little if any common 
bond between a window washing concern and a building under contract that needs 
its windows va shed. 
Although most writers have given credit for the development of the 
"unity of interest" doctrine to the state of New York, the expression had 
been used by Mr'. Justice Brandeis in the Duplex Printing Company decision 
concerning the anti-trust law. The difficulty with the theory 1s defining 
the area of union activity and applying the doctrine to a given set cf facts. 
It is obvious that many different conclusions can be reached. 
65 Enterprise Window Cleaning Co. v. Slovsta, 86 N. E. (2) 750 
(H. Y.), 1949. 
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A new view has been presented by the Califo~nia Courts which may 
snread to other jurisdiotions and tends to show the regressive attitude in 
courts ooncerning the use of secondary boycotts since World War II. 66 The 
plai.ntiff Ws a railroad and engaged in hauling lumber and logs for various 
mills. The court upheld the issuance of an injunction when the union picket-
ed the railroad many miles 8Wy from the lumber mills with whom the union 
had 8 labor dispute. This oase is interesting because it was the first time 
that a California court recognized the rights of the general public as a 
narty in interest when a union uses the secondary boycott. It should be 
emphasized again that California has always been extremely liberal 1n its 
attitude toward the use ot secondary boycotts. The regre!sion may be due to 
the faot that unions are cu~ently strong enough without such a tactic and 
may be a view that will be nationally accepted one day. 
66 Northwestern Paoifio Railroad Co. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers 
Union, 1$9 Pac. (2) 277 (Cal), 1948. 
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C HAP1':'Im IV 
A SOCIAL ANALYSIS or LEGISLATION TO THE WAGNER ACT 
A review i8 necessary setting forth the course ot modern labor hia-
tory trom the beginning of the twentieth century and the philosoph7 behind 
the new legislation due to changes in the economy. At the turn ot the 
twentieth century, many employers became alarmed at the increasing strength 
of the labor movement. Such emoloyer's organi?8tlons as the National Aasoc-
ietion ot Manufacturers, the National Metal Trades Association and the 
American Anti-Bo.ycott Association spearheaded drives to maintain open shops, 
blacklists, assisted employers engaged in industrial disputes and opoosed 
legislation soonsored by labor. Public opinion wae successfully molded agains,", 
the union movement, as was the present day attitude. Under such pressure, one 
cen rationalize decisions exemplified by the Danbury Hatter's ease. With 
World War I, conditions became tRvorable to the growth of unions and the 
membership increafled rapidly. tabor had agreed not to use strikes and boy-
cotts and the wedding was conroleted when employers permitted union organiza-
tion and collective bargaining. Following World War I, union membership was 
at a historical peak. However, the rising coat ot living, lagging wage rates, 
a tendency of some employers to withdraw their recognition of unions end the 
71 
general reconversion from a wartime to 11 peaoetime economy caused social un-
rest. There was a changed public attitude toward the unions, related in 
pert to the fear of communism from 1919 to 1921. 1 By 1923, union membership 
had dropped due to such factors as technological improvements, the growth ot 
!DB!!S production and giant corporations, an increase in real wages and the 
velfare nrograms conducted by cap1 tal. The courts, and in perticular the 
injunction iesued by them, accelerated the union disintegration. 
NeverthelesB, there was one industry in which the unione were aid.ed 
and abetted by the federal government. In 1926, the Railway Labor Act, due 
to the political power of railway unions in the vest and the cooperation of 
the railroad industry, was made the law of the land and emphasized collective 
bargaining without governmental regalation. 2 The law encouraged colleetive 
bargaining, union organization and protected union members, being the fore-
runner of Section 7 <a' of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the 
Wagner Act. 
The Great Depression started in 1929 and unemployment grew. Those 
employed vere i.nsecure and there was a declining standard ot living. As 8 
result, there wae a widesnread lo~s of confidence in the free enterprise 
system. Many experts felt that an increase was necessary in consumer ourc!1as-
ing nower before increased production and employment could be sustained. It 
-
1 Millis & Montgomery, Organized Labgr, Vol. III, 140-149. 




sO, then unions had to be supported and collective bargaining promoted to 
equalize the power attained by large corporations. Thus, a new governmental 
policy was incorporated whereby the use of the labor injunction was restrict-
ed, 'Positive rights of organization were granted, collective bargaining was 
promoted, which, finally, resulted in a great increase in union membership. 
The depression led Congress to pass the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act 
in 1932.' For the first time there was a federsl labor policy which per-
mitted full freedom of association for workers and freedom from interference 
when organizing. The Aot severely limited the power of federal courts to 
issue injunctions. A labor dispute was broadly defined thus, in effect, 
permitting strikes, boycotts and picketing; safeguards were provided limiting 
the issuance ot temporary restraining orders; union liabUity for damages 
was limited; and "yellow-dog" contracts were no longer enforceable. The 
Norris-LaGuardia Act became necessary because the substantive law, initially 
provided by the Sherman Anti-Trust laW', had not been changed by the Clayton 
Act of 1914. The previous restrictions plaoed upon boycotting activities was 
removed as enunciated in Section 4. Section 13 def:1.ned a labor dispute in 
broad language so that the use of the labor injunction was prectically at an 
end. By 1943, many states had anti-injunction laws oosed upon the Norris-
LaGuardia Act including Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
3 47 U. S. Stat. 70. 
74 
utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 4 
The secondary boycott was no longer subject to injunctive procedure 
in most of the heavy industrial states. Among the reasons advanced for per-
mitting the secondar,r boycott were: 
1. The well-being of society depended upon the economic condition 
of the working class and consequently labor must be given every 
available means to achieve success. 
2. The good accomplished outweighed the evil effect. 
3. Restricting the us. ot the boycott would only cause its contin-
uanee in defiance of the lav when there wa III a real need. As an 
example, prohibition did not stop drinking and greater social 
problems arose. 
4. Prohibiting boycotts, when peacefully conducted, deprived labor 
of a human right guaranteed by the constitution. 
5. The union is generally at a disadvantage should it call a strike 
beasuse men are easy to replace, unfavorable publicity, 108s of 
wages by union members, etc. 
6. The em,loyer used suah weapons as labor spies, blacklists, lock-
outs, and other devices so that labor was in need of s strong 
counter weapon. 
7. Many enrployer's associations such as f.M National Association 
of Manufacturers, whose 80le purpose was to stop the growth of 
unions, were financially powerful in waging educative programs 
and legislative campaigns so that the secondary boycott became 
a necessity as a counter measure. 
s. ~ny of the so-called neutral employers were directly int.ereet-
ed in the primary dispute when contracts were sublet b.Y a 
primary employer during e strike. 
Many felt that the use of the secondary boycott ~hould be permitted, among 
them being Professor Commons, a foremost authority from the University of 
Wisconsin. 5 However, much of the case presented in favor of the boycott as 
4 Millis & Montgomery, OrR!!nized tabor, Vol. III, 593. 
5 ~,596. 
indicated above, was questionable. The blacklist vas a weapon which had been 
discarded by management, secondary boycotts received a8 much or more unfav-
arable publicity than a strikeJ it not used conservatively, the secondary 
boycott would hinder collective bargaining; and the public would sutfer in 
_ny instances. 
The decisions rendered under the Norris-LaGuardia Act with respect 
to the permissability of the secondary bo1Qott are in conflict. The majority 
held that secondary boycotts came within the meaning of a "labor disputett6 
although others held that such action did not constitute a "labor dispute" 
so that injunctive relief vas permitted. 7 When the United States Supreme 
Court decisions interpreted the law, it became clear that labor vas finally 
treed trom lIl8D7 restrictions placed upon them b,y the older legal interpreta-
6 Taxi Drivers Local Union Bo. 889 v. Yellow Cab Operating Co., 
123 Fed. (2) 262, 1941. 
InterDStional Ass'n. of Bridge Workers v. Pauly Jail Building 
Co., 29 F. Supp. 15, 1939. 
Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F. (2) 948, 1939. 
Cole v. Atlanta Terminal Co., 15 F. Supp_ 131, 1936. 
United Packing House Workers Union v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 
563, 1945. 
!mal. Ass. ot street etc. Railway EMployees v. Dixie Motor Coach 
Corp., 170 F. (2) 902, 1948. 
7 Fehr Baking Co. v. Baker's Union et aI, 20 F. Supp. 691, 1937. 
Gomez v. Ottice Workers Union, 73 F. Supp. 679, 1947. 
Communication Workers of America v. Mountain state Tel & Tel Co., 
81 F. Supp. 397, 1948. 
Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, etc., 90 F. Supp. 640, 1950. 
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tions such as round under the anti-trust laws and statutes. S 
One test applied to determine whether an injunction should be 
granted by the court was whether there was fA "labor dispute". In Bakery 
Sales Drivers Union v. Wagshall, the court found that the picketing was being 
carried on to force a restaurant owner to pay a debt which, it was clalmed, 
bBd already been paid. 9 It appears that a bakery had requested to change 
the time of deli'9'ery of bread trom the lunch hour ot most employed people to 
8 more suitable time. Because of the inability to oomply with the request, 
deliveries were stopped. The union's agent then visited the proprietor and 
demanded payment for the bakery goods already delivered. The bill had been 
paid directly to the bakery concern and payment to the business agent vas 
refused. The court said that there was not a "labor dispute" and issued an 
injunction. In another case, a union whose members were on strike in New 
York cit,., against the operator of a dance hall, picketed the dance studio 
opersted by the plaintiff in Wsshington, D.C., to facilitate matters. 10 The 
court held that there was no labor dispute because the only connection between 
the washington studio and the New York employer was that they vere both 
8 taut v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 US 323, 1937. 
91, 1940. 
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 US 
9 333 US 437, 1948. 
1947. 




operated under the 88me name by' a different partY' and there was no affili-
ation betveen the tvo except that the right to operate the studio was given 
by the Nev York proprietor to the nlaintiff. The court held that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act did not apply because there wasn't a "labor dispute" and the 
court could issue sn injunction. 
The "unity of interest" theory, already discussed, is also impor-
tant when requesting an injunction. If there is a "unity of interest", then 
there i8 8 "labor dispute" and neither an injunction nor damages can be 
secured. If the court does not find a "unity of interest", then injunctive 
relief is in odder. 
Another criteria apnlied is whether the means used cannot be con-
doned. Generally, the courts viII enjoin secondary picketing vhen violence 
is used. 11 
After the election of 1932 upon a national level, a new philosophy 
was presented wherein labor attained great favor. The National Industrial 
Recovery Act became the law in 1933 and agreements were permitted between 
emoloyers to promote the public welfare 80 that the protection of organized 
labor became a necessary corollar,.. 12 Thus, Rl8D7 ot the heavy industries 
11 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 763 v. Meadowmoor 
Dairies, 312 us ~7, 1941. 
12 48 u. s. Stat. 195. 
were organized, a heretofore unknown phenomerl1!l. On the other hand, many 
company unions were organized, believed permissab1e under Seotion 7 (8) b.r 
exPerts in the field. 13 A Nations1 I.abor Board was established to settle 
disnutes and eventually assumed the quasi-judioia1 function of interpreting 
section 7 (a). The Board experienced great difficulty beoause it had no 
means of obtaining comp1ianoe with an order exoept to remove the Blue Eagle. 
Public Resolution Number 44 allowed the President to establish boards to 
investigate any controversy arising under Section 7 (8) which obstruoted 
interstate commerce. Thereafter, a National Labor Relations Board was estab-
lished oonsisting or three full-time members. In 1935, the NRA was deolared 
unconstitutional because of en unlawful delegation of legislative powers to 
an administrative board. 14 Then, the National Labor Relations Aot became 
the lew of the land. 15 Although the National Association of Manufacturers 
vas extremely active in promoting opposition to the Wagner Act, there was 
surprisingly little controversy in Congress, undoubtedly due to the gravity 
of the economio situation and the uncertainty accentuated by the unoonstitu-
tione1ity of the NRA. Prior to the passage of the bUl, Senator wagner had 
testified that it was necesssry to include all persons in the definition of a 
13 Millis-Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, Chioago, 1950 
22. 
14 Scheohter Poultry Co. v. U. s., 295 US 495, 1935. 
15 49 U. s. Stat. 449. 
labor dispute, regardless of whether the participants stood in the proximate 
relationship of employer and employee. 16 Section 2 (9) of this Act incor-
porated this attitude stating: 
The term "labor dispute" includes any controverg,y concerning 
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the 
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fix-
ing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or 
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants 
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 
One of the most important results of the Wagner Act was the effect 
upon state labor legislation, the federal laws almost always seem.ing to set 
the fashion for the states. A few ·Ba~ Wagner Acts followed the federal 
legislation and guaranteed employees the right to organize and bargain collee 
tively_ And with the legislation ce .. a shift in previous legal philosoph)" 
and early statutory thought concerning boycott activity. What should be 
emphasized is that most of the comprehensive laws shifted the initial deter-
mination in a labor dispute from a court and were now under the control of 
administrative agencies which had been created and assigned specialized duties 
in the field of labor. 17 As previously noted, courts of law, often formal-
istic and with little knowledge of labor history, caused difficulty in pro-
moting industrial -peace and collective bargaining. To have experts, chosen 
1827. 
16 Legislative History of NatioD!l Labor Relations Act, II, 1935, 
17 Harry A. Millis &: Harold A. Katz, ttA Decade of State Labor 
Legislation, 1937-1947", University or Chicsm Lay Reviey, xv, 1947-1948, 282. 
so 
for merit in the field of labor law and relations, is a great improvement. 
It would be naive to assume that only the most qualified vere chosen to man 
the boards as most are political appointees and "to the victor belongs the 
spoils" still 8p~lies. But at least, the basic thought was there and many 
excellent boards funotioned, such as in the State ot New York. 
With the advent ot World War II, mBrly states began prograq design-
ed to regulate union activity. What is surprising is that most ot the 
regressive regulatory programs were not found in the east and middle west, 
where industry is heavily concentrated, but in the so-called non-industrial 
areas of the United states. Undeniably, the reason for such seemingly unnec-
.ssary legislation was that if unions could be kept out, industry would be 
attracted to such areas. The history of the organization of the Textile 
Workers Union is filled with the movement of industry from the east to the 
southern geographio portion of the United states and the subsequent inevitable 
organizational drives. Farmers and business men can generall;y be expected to 
join the anti-union drives causing considerable labor difficulty 1n areas 
that are now inviting industr,.. A review will be made of state attitudes as 
expressed by legislation in the following chapter, concerning the effect of 
World War II end the Taft-Hartley. 
• 
CHAPTER V 
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT 
A, DIlOuB.iops in tne United State. Congre., 
The testimony presented prior to the 1947 amendments to the Wagner 
Act was voluminous, repetitiye, sometimes prejudiced and unnecessary. By 
noting the name of the person presenting evidence or the organization which 
he represented, one could be positive without reading the testimony as to 
whether he was for or against the proposed secondary boycott provisions. 
Although such biased testimony is definitely desirable, the complete lack of 
opinion by impartial observors vas evident with the exception of Mr. Ludwig 
Teller, a labor expert trom. the city of New York. The cost of preparing 
labor legislation is enormous and the consequences are graye. Yet, little or 
no attemnt was made to get the opd.nions of persons who could be classified as 
exnerts. For exsllple, when Mr. Green of the AFT ... or Ph!lip Murray of the CIO 
testified, both now deceased, one can be assured that the serious consequence. 
and the use of the secondary boycott will be minimi~ed. When representative, 
of employers' appear, by the same token, one can be certain that the abuse 
labor in using the secondary boycott will be overemphasized. But the so-
ealled expert and impartial witness, with a knowledge and understanding of 
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As previously noted, the evidence and testDaony was lengthy and 
often without purpose. To grant equal weight to the claiJDs of both labor and 
management, the highlights of the material will be presented and classified 
in accordance with the views expressed by management, unions, public officials 
and the lonely Mr. Teller. 
1t Abuses Noted by 1t!lnagement 
Robert S. Edwards, President of the National Electrical Manufactur-
erIe Association, testified of instances of abuse in the use of the secondary 
boycott prevalent in the construction trades and associated industries. 1 
The AFt International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, New York, completely 
controls the labor market in the installation of electrical equipment of all 
types. The union had refused to install e1ectrioa1 gadgets unless they were 
manufactured by the I. B. E. W. members in the manufacturing plants. Upon 
occasion should the employees of the manufacturer choose to affiliate with a 
union other than the I. B. E. W., the market was taken away from the employer 
though the latter had nothing to do with the choice of his employees. Mr. 
Edwards felt that the use of the boycott, in moat instances, was for juris-
dictional purposes 8S the CIO and .AFt were engaged in cOJll1)8titive membership 
drives. The objective of these boycotts were illegitimate, Mr. Edwards said, 
1 "Hearings Before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare", U. s. 
§!nate, 80th Congress, First Session on S. 55 and S. J. R. 22, 176-204. 
8S the purpose did not affect hours, wages and working conditions •. Mr. 
Edwards further noted that the CIC was actively engaged in an organi7Btional 
drive during the year 1934 and Local Number 3 of the I. B. E. W. in New York 
City wanted to chenge affi~iation. Manufacturers in New York city were told 
to influence their employees to remain affiliated with the AFt. (This 
evidence, incidentally, appears to be erroneous as the CIC was not officially 
organized in 1934.) Another example was the products manufactured by the 
General Electric Company and Westinghouse concern as their equipment could 
not be installed in New York because the employees were members of a CIC 
union. 
Some of the information given concerned the Benjamin Electric Manu-
facturing Company in Chicago whose employees voted for CIO representation. 
This concern sells lighting fixtures throughout the United States and the 
I. B. E. w. threatened a nationwide boycott on the products made by the 
Benjamin Company unless they agreed to have their fixtures wired by an elec-
trical contractor (generally, wiring ie done by the manufacturer) who employed 
I. B. E. W. labor. For a time, the company complied with the union order. 
However, the electrical contractor designated to do the wiring by Benjamin 
could not meet production quotas and a request was made by Benjamin for per-
mission to do some of the wiring at his factory. The I. B. E. W. refused. 
As a result, the company lost many orders and revenue when it notified dealers 




Mr. Edwards contended that such boycotts (really jurisdictional 
disputes) make for higher prices, emnloy~es lose their right to choose a 
representative for collective bargaining purposes, men are laid off because 
orders cannot be filled containing certain union labels, and the manufactur-
er, though complying with the provisions of the Wagner Act, looses business 
because of the inter-uniol'l squabbles. 
Senator Pepper, in questioning Mr. Edwards, asked if the eleotrical 
manufaoturers themselves did not ohannel nroduots through certa in wholesale 
distributors, thus oreating a monopoly. A definite answer was not given by 
Mr. Edwards. Sell8tor Pepper mentioned that the electrical manufacturers were 
also found guilty of violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in the case of 
Allen-Bradley v. Local Union No.3. 2 The ex-eongressional representative 
trom Florida then asked if the abuses l'lOinted out by Mr. Edwards could not be 
corrected b,y strengthening the anti-trust laws since union monopoly is often 
due to industrial monopoly. In the Allen-Bradley oase, the United states 
Supreme Court found that both the manur~oturers and the unions had oons.,,1red 
to restrain trade. The court f'urther said that had the union acted alone, the 
Sherman Aot would not have been violated under the Clayton and Norr1s-
LaGuardia provisions. Mr. Edwards was not briefed on a proper reply to 
Senator Pepper's query. 
statements were presented by Roland Rice and Sen R. Miller of the 
-
2 32S US 797, 1945. 
-
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American Trucking Association .3 to the effect that secondary boycotts should 
M outlawed because of the damage done to innocent th:1.rd perties and the pub-
He. Because of the strategic position of the trucking industry, an "unfair" 
ban can be placed upon any employer and the truckers union will not nermit 
the delivery of materials or merchandise to the secondary employer. The 
point was made that if an employer is prohibited by law from compelling his 
employees to join a union, then, b.Y the same token, the unions should be 
orohibited from trying to force him into an illegal aot. It also appeared 
that the trucking unions had notified emp1a,rers with whom they have contracts 
that they no longer will interchange bUsiness with other freight lines whose 
employees were not unionized. When the Machinist's union left the AFt, the 
Teamster's had attempted to organize their members which added to the strife. 
John R. Van Arnum., Seeretary, National League of Wholesale Fruit 
and Vegetable Distributors, Washington, D.C., stated that the Joint Council 
of Teamsters, No. 40, and the COlBlllission House end Produce Drivers, Local 944, 
of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, undertook to organize all people buying and 
delivering though they were self-employed with no employees (street pedd-
lars). 4 Theae unions had a contraot with the fresh fruit industry wherein 
the former had agreed to allow the delivery of fresh fruits and vegetables • 
.3 ·Hearings Before CODmlittee on Labor and Public Welfare·, Us g, 
Senate, JS.3-.3S9. 
4 n14" 494-497. 
They violated the agreement and boycotted all: members to the contract in 
their organizational efforts. Supl)Ort vas obtained from the other locals in 
the city so that the unloading and handling of perishable items which were 
struck in Pittsburgh were reconsigned to dealers in other cities such as 
Philadelphia and CincilU18ti. 
In Indianapolis, Indians, the teamsters local Number 23.3, AFt, had 
undertaken to organize the truck drivers, helpers and other employees of 
wholesale produce dealerse Because not more than twenty-five percent of the 
emolo.yees concerned belonged to the union, employees were ordered not to load 
or unload any merch.indlse to or trom Indianapolis. 
Local 929, AFt, Teamsters, Philadelphia, demanded certain condi-
tiona before signing 8 contract with jobbers in the produce market. To exert 
pressure so that the union demands were met, car lot receivers on the rsil-
road lines were beycotted when refrigerator cars were not unloaded, even 
though they were not a perty to the dispute. 
Because of the perishable quality of foods not canned or frozen, 
labors most effective weapon to gain its demands is the boycott, especially 
when the transportation is controlled. 
In Kaness City, milk producers had been sending their product te 
market b,y contracts with independent haulers. 5 Some of the truckers were 
-
5 lh!d., 1644-1647. statement by Charles Holman, Secretary, Nat-
ional Coouerative Milk Produoers Association. 
also milk produoers, picking un milk belonging to their neighbors. Local 
207, TeaMsters, Aft, Kansas, undertook to organize these truckers. To aid 
the union drive, employees of dairy companies were instructed to refuse te 
unload milk brought in by inde'!)endent truekers. The result was a great milk 
spoilage because the independents had to retlll'n the milk to the .farms, 
causing great loss. Thus, the losers were milk producers, with ,,,hom the 
union had no dispute. 
The Walker-Gordon Company, New Jersey, produoed and bottled oerti-
fied milk commonly prescribed ~ physic tans for infant feeding formulas and 
invalids. The Teamsters, Local 680, requested that the o01lpany make the 
union bargaining representative tor the men emoloyed on the farm. The com-
pany refused to eomnly with the union demand because of 8 possible violation 
of the law. In retaliation, the unions in distributing plants refused to 
handle the milk processed b.y the Walker-Gordon Company and drivers of trucks 
were not a lloved to haul the It contra band" • 
Fentries Hill, President of the Northern Redwood Lumber Co~ny, 
Korbel, California, told of 'Oicketing in California, hundreds of miles from 
the scene of a strike, those projects using redvood lumber because of dis-
obeying a boycott against the products of the struck plantse 6 Supposedly 
eighty pereent of all carpenters in the United states, belonging to the 
Carpenter Brotherhood, AFL, had agreed not to use wood cut b.r concerns whose 
6 lhW" Ins. 
.. gg 
employees were not members ot the Brotherhood. 
A written document was made a part ot the record, submitted by 
Charles Wilson, President, at that time, ot the General MOtors Corporation. 7 
The essence thereot was that secondary boycotts should be prohibited because 
tree enterprise was hampered. 
The Chamber ot Commerce ot the United states S and Harold stassen, 
former governor of Minnesota, oollege ~resident and currently on the exeou-
tive staft of President Eisenhower, 9 contended that jurisdictional disputes 
should be outlawed as should the picketing of innocent third persons. 
Ira MOsher of the Executive Committee ot the National Association 
of Manufacturers emphasized the taot that seoondary boycotts destroy collec-
tive bargaining and are partioularly harmful to smaller companies. When 
secondary bo)rcotts are oombined with tndustry-wlde barge ining and closed 
shops, a few men and unions have the power to '01&y havoo with the entire 
nation. 10 The general counsel tor the N. A. M., in a prepared dooument, 
alleged that unions justify the use of secondary boyootts as a means ot quar-
antining substandard labor oonditions. However, the unions then beoome the 
judge of what substandard oonditions are and oonsequently seoondary boyootts 
7 Ibid., 485-486. 
8 l!!£., 538·540. 
9 Ibid., 568-569. 
10 .ill£., 935-936. 
should be made il1elB1. 11 
2, Labors Position 
The following contains the evidence submitted b.Y unions, their 
leaders and attorneys to substantiate the contention that the secondary ba.y-
cott was necessary to American unions and were not harmful to the national 
economy. G. L. Patterson, general counsel for the United Rubber, Cork, 
Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, CIO, stated the secondary boycott 
1s a legal weapon necessary, in many instances, to attain a legitimate end.12 
He emphasized that b07cotts become necessary against emoloyers who engage in 
the operation of a plant under sweatshop conditions, selling upon a competi-
tive market with other emplo7ers whose emplo;rees are organized. 
Walter R. Batezal, editor of the Progressive Labor World, stated 
that some secondar7 boycotts were justified. 13 ae made specific reference 
to the Drinting industr7 where work is often sublet to non-union shops. 
William Green, former President of the AFt, was naturally tor the 
continued legitimacy ot the secondary bo7oott. 14 He alleged that in many 
instanoes, it was impractioal or impossible to establish decent work standards 
11 Ibid. J 1814. 
12 Ibid., 1552-1553. 
13 n!!l., 1938. 
14 Ibid., 9g1-992. 
save by pressure brought to bear upon customers of the unfa ir employer. He 
stated that the AFT. was against boycotts where another union had been certi-
fied by the Na tionB.l La bor Rela tiona Board and when boycotts are oonduoted 
merely beoause carta in products are produced in another a·rea. However, SO",,,,,uu.T 
sry boycotts are otten necessary to alleviate sweatshop conditions. 
Philip Murray, until recently President of the CIO, presented s1mi-
lar evidence. 15 He added that less than one peroent of the workers involved 
in strikes during 1946 engaged in seoondary boyootts. Where the boyoott was 
used in jurisdictional disputes, the AFI" the CID, and other inde'Dendent 
unions should ~nter into agreements and solve their own difficulties. It 18 
interesting to note that a member representing labor openly admitted that the 
jurisdictional boycott was 8 -problem. 
The president of the 011 'Workers International fJnion, CIO, Mr. O. A~' 
bight, stated that if' compa117 A 1.s struck and company B 8hips gasoline to A, 
then n can be picketed sinoe he 1s no longer 8 disinterested party. 16 
A. F. 'Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 
.'Ye testimony upholding the view preeented by Mr. Murray_ He was against 
,lD'il!ldietlonal disputes and the secondary boycott as associated therewith. 
he felt that it would be an error to meke all secondary boycotts 
15 lh,!$!., 1114-1115 and 1157-1159. 
16 lbiq., 1496-1497. 
17 Ibid., 2117-2118. 
Mr. Harvey W. Brown, International President ot the International 
Association ot Machinists, presented an interesting view. 18 He stated that 
a distinction should be made between boycotts that definitely operate agains 
the best interests of the public and a boycott about which there is a reason 
able doubt as to its value to society. Boycotts against goods made by 
"outside firms" (those not manutactured within a given area) should be made 
illegal and is consistent with the purpose ot the anti-monopoly laws even 
though the union concerned was acting without the aid of a going business. 
Evidently, Mr. Brovn had the Allen-Bradley case in mind. His reason vas tha 
unions were not organized to increase prices. 
3. The Congressional Outlook 
The views ot those representing the public wlll now be reviewed. 
In a minority report submitted b;y Senator Thomas of Utah, he clearly stated 
that new legislation was necessary to ban unjustifiable torms of labor 
abuse. 19 Although some forms of secondary ba,ycotts should be made illegal, 
others were necessary. The jurisdictional disputes should be outlawed but 
secondary boycotts intended to protect wage rates and working conditions 
should not be nrohibited. The appropriate goal he indicated was legislation 
which prohibited secondary boycotts in pursuance of unjustifiable objectives 
18 Ibid., 1614-1616. 
19 "Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act", I, 
!enate Minoritl Report Number 105, Part II, on S. 1126, 80th Congress, First 
SeSSion, 1945, 481-482. 
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but did not impair the unions right to preserve its own existence. He 
further added that the law, as proposed, was contusing snd failed to take 
cognizance of the trend in courts of law. The judiciary were beginning to 
turn from the practice of considering secondary boycotts in terms of the 
old common law conspiracy doctrine and were determining the 1ega1it7 of 
particular factual situations on the basis of the tort doctrine. Using such 
an approach, there was a growing acceptance of certain forms of action 
directed against parties who are not immediately involved in a law dispute 
where there was a "unity of interest" beween such 8 party and the disputing 
employer. Evidently, Senator Thomas felt tbet the doctrine enunciated in 
Goldfinger v. Feintuch 20 was sound and necessary to promote legitimate 
unionism. The Senator from utah felt that the leg1.slation proposed would 
reverse the trend indicated above. A refusal by one union to handle a 
product made by other non-union labor would be an unfair labor practice and 
Section 8 (b) (4) as prepared (and eventually enacted) should be more pre-· 
cise17 defined and limited. 
Mr. Gerald w. r..andie of Indiana presented another view. 21 He 
felt that the secondarT ba,ycott throws many innocent people out of work and 
many disinterested parties were deprived of the necessities of life. He 
20 276 N. Y. 281, 1937. 
21 "Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act", 
~ Senate Minority Report Number 105, 583-584. 
stated thBt the lettuce strike at Salinas in 1936 caused a loss of 2,000 
ears of lettuce because of a secondary boycott. In LosAngeles in 1946, 
20,000 pllons of "hot milk" 'Were dumped in front of the city hall. "Hot 
milk" here refers to a secondary boycott against the deliyery of any milk 
in 'Which the union involved thought that union milkers should be employed 
or the truckers delivering should be union members. Mr. Landis felt that 
the secondary boycott has hurt the innocent farmer badly since non-union 
trucks are threatened a8 are the dairY men themselves should they attempt to 
do their own hauling. 
He referred to a situation in Philadelphia when Local 929 of the 
Teamster's attempted t. organize the female clerks of wholesale produce 
dealers and the dealers 'Were powerless before the union demands. 
SeDBtor Ellender submitted evidence that a CIO union 'Was certified 
as bargaining representative of the employees neon sign manutacturers. 22 
When these signs vere distributed in various states, the AFt craft union 
members refused to install the signs because they bore CIO labels. When the 
CIO attempted to organize the cannery workers in Calitornia, the haulers 
belonging to the AFt allowed the fruits and vegetables to vaste in the fields 
the teamsters retusing to carry them. In Oregon, Washington and California, 
CIO longshoremen refused to unload lumber carried in ships manned by AFt 
22 Ib;td ., 1054. 
seamen. 
Senator Robert A. Taft noted unions failed to submit any evidence 
of when a secondary boycott vas necessary and for the general benefit of the 
communi t7. 23 
. Senator MOrse from Oregon felt that the purpose of Sec ion g (b) 
(4) vas to clog the federal courts vith petty litigation, havi.ng no objeot 
but that of veakening the labor movement. 24 
Mr. Pepper, then a Senator from Florida, stated that not only \0188 
the secondary boycott outlawed by the propesed legislation but that there 
was added the arbitrary and mandatory requirement that,. National Labor 
Relation Board Regional Attorney, upon nothing more than what he considered 
reasonable cause, seek an injunction. 25 Senator Pepper thought this un:f'air 
because a similar requirement was not put into the law when an employer 
commits an unta ir labor nraotice under Section g(a). 
The United States Secretary ot Labor at that time, Schwellenbach, 
stated that when an industrial organization violates the law and commits an 
unfair labor practice, the use of the secondary boycott should be legally 
permis88ble. 26 Other forms of enumerated justifiable aecondary boycotts 
,~ 
23 1h!!1., 1106. 
24 llU4., 1370. 
25 nJ4., 4200. 
26 ItHearings Before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare", U, §. 
hDate, 1959.l960, 
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vould allow, as an example, carpenters on construction jobs to refuse to 
install any millwork made by nonunion labor working for lover vages. He 
yould also permit the picketing of a retail store selling products of an 
unfair employer providing the placards carried by the pickets refer only to 
the prod.ncts in which there is a labor dispute. 
4. The Expert Vi!Vp2int 
Ludwig Teller, attorney from Nev York, arbitrator and labor rela-
tions consultant, felt that secondary boycotts should be regulated and 
innocent third parties should be protected. 27 However, protection should 
not be given to those who aid employers during 8 labor dispute. He felt 
that any retailer, purchasing merchandise with the knowledge of a labor dis-
nute, is no longer an innocent third party but becomes a person in interest 
eoonom.lcally and the union should be permitted to proceed against the 
retailer selling the unfair product providing banners are carried enumerating 
only the unfair employer or struok plant. 
,. A SJa!1!817 
A rew general observations can be safely made that would cover the 
entire proceedings prior to the passage of the 1947 additions. The most 
27 Ibid., 254-256. 
obvious point concerns the difference in preparation between those represent-
ing management and thoae "oarrying the ball" for labor. lI.s.nsgement definitel 
advanced a far better argument than labor by citing enumerable examples of 
unnecessary, unscrupulous and indefensible secondary boy-cotta. Labor on the 
other hand was unable to offer more than "there are good and there are bad 
boyootts". Yet, even then, most of the evidence subm'tted in behalf of 
Section 8(b)(4) concerned the jurisdictional boy-cott which is not the only 
tyPe of secondary boyoott. The handwriting was already on the 'W!lll a8 labor 
diffioulties were aooentuated due to the end of the war, rising prioes, 
searoe materials and a general reconversion to a peaoetime economy. By 
being veIl prepared and offering legislation against those asnects receiving 
the MOst unfavorable publicity, unions might have been able to avoid the 
restriction of all secondary activity-. 
Due to the press and radio publicity, the atmo8f)here of the entire 
hear1.ng definitely faTOred managements point of view. Rere 1!lgllltn, labor 
failed miserably by not having adequate public relations. Men in Congress, 
dependent upon votes for future nopularity and reelection, only eXPressed 
that which vas Itfashionable" shortly after '\ITorld War II. It is interesting 
to note that when President Trum-n vas given the Taft-Hartley bill for 
approval, George Ge.llu-o, director of the Ameriean Institute of Public Opin-
ion, conducted e poll amongst the voting population consisting of while 
collar Yorkers, laborers, farmers, professionals and business people. 28 
2S Iron A.gI, Vol. 159, Part III, June 5, 1947, 123. 
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The majority of those polled wanted t~e Presiaent to sign the new lawe 
However, manual laborers, skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled wented the 
President to veto the bill. By party denom.ination, thirty-five percent of 
those considering themselves as Democrats were for the bill, forty-nine 
percent wanted the legisll!!tion. vetoed and sixteen percent had no opinion. 
Of those professing Republican affiliation, sixty-three percent of those 
polled wanted the President to sign the bill whereas only twenty-three 
percent desired that President TrumBn veto the Act. Only fourteen percent 
were non-commltt.a1. 
As prev-:1ously mentioned, the jurisdictional dispute received a 
great deal of adverse 1')ublicity. Yet, in 1946, jurlsdicUoll8l disputes only 
accounted for 3.5% of the total number of work stoppages and only .$% of the 
totsl number of idle man-hours. 29 An analysis of th:h important issue dis-
closes that the jurisdictional dispute falls into two claes1f'1cations. The 
first problem involves the existance of craft unions and the limited juris-
diction of workers with definite occupations, usually of a highly skilled 
craft and often found in the ~onstruetlon trades. Because of the Impossi-
billty of devising e~haustive job classifications, duty designations and the 
terseeability of industrial changes, there are always areas of' uncertainty 
and overlap~lng. In the buildIng industry, thera are many squabbles over 
which trade shall attach metal trim, etc. The dispute is generally between 
-
29 :t;?nthlY tal:>or Revtew, Vol. 64, May, 1947, 795. 
-
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two creft unions, eech claiming control over the ~rticulsr task to be oer-
formed. The second nroblem involves s conflict between two unions over the 
right to sct as the colleetive bargaining representative for a specifio 
groun of workere. Despite the overlapping between the two types of eo-called 
jurisdictional dis?utes, there were different methods available for settling 
each. In the first, an administrative action vas necessary since no method 
vas available by which workers could exoress their views. In the second, it 
was possible to settle the dispute b.Y having the N. L. R. a. conduct an 
eleotion. It should be noted that a jurisdictional row is not necessarily 
a secondary boycott, es defined. 
Again one should note the lack of impartial and expert testimony 
with the exception of Ludwig Teller. For this, lebor, management and the 
80th Congress must share the blame. Because they are renresenting the 
publiC, t.he congressional committees should have been .far more selective and 
requested more impartial experts to nresent views before passing laws desi~-
ad to effect the entire nation. 
Dr The Con!tltut19D81 Asp.et 
When the Taft-Bertley was enaeted, many authorities doubt.ed the 
constitutionality of several of the provisions contained therein. Whenever 
the constitutional question of Section g (b) (4) vas raised before the 
respecti.e Courts of Appeal in various circuits, s11ch e8 th~ issuance of a 
"99 
temporary injunction under Seotion 10 (1), 3q or upon the Boards petition 
for a review or enforcement of orders under Seotion 10 (e) and (t), 31 the 
courts oonsistent1y upheld the secondary boycott provision against the 
argument that the curtailment ot the right to pioket violated the First 
Amendment of the United states Constitution. 
TdOng before Section 8 (b) (4) reached the Supreme Court, the ques-
tion of the oonstitutiona1 protection of tree speech when B union picketed 
10'88 "batted" about. In the 8iboney CBse, the court upheld the right of a 
state to regulate picketing when used in an attempt to achieve a result in 
confH.ot with the nub1ic po1:1cy of a state as enunciated in a statute. 32 
Here, the union had picketed a supplier ot ice to compel him, contrary to 
the Miss6uri Anti-Trust Law, to sell ice only to those drivers who were 
members of the union and to stop the sale to the non-union drivers or inde-
pendent contractors, whom the union was trying to orgsni.ze. The Court 
specifically st$ted that the United states constitution cermot be used as a 
shield to break 8 state law. There was nothing in the constitution under II 
the First Amendment granting a union the right to ex~ress itself contrary to 
30 Printing Snecisltie. & Paper Converters Union v. LeBaron (Seal-
right), 171 F.(2) 331, 1948. 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Sperry (Wadworth), 170 F. 
(;2) 363, 194f~. 
31 NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Eleotrioal Workers (Langer) 
181 F.(2) 54, 1950. 
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Cementers (Wadsyorth), 194 F. 
(2) 60, 1950; certiorari den1ed 341 US 490, 1949. 
32 Giboney v. Empire storage &: Ice Co., 336 US 490, 1949. 
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public policy. Although the Ritter. Cate case 33 had also restricted the 
union picketing, many felt that these situations were confined to the 
specific factual cases end that the basic right to picket, unrestrained, 
remained unchanged. 34 In a fiYe to four decision, the court, in the Ritter 
case, upheld the issuance of an injunction to prevent the picketing'ot 8 
restaurant by a union whose only grieY8nce was that the owner had let 8 con-
tract to a non-union contractor to construct a building which was in no way 
connected with the restaurant business. In the Wohl case, a state court had 
enjoined the picketing of suppliers of independent peddlars with whom the 
union had a dispute. 35 Union members distributing bakery goods had attempt-
ed to induce independent peddlars to work six daY's a week a nd to hire an 
unemploY'ed union member one daY' a week. The union picketed the customers 
purchasing from the peddlers because no other means were available. The 
Supreme Court held that there was no unconstitutional invasion because of the 
right of tree speech granted to unions and others. The Ritter and Wehi O8se. 
could be distinguished on the theory that the former inyolved .econdary 
"picketing of a different industry than that with which the union was engaged 
in a labor dispute whereas the Wohl case concerned 8 diapute in the same 
industry. It can readilY' be seen that the issue was subject to doubt and the 
-
33 315 U. S. 722, 1942. 
1942. 
34 Carpenterts & Joiners Union Y. Ritterts Cate, 315 US 722, 




effect of these decisions upon Section (8) (b) (4) plaoed the outlawing of 
the secondary boyoott in the speculative area. 
With the decision rendered h1 the Supreme Court in Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 36 the expert in the field of labor law felt that picketing was 
entitled to protection 8S a right of tree speech although there was consid-
erable doubt 8s to the extent to which this right could be limited. 
Later, the Supreme Court rendered decisions in three cases defin-
italy setting forth the doctrine that picketing was something more than free 
speech and iii state could regulate picketing whenever it was contrary to 
reasonable public policy ss enunciated by court decisions or statutes. 37 
As s result of these decisions, the United States highest court's opinion 
determining the constitutionality of Section (S) (b) (4) csme as an anti-
climax. In the Langer esse, 38 the court discussed the contention that 
Section (8) (b) (4) violated the constitution h1 citing the Giboney, Hanke, 
Ga zzam and Hughe8 cases. If picketing vas proscribed in furtherance of an 
unlawful object, then the guarantee of tree speech did not apply to the 
present 1.8ue. 
1950. 
36 310 US g8, 1940. 
37 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 US 470, 
Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 OS 532, 1950. 
Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 us 460, 1950. 
38 I. B. E. W. v. NtRB, 341 US 694, 1951. 
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Although the right of tree speech snd Section S (e) 39 is a sub-
jeet apart, mention is made herein a8 unions had contended that Section 8 
(b) (4) and Section ~ (e) must be considered together. Unions argued that 
conduct which merely consisted of peacefully persuading or inducing action 
was not a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) providing that the requirements of 
Section 8 (c) were complied with. However, the courts have consistently 
held that Congress did not intend that Section 8 (b) (4) should be subject 
to the "free speech" clause. 40 The reasons given were that to exeJlll>t 
neaceful secondary picketing from the prohibitory clause of Section 8 (b) 
(4) would in effect permit secondary boycotts contrary to the intent of 
Congress and the door would be opened to customary secondary means of enlist-
ing the support of "disinterested" employees in use prior to the present Act 
to bring eoonomic pressure to besr on employers, contrary to the legislative 
history of the Taft-Hartley. Therefore, the nurpose of Section ~ (c) was to 
protect non-ooereive speech in the furtherance of a lawful object and was 
not intended that it be extended to unfair labor practices. 
In contrast to the constitutional protection which had been granted 
39 Sec. 8 (0), "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, 
or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual 
torm, shall not constitute or be evidenoe of an unfair labor practice under 
any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of 
reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 
40 NLRB v. Denver Building Trades COuPeil (Gould & Preisner), 341 






to picketing as an exercise of the right ot tree speech, the right to strike 
is not protected by common law nor the federal constitution. 41 No argument 
has been advanced that the prohibition of strikes as enunciated in Section g 
(b) (4) was unconstitutional. HoweV'er, in the Rice Milling O8se, 42 the 
court noted that Congress did not intend to outlaw the primary strike when 
conducted for legitimate labor goals. 
g. the Aot and Its InterPretation 
The interpretive problems regarding seoondary boycotts oonfronting 
the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts are many and 
varied. An explanation of the procedural questions is necessary before the 
sub~tantive law is analyzed and reviewed. 
The Act, in Seotion 10 (e), 43 oontains the necessary oonstitution-
81 nroV'isian which provides for court review after 8 deoision is rendered by 
the Board and such determinations are enforced uPon petition to the Court of 
41 Dorcby' v. Kansas, 272 US 306, 1926. 
42 NLRB y. International Rice Milling Co., 341 US 665, 1951. 
43 Section 10 ee) ••• ltehall be subject to review by the 8'Ppro- I, 
'()riate circuit court of appeals if application was made to the district 
court as hereinaboV'e proV'ided and by the Supreme Court of the United States ',I 
UPOn writ ot certiorari ••• ". 
Appeals in the proper anpellate district. Seetlon 10 (1) 44 makes it manda-
tory for ~he Regional Attorney of the Board to secure 8 temporary injunction 
in a United States district court when there is reasonable cause to believe 
that Section 8 (b) (4) (A), (a) or (C) has been violated after a preliminary 
investl~tion has been conducted. 
The Board is charged with the interpretation and enforcement of 
Section 8 (b) (4) and issues of constitutionality are to be determined b.1 
the courts alone. 45 The re,orte and recommendations of the Examiners are 
final under Section 10 (c) unless a disputant files an exception within 
twenty days after the opinion by the examiner is officially rendered. 46 It 
should be noted that opinions rendered by Trial Examiners are only of value 
until the Board or the federal courts have passed upon the exaot question in 
issue. A SOl~ce of confusion concerning the substantive provisions of 
Section a (b) (4) lies in inconsistent court deci"ions and BoArd rulings 
betl,Teen various jurisdictions and individual eases. As already indicated, 
44 Section 10 (1). "Whenever it is charged that en1 person has 
engaged in en unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph .4 (t), 
(B), or (C), of Section 8 (b), the preliminary investigation of such charge 
shall be made forthwith and giTen priorlt7 over all other eases except ••• 
If, after such investigation, the officer or regions.l attorney to whom the 
matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe suoh charge is true 
and thBt a oomplaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition 
any distriot oourt of the United states ••• n • 
45 Rite-Form Corset Co., Inc., 75 NLRB 174, 1947. 
46 Section 10 (c). " ••• and if no exoeptions are filed within 







the Regional Attorney, under Section 10 (1) :fa required to seek a temporary 
restra ining order when there is suffic ient ev:i.dence available d !sclos ing a 
union violation of the secondary boycott provisions. As a result, federal 
district courts frequently peas upon issues which the Board has not yet 
decided. The Board has taken the position, with good reason, that decisions 
rendered on petitions for temporary injunctions are not binding upon the 
Board and are not res adjudicata. 47 The Gould and ?reisner case, which will 
be subsequently discussed, went to the Supreme Court and the position advane-
sd by the Board was upheld since a petition for an injunction is not decided 
upon a full hearing nor are all the merits and arguments presented. However" 
all other decisions are binding upon the Board. 
1. The Jurisdictional A8P!C~ 
Concern:i.ng jurisdiction, the mAD decides the iRsue on a "case to 
ease" basis and it is not bound by the determination of the General Counse118 
Under the Wagner Act, the power of the Board to hear disputes involving the 
47 Denver Building Trades Council (Gould & ?reisner), S2 NLRB 
1195, 1949. 
Denver Building Trades Counsil (Grliuman), S2 NLRB 9.3, 1949. 
19M~. 
Le Bus v. Pacific Coast Marine Association, 23 LRRM 2027 (ta.), 
Evans v. T. T. n., 76 F. SupP. 881 (Ind.), 1948. 
GrahaM v. Boeing' Airplane Co., 22 tRRM 2243 (Wash.), 1948. 
48 Retail Clerks International Association (A-1 Photo Service), 
83 NT~B 564, 1949. 









oonstruction industry wae never constitutionally tried. Prior to the 1947 
ohanges, the B08rd had deolined to take ,jurisdiction over disputes 1n the 
building industry beoause of limi.ted resources and faoilities. However, with 
the passage of the 1947 amendments, the Board exeroised jurisdiction in the 
construction trades. The Board took jurisdiction in a case involving an 
electrical contractor, the total value of the services and materials being 
$325.00, because suopliers of material from another state were involved. 49 
In the Gould and Preisner case, interstate oommeroe was affeoted where the 
subcontractor against whom the union activities were directed purchased 
sixty-five peroent of it~ raw materials outside of the stete and most of the 
rini~hed products, though purchased within the state, were also ~rodueed 
outside the state. Interstate commerce vas further affected where two union 
carpenters and one sheet-metal worker left a job three days nrior to com-
~letion. 50 When the caee went to the Court or Anneals, the issuance of an 
injunction by the lower court was upheld because the drive-in theatre 
business involved lBrge sums of money though the individual contributions 
vere slRBll. 
The Board issued a series of decisions to serve as a guide when 
49 I. B. E. W. Local 501 (Langer), 23 LRRM 1661, 1949. 






jurisdiction would be taken. 51 Under the crJteria cited, a good portion ot 
the building industry would not meet the requirements spelled out and there 
is serious doubt that Congress intended such standards. The Supreme Court 
in 341 U.S., at page 684 52 clearlY' held that the Board can refuse to take 
jurisdiction though there is a substantial effect upon oommerce if the Board 
states that the policies ot the Act will not be effected. However, in spite 
of suoh forceful language, a reoent 08se before the Court ot Appeals reversed 




2. A fAbor Organi.l!.ation Defined 
Section 2 (5) detines the type ot labor organization covered by 
51 WBSR, Ino., 91 NLRB No. 110, 1950. 
Local Transit Lines, 91 NLRB No. 96, 1950. 
The Borden Co., 91 NLRB No. 109, 1950. 
Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co .. , Ltd., 91 m:,RB No. 116, 
Hollow Tree Lumber Go., 91 NT~B No. 113, 1950. 
Federal Dairy Co., Inc., 91 NLRB No. 107, 1950. 
Dorn'~ House ot Miracles, Inc., 91 NIP-B No. g2, 1950. 
The Rutledge Paper Products, Inc., 91 NLRB No. 151, 1950. 
Memphis Cold storage Warehouse Co., 91 ~TLRB No. 219, 1950. 
Willard, Ino., 2 NLRB 1094, 9aF (2) 244, 194A. 
52 DenverBul1ding Trades Council (Gould & Preisner) v. NLRB. 
53 Joliet Contractors Association v. NLRB, 193 F (2) e33, 1952, 
1,1, 
the Taft-Hartley. 54 The Board, in the case -involving the Di Giorgio Fruit 
Corporation,55 ap~lied Section 2 (3), 56 and held thnt 8 union composed of 
agricultural employees was not 8 labor organization under the Act eno, as 8. 
result, incapable of violating Section 9 (b) (4). However, a separate local 
of Teamsters ",hose membership included truck drivers of other emo1oyers as 
well as those employed by Di Giorgio vas hold to be a labor union eanable of 
com.m1.tting a secondary boycott under Section ~ (b) (4). A question arose as 
to whether a Dolltica1 subdivision, e Board of Education, came under the 
jurisdiction of thp. NJJRB. 57 The Board held that the Act excluded govern-
mental agencies. 
J. The TYpe of Induc,ments Not Proscribed 
Should inducements be !lisde by a unton to a supervisor, 58 or an 
54 Section 2 (5). "The term tt1abor organ:1.Y..ationtt means any organ-
ization of any kind, or any agenoy or employee representation committee or 
plan, in which employees pertioipate and which exists for the puroose, in 
whole or in part, of dealing with employers ooncerning grievances, labor dis ... 
putes, wages, rates of nay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.U 
55 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Di Giorgio Fruit Corp.) 
87 NLRB 720, 1949. 
56 Section 2 (3 ).. It ••• , but shall not include any individual 
emnloyed as an agricultural laborer ••• n • 
57 A1 J. Schneider, Inc., S9 NLRB 221, 1950. 
58 Arkansas Express, Inc., 92 NLRB 255, 1950. 
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emple,er, 59 or a single employee, 60 the Act is not violated. An individ-
us1 union member cannot commit an unfair labor practice unless acting as an 
agent tor the union concerned. In the Gould ease, the Board held that the 
withdrawal ot services ot one man was not a strike since there wasn't a 
concerted stoppage 8S required by statute. Presumably, a consumer's boycott 
is not proscribed, even it involving employees ot the secondary employer, 
because the concerted refusal must be in the course ot employment. 61 
/ .. A,encI 
An agent ot a union is detined in Section 2 (13) and incorporates 
the common law doctrine ot agency_ Thus, when presented, there is always a 
tactual question as to whether the ~r8on instituting the boycott had express 
or implied authority to commit an unfair labor practice, whether the acts 
committed were within a union agents apparent authority or whether the agents 
action, it not within his position scope, was ratitied by the union. It 
becomes obvious that a mere union member, not an otticial nor baving admin-
istrative powers, cannot ordinarily involve a union in an unfair practice. 
To date, the agency problem has not been considered by the Board in a ease 
59 studio Carpenters v. Loews, Inc., 182 F(2) 16A (Cal.), 1950. 
60 Denver Building Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 82 NLRB 
1195, 1949. 
61 NLRB v. Service Trade Chaufteurs, 191 F(2) 65, 1951. 
arising under Section 8 (b) (4). However, the question ot agency 1s not 
peculiar to the secondary boycott and the Board has reviewed this problem 
in oth.r cas.s. 62 
5, The Independent Contractor 
Whether the conduct with which the union is charged constitutes a 
secondary boycott depends upon the relationship between the two employers 
and the control exerted by the primary employer over the "neutral" business. 
It the relationship is 80 close that one may be regarded as the "all,- ot 
the other, picketing or other secondary activity is permiesable during a 
legitimate labor dispute. Generally, the relationship ot contractor and sub-
contractor is not sufficiently close, as evidenced in the construction 
industry, to call the two employers "allies", nor are the employers "allies" 
when one deals almost exclusively in the products of the other, where the 
ownership is entirely separate snd distinct. In the Schenley case, 63 the 
union had struck several distributors of Schenley products and ita members 
employed by other distributors had refused to handle Schenley product. in an 
effort to compel the primary employer to settle 8 strike in one of its sub-
62 Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79 NLRB 1487, 19M~. 
Smith Mfg. Co., Inc., 74 NtRB 544, 1947. 
Perry Norv,ll Co., 80 NLRB 225, 1948. 
The Great A & P Tea Co., 81 NtRB 880, 1949. 
63 NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, 178 F. (2) 
584" 1949. 
sidiary plants. The court rejected the unionJs contention that there was a 
sufficient identity of interest between Schenley and the distributors to make 
them "allies" since the distributors were independent contractors who merely 
market large quantities of SChenley products. 
The construction and need1e.trade industries bave always subcon-
tracted work and the question arose vhether Congress intended to protect an 
employer who sought to avoid the etfects of a strike by subcontracting to 
other firma. The mere tact that the tvo employers ere nalliea" in the sense 
that the term is used in the business world is no detense against a secondar 
boyoott charge. There needs to be some degree of control exercised by the 
primary employer oyer the so~a11ed neutral employer. In the construction 
industry, it is ve11 knovn that subcontractors are constantly employed and 
there appears to be little dispute vith decisions holding that union picket-
ing of 8 subcontractor hired by a general contractor is a secondary boycott. 
In the needle trades, subcontracting is only prevalent during the seasonal 
'Oeriods. To avoid a labor dispute, it vould be a simple matter to merely 
subcontract 88 lIueh of the vork as possible, thus avoiding the effects of 8 
union drive. Here, an equitable solution becomes difficult. 
The Ebasco case vas one of interest and concerned the independent 
oontractor problem. 64 A CIO union, composed of architects, engineers and 
technicians called a strike against the Ebasco Services, Inc., 8 company 
64 Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supn. 
672 (N. I.), 1948. 
engaged in engineering design projects as con.sultants. Part of the work of 
this concern was sublet to the Project Engineering Company, with Fbaseo 
supervisors closely inspecting and handling the work performed by the second 
ary eDtployer. Aiter the strike was called, Ebasco increased the amount of 
work subcontracted to the Project concern. The Regional Attorney, 8S re-
quired b7 Section 10 (1), sought an injunction whioh wes denied by the 
District Court because of an identity of interest between the two employers. 
The court felt that Project Engineering was not an innooent third pllrty 
because of the close supervision exercised over the employee. of the former. 
This decision seems in line with the intent of Congress which was expressed 
by Senator Taft prior to the passage of the Act. 
This provision makes it unlawful to resort to • secondary boycott 
to injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned 
in the disagreement between an employer and his employees. 65 
A similar result was reached in a case involving a suit for damages. 66 
6 , Suits for Dama us 
In Gerry v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 67 the 
court nroperly denied the petition of a private party for injunctive relief 
65 93 Congressional Record 4323, April 29, 1947. 
66 Mills v. Plumbers Union, 23 LRRM 2559 (MO.), 1949. 
67 21 tRRM 2209 (Cal.), 1948. 
under Section )0) (b). 68 Section 303 permits suits for damage. b.Y private 
persons in courts and not before the Board. The substantive rights provided 
b.Y Section )03 and the remedies at Section g (b) (4) are identical. The 
ditference is only one of procedure since Seetion 8 (b) (4) require. the 
Regional Attorney ot the Board to a.k for en injunction and Section 303 per-
mits suita b.1 private parties for damages. A number of cases tested the 
jurisdictional requirements under Section 303 (b). Section 301 (., provides 
for suits in violation of contracts and Section 303 (b) provide. tor suite 
to be brought in the United State. Distriot courts nwitbout respect to the 
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the partiesn • 
The Southern District of New York held that Section 303 creates a new tederal 
right and there i8 no requirement of diversity. 69 On May 1, 1950, the Court 
of Appeals tor the Ninth District held that there was no requirement for 
diversity of citizenship in a suit under Section 303, reversing a lower court 
opinion. 70 
68 Section 303 (b). "Whoever shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason or any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any 
distriot court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions 
ot Section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any 
other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages 
by him sustained and the cost of the suit." 
69 Baumer Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 25 LRRM 2498 
(H. Y.), 1950. 
70 26 LRRM 2136, 1950. Certiorari denied by the U. S. Supreme 
Court, 26 LRRM 2611, 1950. 
Private suits for damages under Section 30) have Beldom been 
brought to court considering the nUDlber of charges being rUed under union 
unfair practices. However, the recent decision in the Juneau case may change 
managements inertia. 71 The trial court awarded three-quarters of a million 
dollars in damages and the Supreme Court upheld the verdict in a jurisdio-
tional dispute. The union had contended that the National Labor Relations 
Board must make a determination under Section 10 (k) 72 before a private 
person could sue for damages. The court held that Section )0) is a separate 
remedy and a determination was not necessary by the Board before damages are 
sought in a court of law. 
7. Ie There a strike? 
The Board must often determine whether the action the union 18 
charged with constitutes a strike in violetion ot' Section a (b) (4). Section 
501 73 covers the question of strikes or whether the activity constitutes the 
71 International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 
US 237, 1952. 
72 Section 10 (k). " ••• , the Board is empowered and directed to 
hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall 
have arisen •• ,ft. 
73 Section 501 (2). "The term ·striken include. any strike or 
other concerted stonpage of work b.1 employees (including a stoppage b.1 reason 
ot' the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement) and any concerted 
slov-down or other concerted interruption of operations by employees,-
• 115 
exeroise of the right to seek other employment. Section 502 permits an 
employee to quit his job in accordanoe with the oonstitutional prohibition 
of involuntary servitude. 74 The Watson Speoia1ty Store case first faoed 
this problem. 75 Here, the members of the Carpenter's union ceased work one 
day prior to the erfeotive date of the Taft-Hartley and the court held that 
there was no evidence i.ndioating that the workers intended to quit their 
jobs. In the Osterink oase, 76 the Board found that the union oal1ed a 
strike in violation of Seotion 8 (b) (4) (1) when tva men were removed trom 
a job. In the Gould & Preisner decision, the Board said calling one man off 
8 job \188 not a strike. 77 While the deoisions rendered in oases involving 
V8lkouts by one person or by tva or llOre have determined whether a plant is 
"struck", the approach appears to be unrealistic. The question is whether 
a strike 1s intended and not whether one or two men are involved. 
When 114 from 8 total of 115 union members quit their jobs within 
a short period or time, the Board held that the employees had engaged in a 
74 Section 502. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to re-
quire an individual emplo16e to render labor or service without his consent, 
nor shall anything in this Act be construed to make the quitting of his 
labor by an individual employee an illegal aot; ••• ". 
75 22 teRM 2247, 1948. 
1949. 
76 Briok1ayer's Union (Osterink Construetion Co.), 82 NtRB 228, 




strike though the unions attempted to disguise the walkout. 78 Here, the 
Electrical Workers Brotherhood was unable to dissuade the corporation 
managing the atomic energy plant at Oak Ridge from letting an electrical 
contract for certain repairs to a non-union contractor who had submitted the 
lowest bid. The union members, in protest, resigned their jobs individually 
or in groups within several days. When the Regional Attorney secured an 
injunction, the em:ployees who had "quit" their job returned. 79 '!'he union 
had contended that the employees had quit for personal reasons but this view 
was rejected b,y the Board. 
S. Section a !bl (4) (Al 
Although Section 8 (b) (4) contains four subdivisions, the last 
(D), applies to jurisdictional disputes and will not be reviewed SO since 
such proscribed activity does not constitute a secondary boycott as defined. 
The activities forbidden by Section 8 (b) (4)(A), (8), and Co) will be dis-
78 Hatter of Electrical Workers (Roane Anderson Co.), 82 ILRB 696, 
1949. 
79 Styles v. Local 760, I. B. E. W., 80 F. Supp. 119 (Tenn.), 1948 
80 Section 8 (b) (4) (D). "forcing or requiring any employer to 
assign particular work to employees in a particular labor or8&nization or in 
a particular trade, craft, or class, unless such employer 1s failing to con-
form to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining 
representative for employees performing such work". 
cussed. 
Most problems have arieen under (A) 81 whieh ".. designed to stop 
the use of economic coercion or pbJsical force upon any eap1..,er of 8elf-
eaployed person. In the Schenle,. Distiller,. case, the union was involved in 
a pr11tsr,. dispute with stagg, a manufacturing subsidiary of SchenleY'. 82 
The union refused to handle products of the SchenleY' distributers 8S 8 method 
af economic coercion. An unfair labor practice charge was made by Jardine, 
a distributor of Schenle,.. The union contended that Jardine was not a MU-
tral distributor, haYing an interest in the SchenleY' products. The Board 
said tbet the facts dittered trom tbet in the Ebesca case (previousl,. dis-
cussed) because there was no tinancial or other relationship that would 
indicate eontrol by Schenle,. over its distributors. The Circuit Co\U"t sub-
sequently affirmed this .iew, 83 and other Board decisions have to11ovecl 
suit. 84 Welther the Board DOl' the courts have shown a117 tendeno,. to follow 
81 Section 8 (b) (4) (A). "foroing or requiring any employer or 
se1t-e.,loyed person to join al'l7 labor or employer orpDi2lllltlon or any emplo,. 
er or other person to cease using, selling, handling, traDsporting, or other-
viae dealing in the products ot any other producer, proce.sor, or manutactur-
ar, or to cease doing business with any other person.-
1949. 
1949. 
82 Wine, LiqUGr &: Distillery Workers, 78 NLRI 504, 1948. 
83 NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers, 178F. (2) 584, C1-2, 
84 Metal Polishers Union (Climax Machinery Co.), 86 NUtS 1243, 
latio,.l Union ot Marine Cooks (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.), 87 
NLRB 54, 1949. 
I; 
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the "unit,. of interest" rule propounded tv' the New York courts in Goldtinger 
v. Feintueh where the two employers are oompletely independent ot one 
another. 
In the Sohenley case, the union oontended that its aotions at the 
warehouse. of the distributerl!J were not d'reoted against the princ!'ple but 
resulted from an accUllulation of unresolved grievances at each ot the dis-
tributors which eonstituted a primary dispute. The Board did not 'lind 
sutficient evidence to support the unions point of view and the strike at 
the distributor. vas intended to attect Schen1ey's. The Board and Court 
said tbat the Act did not require that the picketing of the distributcrs need 
not be the sole union motive to be proscribed. 
'l'he use of the unfair list b.T unions is worthy of speoia1 mention. 
The Grauuan ea.e held that merely placing a primary em.plO1er on an unfair 
list vas not a violation of subsection (A) and is similar to direct picketing 
even though one of the efteots of such a listing might well be that some 
employees would withhold their servioes from the aeeondaryemployer. 85 In 
the Oat.rink O8se, previously decided, the Board held that placing the name 
of the primary employer on an untair ltst vas a violation of Section 8 (b) 
(4) (A) 86 and the Grauman deei.ion speoifioally reversed this ruling. 
8S Deuel' Building &: Trade. Council, 87 NtRB 755, 1949. 
86 Bricklayer's Union (O.teriDk Construction Co.), 82 NtRB 228, 
1949. 
Unions are also forbidden to make attempts to torce an employer 
or selt-eDlployed person to become a member ot an employer's association. 
This provision was intended to outlaw trade associations which act as oolleo-
tive bargaining agents for its .embers thereby imposing unitorm contract 
prOYisions on an industry- wide basis or by locality. S7 
In the Western Express Company decision, the union had instructed 
an employee 01' the secondary employer not to unload a trailer received rrem 
a trucker with whom the union had a dispute. gg In detense, the union 
alleged that it only issued suoh instruotions to determine whether the 
secondary emplo,yer's use ot the trailer contlicted with a olause in the 
union's contract with the neutral, which reserved to the union the right to 
accept freight bound tor struok establishments. The Board held that the 
object ot the unions conduot was to toree the seoondary emplo.yer to cease 
doing business vith the struck firm until the applicability of the clause 
in the contract was determined. Such action was a temporary- boycott and Ii 
violation ot Section 8 (b) (4) (A). 
ff7 Barker v. United Brotherhood ot Carpenters &: Joiners, 21 LRRM 
2406 (Ala.), 1948. 
Le Baron v. Printing Special ties It Paper Converters Union, 7' 
F. SUpPa 67g (Cal.), 1948. 
Sperry- .... United Brotherhood ot Carpenters It Joiners, 21 LRRM 
2244 (Kansas), 1948. 
Douds v. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 75 
F. Sup~. 414 (Nev York), 1947. 
88 Local 294, International Brotherhood at Teamsters, (Western 
Express Co.), 91 NtRB 340, 1950. 
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The Board has determined that a uniPn does not violate (1) when it 
pre'ftlils upon customers, who are also supervisors, to abstain trom purchasing 
the employer' 8 produots. ~ Often, the Board is ca lled upon to determine 
what is "induoement or encouragement. ot employees so as to tall within the 
proscribed activity_ In a pertinent case, the Board held that there was 
,! inducement or encouragement" when a union agent had his secretary oall uniun 
members employed at various meat markets to inform them that a specific whole-
sale meat dealer had been plaoed on an "unfair" list. 90 The union relied 
upon the Grauman case which held that the activity vas primary when the union 
within its own councils claseified a primary employer as unfair. The Board 
rejected this view because relaying the information b.1 telephone to the 
employees at the place of business of the secondary employer was tantamount to 
a specific instruction to cease work. 
In a recent Board case, union members called a strike when they were 
required to work on shingle. produced 1n a Canadian mill whioh did not bear a 
union label. 91 The union contended that since the product was foreign made, 
the action was pr1-.ry so that the "inducement and encouragement" was not the 
89 Local 878, International Brotherhood of Tea_ters (Arkansas Ex-
press), 92 NLRB 255, 1950. 
90 A_lga_ted Meat Cutters, Local No. 303 (Western, Inc.), 93 N'IBB 
336, 1951. 
91 Washington-oregon Weavers Council (Bound Shingle Co.), 101 NLRB 




type proscribed b.y the Act. The Board, in effect, said, although it did not 
have jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer, it did have the power to 
remedy unfa ir pre ctices of unions in this country and the secondary employer 
and the violation occurred within the Board's jurisdiction. 
The Board, in another oase, found that ~A) was violated when union 
members, employed b.y the trucking compan1es, refused to handle merchandise 
Bought to be delivered or picked up at their employers t premises by other 
concerns unless the driver attempting the delivery or pickUp was a member of 
the sa_ union. 92 In addition, the union was guilty of an unfair labor 
praotice b.r preventing nonunion orews of the visiting concerns from performing 
services upon equipment belonging to the trucking companies because the union 
objective was to force the two employers to sever business relations. 
9. §eetion 8 (b) (4) (a) 
Section 8 (b) (4) (D) forbids a union from forcing another employer 
to bargain with a union which has not been certified. 93 This vas designed to 
prevent 8 union in one plant trom boycotting some other employer for whose 
empl.,..ees 8 union has not been certified. Thus, it appears that synlpathy 
92 Teamsters, AFL, (Irvin J. Cooper, Jr.), 101 NLRB 10. 215, 1952. 
93 Section a (b) (4) (a). "forcing or requiring any other employer 
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his 
IDlployees unle •• such labor organization has been certified as the representl-
tive of such employees under the provisions of section 9H • 
.. 
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strikes, which haYe as their "object" the use of force upon the unrelated 
employer to recognize er bargain with an uncertified union, is proscribed. 
However, a syapsthy strike, which has some "objeot" other than the one pre-
vious1y stated or where the labor organization which it sought to compel the 
unrelated employer to recognize or bargain with has been certified by the 
NLRB, is permisssble under the Aat. 
In a dispute involving members of the Teamsters unien, a local 
department store was picketed to force a parcel delivery service, which had • 
contract with the department store, to recognize the union as the bargaining 
agent. 94 The Board held that fa) ws violated. In the Kanawha Coal case, 
subsequently cited, the Board held that the union violated (D) when it sought, 
by seconda17 pressure, to compel certain independent dealers to join an 
employer's association with which the union bad a olosed shop agreement. Had 
the union been successful, the lumber dealer would have become subject to the 
union's contract and would have to reaognize the union without it being certi-
fied. .Bringing pressure on an em:p1oyer almost two years after the right to 
represent the employees had been taken awy by s petition for decertification 
violated fa). 95 
94 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Howland Dry Goods Co.), 
85 NtRB 1037, 1949. 
95 Construation taborers Local 320 (Armco Drainage & Metal Products, 
Inc.), 93 NLRB 751, 1951. 
10. §ection 8 (b) {4} (cl 
Section 8 (b) (4) (C) torbids a union to use its eoonomic powers 
to torce an eaployer to bargain with one union when another has been certified 
a8 the bargaining representative ot his eaployees. 96 Due to the organiza-
tional drives b;y the CIO and Aft, lDI!Uly labor disputes with e."l.,.ers were 
undertaken to gain greater meRlbership and power tor the union attempting the 
venture. It the employer intervened prior to 1947, there ws a good pGsslbU-
ity that he would have been guUt,. ot an unfair labor practioe. It he did 
nothing, the employers business suttered. Another reason for banning sueh 
aotivity oaD be found in state court decisions represented b.r Florshe1m Shoe 
Company v. Retall Shoe Sale8men's Union 97 and Swenson v. Central Labor 
Counoll, 98 vhich forbad union activity in similar situations vherea!! sueh 
oonduct ws 1'8rmissable in some eases in the federal oourts because ot the 
Norris-LaGuardia Aot. In the Florshe1m case, the Nev York state Labor Board 
had certified an AFL union after holding an election. A cro affiliate con-
tinued to 'Picket the Florsheim COl!rp8ny after the eleetion. The New York Court 
96 Seotion 8 (b) (4) (C). "forcing or requiring any employer te 
reoognize or b!!1rgain vith a particular labor organization as the representa-
tive of his employees it another labor organization has been certified 8S the 
representative ot such employees under the provisions of Section 9". 
97 42 I. E. (2) 480 (I. Y.), 1942. 
98 177 Pac (2) 873 (Wash.), 1947. 
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ot Appeals upheld the issuance of an injunction by the lover court and re-
stra ined the pioketing as being contrary to public policy. In the Swenson 
opinion, the court tollowed the ruling in the 'lorsheim esse when a union 
had been certified by the tabor Relations Board although no contract had been 
signed between the certified union and the employer. lbwever, opinions ren-
dered :in federal courts, in situations similar to that found in the cited 
cases, had denied injunotions beeause of the constitutional fllarantee of fre. 
speech, 99 and the Norris-LaGuardia Aot. 100 By reviewing the testimony a8 
presented In the beginning portion of this chapter, the purpose of Congress 
becomes clear in enacting (0). 
In a recent ease, a minority union struek against an eaployer who 
had contracted with a formally certified union to eomnel the emnloyer to adjust 
101 the grievances of the members of the striking minority union. 1'he Board 
held that (0) was not violated If the desired adjustment was not contrary to 
the oontract between the employer and the certified union and, more important, 
1943. 
99 Csfeter:ht EMPloyers Union, Loesl 302 v. Angelos, 320 US 293, 
Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 US 769, 1942. 
AFt T. Swing, 312 US 321, 1941. 
100 Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 591. Supp. 625 (Minn.), 1945. 
Fur Workers Union Loeal No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union No. 2123S, 
105 F (2) 1, 1939. 
101 Perry Norvell Co., SO NtlB 225, 1945. 
Eleetron~.es Equi"ment Co., 94 NLRB 62, 1951. 
as long as the striking union did not seek to toroe reoognition of its nunit" 
renresentation ot enmloyees who torm part of the berge ining unit represented 
by the Bl8jority as oertified. The union sought to act a8 a representative 
for employees to exereise the right of individU81 ad.1ustment ot grievances 
whioh the Aet 8 ssures to every employee and is perm is sa ble. 102 However, 
should the minority union seek to re~resent 88 a unit employees forming 8 
nert of the bargaining unit represented by the certified union, as disting-
uished from the agency for the adjustment of individual grievances, th~re is 
a violation of the Act. 103 
In the Oppenheinl-CollinJr, Department store opinion in New York, the 
union whieh had been the bargaining agent, hed not complied with the tUing 
requirements contained in Section 9 (f) (g) and (h), so that it wes not 
placed Oft the ballot when aft election was held. 104 As a result, another 
union was elected ana the former bargaining agent picketed the lremises of 
the employer. The picketing union contended that the purpose of the picketing 
weB not to force the employer to recognize or atrga in with it but rather to 
nersUl!lde the empl.yer to reinstate certain members of its local union. Sec-
102 Douds v. Retail & Wholesale Department store Workers, 173 F. 
(2) 764, 1949. 
103 Hwnpbrey v. International Brotherhood of Team.sters, 85 F. Supp, 
473, 1949. 
104 Douds v. Loea1 1250, Retail, Wholess1e Department store Union 
(Op-oenhe1m-Col11ns), 23 LRRM 2424, 1949. 
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tion 9 (a' permits employees to 'llresent thel~ grievances and the Court of 
Appeals upheld the union position. 
A union is prohibited, under (C), from engaging in primary strikes 
or boycott activities to force an employer to bargain with a partioular labor 
organization as the re'llresentatives of his employees if another union has 
been certified. 105 It should be noted that SUbsection (C) bars primary 
activity when another union has been certified and Is not a secondary boycott 
as generally definea. The Board heard s case in which a union oontinued to 
pioket a pIant after another union had been certified. 106 The facta dis-
olosed that the union c~11e" 8 ~tr1ke and another union was officially recog-
nbed by the Board during this interim. The Board held that the activity was 
secondary and therefore proscribed. 
D. pttmarI or Secqndarx §olcott 
On June 4th, 1951, the United states Supreme Court rendered deci-
sions in four CBses concern5ng the secondary boycott provisions of the N.t.R.A. 
as amended thBt offered an opnortunlty to clarify the nrimery, secondary situs 
problem. Considering that the o"lnions 1n three of the four cases were unan-
imous and that only two justices dissented in the fourth CBse it might be 
reasonably e~cted thRt the conflict at long last would have been decisively 
l~ See foot, note 96 •• 
1951. 
106 Retail Clerks tocal 1179 (Western Auto Sup'll1y), 93 NtRB 1638, 
settled. Unfortunately, the Court rendered ~pinions concerning issues ot 
whioh there was already little doubt, but left unanswered the fundamental 
question of the primary situs doctrine. 
Before discussing the decisions rendered by the United states 
Supreme Court, a review is necessary of the administrative and court opinions 
conoerning similar problems. In the Ryan case, 1(17 construction had been 
undertaken by the Ryan Construction Company at the Bucyrus Company's plant. 
For sake of convenience, a spec:1al gate had been placed in the fence surround 
ing the Bucyrus firm to be used by the employees of Ryan. When the employees 
of Bucyrus went out on strike, the union picketed the plant including the 
special gate which had been erected for the use of Ryan's employeese The 
Board held that such activity was not a secondary boycott as the picketing 
was primary and the 1947 amendments only intended to outlaw union action whic 
sought to enlarge the economic ares beyond the premises of the primary employ 
ere In the Montgomery Ward opinion, log the company had promulgated a rule 
requiring business agents to receive a pass when visiting the shipping dock. 
In protest, the union patrolled the trucking entrance to Wardts and instructe 
truck drivers, who were union members, not to make any pickups or deliveries. 
The Board held that such union activity was primary 'because the employees wer 
1('17 U. E. W. (Ryan Construction Corp.', 85 NtRB 417, 1949. 
108 87 NUlB 972, 1949. Another issue was whether there was a 
·labor disputeK under Section 2 (9). The Board said there was a bona fide 




only told to stay away trom the premises of ~he primary employer. 
In the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation case, 109 the Teamsters union 
had picketed an unorganized employer for the purpose ot being reoognized as 
bargaining agent. The Board held that the picketing was primary even though 
emplo,yees not covered b.1 the Aot refused to cross the picket line because the 
acti'Vit,. was restricted to the area ot the primary employer. A Kansas Dis-
trict Court made a similar finding in 1948 when it refused to issue an injuno-
tion where the Building Trades unions and th~ Carpenter's organization bad 
picketed the construction site ot a non-union builder and members of the 
Teamsters union had refused to cross the picket line. 110 
In the Sealright case, 111 one of the most difficult problems was 
in issue. Sealright employees struck and a picket line surrounded the entire 
plant. When seTeral truokl of an independent concern crossed the picket line 
hauling Sealright's produotl out of the plant, two strikers followed in a car. 
'When the truck arri'Ved at destination A, the str:l1cers picketed at the tan 
ga tes of these trucks and managed to persuade the employees ot A to refuse to 
unload the trucks. The NLRB held that the picketing was secondary and 'Vio-
lated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. The Diltrict Court enjoined the 
109 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Dt Giorgio Fruit Corp.) 
87 NLRB 720, 1949. 
110 Sperry 'V. Building Trades Council of KanAs City, 23 LRRM 2115, 
(Kansas), 1948. 




picketing and was affirmed on appeal. It can be seen that the problem of 
~eterm1ning the situs of the primary labor dispute becomes more complicated 
when the business opera tions ot the primary employer are not confined to a 
fixed area but are of a transient nature. 
The Schultz decision concerned a similar problem. 112 In 1948, 
Schultz moved his terminal from New York City to Slackwood, New Jersey. When 
Schultz'. contract with the Teamster's union in New York expired, the company 
made a contract with a New Jersey local. In retaliation, the New York team-
sters picketed the trucks at Schultz every time a delivery or pick-up was 
attempted in New York City at the situs ot neutral customers. The Board held 
that this picketing was primary and distinguished it from other cases beoauae 
the primary employer's premises vas in New Jersey and no other means of 
picketing vas available. In addition, the picketing only took place while the 
trucks were being loaded and unloaded. To ests biish a picket line in New 
Jersey would have been useless since the primary employer's business was oon-
duoted in New York city. The dissenting members of the Board contended that 
even though the union oonfined its picketing aotivities to the employer's 
trucks, it was imDI:lterial as Section 8 (b) (4) (A) does not require that. 
secondar,. boycott to be unlawful must completely disrupt the business ot the 
secondary employer and the union's picketing was conducted upon the premises 
112 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Schultz Refrigerated 
Service), 87 NLRB 502, 1949. 
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in the 80le possession of the secondary employer. 
In the Kanawha Coal 08se, m the Board found that the situs of the 
dispute with a specUic tmHrman, who produced timber for mine use vas at the 
sawmill ra ther than a t the mines where trucks of the lumberman were making a 
delivery. The picketing at the mines vas a secondary boycott, although the 
signs advertising the dispute rererred to the timberman, the nicketing vas 
not confined to the period when the trucks were present. 
In a case similar to the Schultz Refrigerated Service decision, the 
District Court ot Southern New York issued an injunction. 114 Sterling Bever-
ages, Inc., had its central office in ltassachusetts, holding a contract with 
the Teamsters union in Massachusetts. '!'he firm vas an exclwdve distributor 
for Rupperts and sent trucks to the warehouse in New York City for merchandise 
Members ot the Massachusetts local drove the truoks to the New York border 
where the teamsters belonging to the New York local took over. The M8ssachu-
setts Teamsters union demanded the right to have its members drive the Sterl1n~ 
trucks in New York city. When refused, the Massachusetts local picketed the 
entrance to Ruppert's in New York C!~ whenever a Sterling truck appeared. 
The Court granted sn injunction, admitting that the purpose of the picketing 
was to induce the e1RPloyee. of Sterling not to move trucks about Ruppert·s 
11.3 Union CODstruction Workers (Kanawha Coal Operators Ass.), 94 
NLRB 17.31, 1951. 
114 Douds v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Sterling Bever-
ages), 85 F. Supp. 429, 1949. 
property but held that Section S (b) (4) (A) ·was violated because the net 
result was that the employees of Ruppert's refused to load or unload Sterling 
trucks, causing Ruppert's to stop doing business with Sterling. The Board 
stated that this case differed from the Schultz opinion because the primary 
emoloyer's trucks were, upon occasion, beyond the area patrolled by the 
picket and the publicity was not restrioted to the trucks but to the areaway 
of the neutral employer. 
The Santa Ana LUl11ber case discussed the folloving of trucks belong-
ing to the primary employer to note the names of his cus"tomers. lIS The union 
did not picket any ot the customers who were to be contacted at a later date. 
The Board held that there was no picketing end the mere trailing of the lumber 
company's trucks could not by itself be interpreted as an inducement or en-
couragement of the customers employees. 
Many of theee oases discussed are contrary to the earlier decisions 
or cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with later rulings made by the Board, 
baving developed since the Pure Oil opinion. In the Pure 011 case, the NLRB 
set the precedent for another series of cases which held that picketing of the 
primary employer at his main location was not a secondary boycott though the 
purpose of such picketing was to force other employers to stop doing business 
with him by inducing their employer to strike or a "refusal to handle". 116 
115 Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union (Santa Ana Lumber Co.), 87 NLRB 
937, 1949. 
1949. 
116 Oil Workers International Union (Pure Oil Co.), 84 ILRB 315, 
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Both the Pure Oil CoJll?8.l'lY end the standard 011 COlIpsny operate petroleum 
refineries that adjoin each other. Standard Oil held a lease for the use of 
the dock facilities end operated the surrounding premises with its employees, 
handling shipments for themselye. end the Pure Oil Company. The union involv-
ed bad been certified a8 the representative for the Standard Oil and Pure 011 
elllployees, although se'f)8rate locals were used. Due to a prospective strike 
inVolving their em:plo,..ee., Standard 011 gave the Pure Oil ComTllny the rlght 
to operate the docking facilitle., Pure Oil to operate the premis •• with its 
ow employees. Pure 011 sought permission trom the union to operate the dock 
but an agreement \I8S not reached. When the strike involving Standard OU 
began, the union placed pickets at the dock. In addition, the crew of a tank-
er refused to load the Pure Oil cargo wes. the loading was under the direct-
tion of a Standard 011 fore_n. Later, the union notified the NatioD8.l Ms.ri-
time Union representative of the dispute with Standard Oil and the ruel 
belonging to the Pure 011 Company became "hot cargo" as soon as it reached the 
dock. Evidence presented diaclosed that the union had requested the employees 
of the Pure Oil Company to strike. '!'he General COUDsel, during the hearing, 
contended that the picketing of the dock vas an unfair labor practice because 
it induced the employee a of Pure Oil to reruae to handle the product of their 
tlllployer so that the Pure Oil Com:paDY would be forced to atop all business 
dealings with the Standard 011 Company. The Board held that the picketing 
vas confined to the primary situs and, as a result, the lav was not violated 
linee all picketing vas in the i1lmediate vicinity of Standard Oil pro:perty. 
The Ganenl Counsel further alleged that the 'letters to the N8.tional Maritime 
Inion had enoouraged the maritime emnloyees on the tanker to discontinue 
business relations vith the Pure Oil Company. The Board held such action vas 
an integral nart of the unions right to take primary action in support of the 
demands made on Standard Oil and the right to publicize - there was nothing 
more than a request to honor a pioket line at the place of business or the 
primary employer. The Board recognized that the union's pressure on the 
primary employer may bave had a seoondary efrect, that or induoing and encottr'-
aging the employees of the Standard all Company to cease doing business. Yet, 
to hold otherwise than that the action was primary, would in erreot outlaw 
every strike. 
In the Moore Dry Dock opinion, 117 the Board followed the rule 
enunoiated in the Pure Oil case. Here, the union had a dispute with the owner 
of a ship with a roreign registry. The ship had been tied up at an American 
,ard so that it could be converted. The union wented to picket the ship to 
secure the customary rate of pay for the seamen attached to the vessel. First, 
the union requested permission of the shipyard to pioket the ship at the dock. 
When refused, the union stationed piokets at the entrance to the shipyard after 
ninety neroent of the crew were on board. Signs were oarried by the piokets 
Darning the ship only 813 being unfair. The Board held the -picketing to be 
-
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primary beoause it was limited to the situs of the dispute loeated on the 
secondary employer's premises at the time the primary employer was present; 
the pioketing was limited to plaoes reasonably elose to the situs of the dis-
pute (where the ship vas tied to the dook); the pr1m8ry employer, at the time 
of the pioketing, was engaged in its normal business at the situs; and the 
banners carried by the pickets clearly disolosed that the dispute vas with the 
primary elllployer. The Board here reoognized that the problem vas one of 
balancing the right of a union to pioket at the site of the dispute a8 against 
the right of the seoondary employer to be free from picketing. When the 
secondary employer is being harbored by the primary employer, neit.her the righ1 
of the union to picket nor the right of the secondary employer to be free from 
pioketing is absolute. 
The oertinent facts in the four cases whioh reaohed the United States 
Sunreme Court will nov be set forth. In the case of NLRB v. International Rice 
ll~ Milling Company, the union sought to organize the employees of a cluster 
of rioe mills surrounding the town ot Crowley, Louisiana. One portion of the 
organizational drive was direoted at the Kaplan Mill and the Teamsters' union 
established a pioket line. None of the employees at the Kaplan mill took part 
in the pioketing. A truok driver employed by a customer sought entrance at 
the mill and vee persuaded by the piokets not to oross the line, Subsequently, 
the truok returned w1.th the vice president of Kaplan's and the pickets stoned 
11S 341 US 665, 1951. 
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the truck as the driver attempted to cross the picket line. The ;ffiRB held 
that Section 8 (b) (4) (A) vas not violated because the union's picketing 
had been restricted to the situs of the dispute vith the primary em.ployer. 119 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the NLRB and held that Section 8 
(b) (4) (A) was violated. The Appellate Court felt that the union activity 
became secondary when the strikers attempted to induce and encourage the 
employees of the neutral e~loyer, even if at the primary employer's plant, 
espeoially vhere there is violence. When the case came before the Supreme 
Court, the direct and most important problem was the primary situs doctrine. 
The Court could have clarified the situation Qy following the legislation as 
written and reiterated earlier decisions or it could have endorsed the primary 
situs doctrine as developed by the Board end made the theory binding upon 
lower oourts and the Board. II~tead, the court selected a novel ground that 
did not appear in the briefs as prepared by the contestants nor found in the 
earlier decisione. The court held that the union pieketing and violence to 
induce two men on e single truck not to cross the nieket line vas net inducing 
the concerted activity proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A). This section, 
contemplated the court, was intended to induce or encourage to some concert of 
action greater than that evidenced by the pickets request to a driver of 8 
single truck to discontinue his trip into the pioketed mill. The limitation 
of the picketing to the primary employer's mill vas held to be significant but 
itI, 119 In re International Brotherhood ot Teamsters (International 
~lce Milling Co.), 84 NLRB .360, 1949 • 
.... 
not conclusive. Thus, it appears that a union's inducements reaching the 
individual employees of a neutral employer only as they happen to approach the 
pioket line of the nrimary employer's plaoe of business are not aimed at oon-
oerted, as distinguished trom individual, coDluct b.Y such employees and is not 
banned by Section g (b) (4) (1). 
In the Rice Milling case, the court neither affirmed nor rejected 
the primary situs theory. The decision only seems to hold that the inducement 
of tvo employees in a single truck at the sit'lS of the nrimary employer is not 
the type of oonoerted activity forbidden b,y Seotion g (b) (4) (A). It is not 
clear that such action if induced elsewhere than at the primary situs is pro-
seribed. Nor is it clear what activity must be induced to constitute a vlola-
tion. 
In the Gould oase, 120 the Denver Building Trades Council and the 
associated unions struck 8gflinst a general contractor who was subletting work 
to 8 non-union contractor. The general contractor and all of the sub-contraot-
ore, with the exceT)tion of Gould and Preisner, employed union members. vThen 
Gould insisted that he complete the electrical work after being requested not 
to, the Council posted 8 picket at the building site and, in accordance with 
the Council by-laws, all members were informed that work was to be stopped. 
'!'he nieketing continued for !leveral weeks until the general contractor termin-
ated his contract with Gould and Preisner. When unfair union practice charges 
-
120 NtJ1B v. Denver Building Trades Council (Goulc & Preisner), 341 
US 67l), 1951. 
.. 
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vere fUed, the NLRB General Counsel in the Denver region petitioned the feder-
al district court for injunctive rel:i.of under Section 10 (1). The court re-
fused to issue an injunction because the activities vupposedly ,-iola ting the 
lav were not in interstate commerce 80 that the court lacked jurisdiction. 
When the ease was heard ~ the NtRB, it decided that the building was in inter-
sta te commerce and the union had viola ted Section 8 (b) (4) (A). 121 Upon 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the court ruled 
that the Board had jurisdiction but reversed the decision of the Board on the 
theory that the complaint and evidence merely established a primary- boycott 
which did not violate the spirit of the secondary boycott provisions. 122 The 
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the union had engaged 
1n secondary activity proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) CAl. Justices Reed and 
Douglas, in dissenting opinions, indicated that in the oonstruction inc.hlstry, 
conflict is usually confined to the construction site, the only place where a 
union can effectively object to the hiring of non-union labor. In addition, 
the secondary boycott provisions were designed to protect those persons wholly 
disinterested in a dispute and the two dissenters felt that 8. sub-eontractor 
and contractor are not disinterested parties. 
In the ease concerning the electrical workers, the Giorgi Construc-
tion Company, Port Cheater, New York had signed a contract to construct a 
-
121 82 NtRB 1195, 1949. 
122 Denver Build ing Trades Council v. NLRB (Gould & Pre isner ), 186 
J'. (2) 326, 1950. 
private dwelling in Greenwich, Connecticut. ~lthough the general contractor 
in question had employed union men in the past, the electrical installation 
was subcontracted to Samuel Langer, whose office was in Port Chester, New York 
and who employed non-union labor. Local 501 of the I. B. E. W. picketed the 
building site and workers a1read,. on the job left. The JiLRB secured a tellpOr-
ar:y injunction in New York under Section 10 (1). The Board th~n decided that 
an unfair practice had been committed violating Section 8 (b) (4) (A) 123 and 
the decision was affirmed by the Court of Anpeals. 124 The S1lpreme Court 
upheld the Board and the Court of Appeals. 125 
The Watson case concerned the Carpenter's Union when a private home 
vas remodeled and refurnished near the city of Chattanoo~, TAnnessee. 126 
The Watson ooncern operated a department store in Chattanooga and Local 74 of 
the Carpenter's union had been attemoting to organi~~ this firm. A contraot 
had been let to remodel and renovate the home and Watson's vas the only store 
in the locality carrying a "particular tyoe of wall and floor covering that 
vas desired. When Watsonts non-union men attempted to install the covering, 
the carpenters on the .'ob left at the request of the union. The Regional 
123 I. B. E. W., Local 501 (Langer), ~2 tMB l02~, 1949. 
124 I. B. E. W., Local 501 v. NLRB (Langer), l~l F. (2) 34, OA-2, 
1950. 
125 51 Ate 67A, 1951. 
"-
126 United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (watson), .341 us 7m, 
1951 • 
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Director of' the Nr~B sought an injunction under Section 10 (1) and the request 
was denied bec"luse the alleged unfair ~)rsctice occurred prior to the rsssage 
. of the raft-Hartley so that the conduct com,lained of, at that time, was not 
unlawf'ul. 127 The NT...RB, however, issued a "cease and desi8t" order alleging 
that Section g (b) (4) (A) had been violated. l2S On appeal, the Court of' 
A!)peels unheld the :UJ{B 129 and the Supreme Court followed suit. 
In a fifth ease, a writ of' certiorari was denied by the Supreme 
Court in a decision involving the building and construction industry. 130 
Here, a union had attemoted to force a union building contractor to stop doing 
business with a manufacturer of' prefabricated houses who employed non-union 
labor. The NLRB and the Court of' Appeals held that the union was guilty of' an 
unf'air labor practice because it had placed the contractor on an unfs 1r list, 
placed a picket at the building site and withdrew a union member from the job. 
To properly evaluate the decisions rendered by the United States 
Suureme Court, it is neoessary to recapitulate. Shortly after the N1.,RA was 
amended, the geographical situs of the strike or the place of picketing was 
127 Styles v. Looal 74, U. B. C. & J. (Watson), 74 F. Supo. 499, 
1947. 
128 In re United Brotherhood of' Carpenters (Watson), 80 NI~RB 533, 
194~. 
1?9 Loeal 74, U. B. c. & J. v. NLRB (Watson), lSI F (2) 126, CA-6, 
1950. 
130 u. B. c. & J. v. NtRB (Wadsworth), 2~ tRRM 2132, CA-10, 1951 
im.mater1al so long as there was an effect upon a secondary employer. 131 It 
is important to note that nowhere in Section ~ (b) (4) (A) is there any 
language indicating that the situs of the aotivity was of any importanoe in 
considering whether s080ifl0 union practioes should be exempted trom the 
seoondary boyoott provisions. However, starting with the deoisi~n given in 
the Pure Oil oase in 1949 and continuing to the ~resent, the Board has renderec 
opinions based upon the oonstantly developing primary situs doctrine. The 
decisions urior tc the Pure Oil oase cannot be reconciled with the subsequent 
ouinions as they are definitely in conflict. The Board is currently exempting 
from the effects of Seotion 8 (b) (4) (A) all activities at the sUus of the 
dispute with the primary employer though such practices may have as an object 
the forcing of an employer to cease business with another. 
In the Langer, Gould and Watson C8.S9S, the Supreme Court gave opin-
ions on cases that were interpreted by the NLRB prior to the Pure Oil decision. 
In each of these cases, the Board had applied Section g (b) (4) (A) literally 
and held that violations had existed though the strjke or picketing took place 
at the situs where the employees of the priIuBry employer was located, discov-
erlng a definite secondary intent. When the Langer and the watson cases came 
before the Court of A'Opea1s jn the Second and Sixth Circuits, reepective4r, I. 
the dec is ione of the Irr.RB were upheld. However, when the Gould ca se came 
131 Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers (Schenley), 78 NLRB 504, 1948. 
Los Angeles Building Trades Council, 83 NTJRB 477, 1949 
-
. before the Court of Appeals in Washington, D.c., the Board was reversed. Dur-
ing this interim, the Board had decided the Pure OU and R,an Construotion 
cases which developed the prima17 situs theory. When the opinion in the 
Gould case \l8S written by' the Court of Appeals, the Pure Oil and R,an Construo 
tion cases were discussed. B)r applying the primary situs the017, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the Board in the Gould case and concluded that an unf'air 
union 'P1"8ctice had not been cODllldtted by' union. 
When the Langer and Watson cases were reviewed by' the United states 
Supreme Court, the decisions of the ItBB were upheld, thus cont1naing the 
rulings of the Board made prior to the Pure Oil case. When the Gould case 
came before the Supre. Court, the decision of the Court of Appeals \l8S re-
versed and the NIBS was upheld, the court stating that the union had violated 
Section 8 (b) (4) (A). It would appear that the Supreme Court agreed with the 
opinions rendered bJ the HLRB prior to the Pure OU case, but it should be 
noted that none of the decisions rendered in the Langer, Gould and Watson 
cases referred to the Ryan Construotion or the Pure OU oases. 
The Supre. Court deoisions oan be justitied by' acoepting the premis 
that the intent of Congl"ess vas to onlJ outlaw action sp8c1ticallJ directed 
against a neutral emplOJer. It does not seem that CODgl"ess sought to prohibit 
priM17 activit,.. 1.32 Although there are mall1 indications that the proponents 
of the 1947 Act and the lobb,yists behind the scenes would have great1,. desired 
132 93 Congressional Record 4321-4323, 1947. 
the .limination ot the primary boycott as w.ll 8S the secondary actiTit,., such 
,action was not pr.ss.d because ot the constitutional question. In these 
initial decisions construing Section g (b) (4) (A), the Supreme Court refUs.d 
to adopt a ... iew that would have an .ttect ot limiting prillBl'7 'Pick.ting 
because ot a secondal'7 ett.et. B.1 reading Section 7 ot the Act, which pro-
tects the right to engage in conc.rted pr.ssure, and Section 13, which grants 
the right to strike, except as specitically prohibited by' the Act, it beco .. s 
obvious that Congress only intend.d to outlaw the secondary boycott. The 
ultimate blame tor the uncertainty which prevails over the interpr.tation ot 
(A) lIUst be placed upon those who dratted the provision. S.ction 8 (b) (4) 
(A) was so poorly .xpr.ssed that a straighttorward reading ot the provisions 
would ha .... l.d to 8 restriction ot 'Drimery activity. Th. NtRB and the Supr ... 
Court sought an interpretation which would avoid the result ot hind.ring 
pr1marr boycotts and a t the sa_ time k •• p the area D8rrow when th.re is 
economic conflict betw •• n the primary .mp1oyer and a union without dir.ct 
injury to the secondary employer. If the .mp1oy.r's plac. ot business is 
statioD8ry and geographica11,. r.mo .... d trOll the premises of any oth.r .mp1oyer, 
the test or the primary situs is merely wh.ther the pressures are confined to 
the situs ot the labor dispute. Obviously, there is a difficult problem ot 
interpretation when there is no geographic separation betwe.n the premise. ot 
the primary .mployer and those ot 8 n.utra1 tirm. In such common situs cas.s, 
the Board has d .... eloped the use ot the to11owing crit.ria tor determining 
secondary actionl 
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1. Did the union 'PUblicise the dispute a8 inTolving the primary 
employer exclusively or did the banners indioate that the dispute extended to 
the secondary emplo,er? 
2. Has the union indicated that the direct and immediate object 
was to twce neutral employers to cease doing business with the primary 
empl07&r or was the union activity designed to curtail the pr1ary employer's 
business? 
3. Did the union attempt to induce employees ot the neutral employ-
er to refuse to perf'orm services tor their own employer rather than merely 
ref'use to render only such services tor the secondary employer as assist the 
prinBry employer? 
4. 'Was the picketing restricted as closely as practicable under the 
cirouutanoe. to the immediate situs ot the primary dispute' 
5. Did the UIlion bave another ettective means available rather than 
the picketing action which was UIldertaken at or close to the .. condar,. employ-
er? 
'Without considering the legal alJl)8ct, a word of' caution is necessary 
concerning the construction industry, which was 1.nYo1ved 1a three ot the tour 
cases ruled upon by' the SuJ)!'e .. Oourt. rhe construction industry presents a 
UIlique problem when discussing the legality ot a bo)"Oott. Men eap10yed in the 
construction trades _y be hired by ditterent pneral contractors every day ot 
the week. lJntil World War II, and the post-war building boom, a great percent ... 




to do better than work on a part-time besis.· As non-union men are hired, 
those belonging to unions stand less chance of being employed at union rates 
when there is a slack in the demand for building in the large industrial 
centers. When a union member refuses to work alongside non-union labor, it 
is not necessarily striking a8Binst the so-called secondary employer but 
against all other contractors for allowing non-union SUbcontractors on the 
job. This is espec:1ally true if the picketing is limited to the 8itUS of the 
construction job. 
When a general contractor engages both union and non-union help, he 
has created a situation which causes dif'ficulty to union members. As partners 
so to speak, the general contractor and the various subcontractors, become 
allied tor the lite span of that construction job. Legally, each nartner 
remains independent because of the lack of control b.Y the general contraotor 
over the emplo;yees ot the subcontractor. In actual practice, the general 
contractor is a busy person so that each sub-contractor supervises a portion 
of the total project because of more experience in one phase and as a reliet 
trOll the daily headaches ot the construction site. The general contractor 
still exercises control at any point b.Y the simple expedient of not letting 
work to the sub-contractor on future jobs should he become displeased. And 
if the union picketing is limited to the site of the construction job, there 
appears to be a question 8S to the independent contractor solution so easily 
arrived at b7 the courts. 
Unquestionably, the war and the reconversion to a peacetime econo~ 
plus the influence of the N.L.R.A •• as amended, paved the way for state legis-
lation which restricted union activity to a great extent. Undoubtedly, there 
was a necessity for regulator,r legislation and the secondary boycott, never a 
tactic high in public tavor, bad to be controlled. Delaware and Minnesota 
provided for injunctive relief upon petition of the injured party and permitte 
suits for damages. 133 Massachusetts, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Utah and 
Wisconsin provided for the bringing of specific boycott oharges before an 
administrative agency with court enforcement after a hearing and a finding and 
order b7 the state labor board. 134 However, none of these states provided 
for the mandatory or discretionary injunctive relief upon the petition ot the 
Board or ettorney charged with prosecuting unfair union practices as provided 
in Section 10 (j) and (1) in the federal lew. Massachusetts outlaws strikes 
and boycotts when used to force an employer to coeit an unf'atr labor practice 
or to bargs in with a union whioh the employees rejected in an election con-
ducted by the state Board. The Minnesota provisions covers a multitude of 
133 Minnesota laws, Chapter 195, 1949. 
Delaware Laws, Chapter 196, Sec. 2, 6, and 10, 1947. 
134 Massachusetts Acta, Chapter 150A l Sec. 4 (A) (2) (a), 1947. Colorado stat. Ann. (Midue Supp.), Chapter 97, Sec. 94 (6) (2) 
(a) el) (g), 1946. 
Penn. stat. Ann. (Purdon), Tit. 43, See. 211.1, et. seq., 1941. 
Wisconsin stat (Brossard), Section 111.01, eta seq., 1951. 
. labor sins. The states ot Alabama, Georgie, 'Idaho, and Missouri passed legis-
lation specitying what activities constitute secondary boycotts and made the. 
misdemeanors. 13' The Iowa lav provided tor injunctive reliet on the petition 
ot an aggrieved part,.. 136 North Dakota holds all bo1'Cotts and s,.nrpatbJr 
strikes to be against public polic,. and permits injunctive reliel and 
damages. 137 Oregon and California have "hot cargo" statutes which prohibit 
. the refusal by persons not directly involved in the labor dispute to work 
upon or retuse to handle non-union materiels or suppliers. 138 
The constitutioDBlity ot severel state statutes have been tested in 
courts. The California Act was held to be unconstitutional because of aD 
unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of speeeh, press and 8ssembl,. and the 
,law failed to set up sufticient standards tor conduct that could be termed 
unlawful. 139 The Idaho law was held to be constitutional. 140 Here, the 
135 Alabama Code, Title 26, sec. 336, Title 14, See. 57, 101 and 
103, 1940. 
Georgia Laws, Ch. 54, 1947. 
Idaho Code, Ch. 44, Sec. SOl to S03, 1948. 
Vernon's Missouri Ann. Stat., Ch. 295, 1947. 
136 Iowa Code Ann., Ch. 7331 to 7336, 1947. 
137 North Dakota Laws, ChI 34, Sec. 0001 to 08(17, 1947. 
138 Oregon Compo Laws Ann., Sections 102, ~05, 1940. 
Deering's CalH'ornie Codes, tabor I, ChI S, 1947. 
139 In re Blane,., 184 Pac (2) 892 (Calif.), 1947. 
140 State 'Y. Casselman, 24 IBRM 2056 (Idaho), 1949. 
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union contended that the statute was unconstitutional because the term "labor 
dispute" was not detined, and the right ot tree speech was infringed because 
picketing wal prohibited except 1>7 the employees ot the pr1ma17' employer. 
Another statute had been ~saed at the same time which detined 8 "labor dis-
pute" and both laws, held the court, could be read together. 
The trend has been definitely established and the evidence tends to 
indicate that the seconda17' boycott in labor disputes will be even more 
strongly controlled 1>7 the state legislation and court orders in the tuture. 
OHAPTm VI 
AN EVALUA 'fION OF SOLOTIONS TO 'l'fIE 
smOIDARY BOYOOTT PROBLEM 
Any solution proposed to remedy the secondary boycott laws and 
decisions will be a cOllpromise measure at best. 'the equities in favor of the 
public and employers must be balanced with those of labor and admittedly all 
concerned may be treated unfairly on any particular occasion. However, it 
cannot be denied that injury to the public through the use of secondary boy-
cotts bas been slight as e01ll'P8red with injury suffered from direct strikes. 
'or example, the recent strike in the steel industry had a strong effect upon 
the national safety because ot the wartime, peacetime emergency. The priM 
question to be answered in arriving at a:n;y solution is whether collective 
bargaining w111 be promoted 80 that eventually the forlMl regnlation of indus-
try and labor w11l be cast aside in favor ot informal control by the partici-
pants. As already indicated, the answer is not simple. 
It one believes in strong unions, there would be little quarrel with 
the continued outlawing ot such aotivities proscribed by Sections 8 (b) (4) 
(B) and (0), undertakings generally distasteful to the public and often 
associated with other more fSvorably received secondary action such as that 
condueted for organizational purposes. In addition, a small percentage of the 
cases arising under Section g (b) (4) come within the forbidden activity ot 
CB) end (e). During the fiscal year 1949, eighty-nine charges were tiled 
under (D) and thirty under (C), 1 During 1950, eight7-r1ine violations were 
claimed under (D) and thirty-tour under (e). 2 For the year 1951, sixtT 
cb9rges were made under (B) and only twenty-two under (e).:; Compare these 
with the unhir labor charges WAde under ~I), 247 for 1949, 2.38 for 1950, and 
14.3 for 1951, and the entire question appears to be ot little importance. 
The most difficult issues are Section g (b) (4) (I) on a tederal 
level and those state levs which outlaw the secondery boycott proper so that 
the balance ot this chapter will be devoted thereto. 
Union18t~ have strongly argued that all secondary boycotts in turth-
erenee ot legitimate labor di8putes ~hould be legslly sanctioned, if peace-
tully conducted. They argue that to permit union men to work upon non-union 
materials and products would eventuall,. result in an undercutting ot union 
standards. Historically, the secondary boycott had 8S its -primary ourpose the 
extension of un~.on control as was indicated in the Duplex Printing ease -
unions attempted to t.<.11(:e work avay frO.1!I non-union yorkers. Labor leaders 
today emphasize that the need for the boycott 1.s principally to enlarge its 
1 Fourteenth Annual Rel)ort of the National tabor Relations Board, 
'or the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 194.9, 'fable 3 (0', 160. 
2 Fttteenth AM-l Repgrt ot the I!tiol\!l tabor Relations Board, 
For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1950, Table .3 (0), 222. 
3 Sixteenth Annual Report ot the national Labor Relations Board, 
For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1951, Table .3 ~05, 294. 
do_in. There is some evidence available which would bear out the position 
taken 'b7 labor leaders. Industr7 has been invited to the south and southwest 
geographic portions of the United States with an implied promise that unions 
will be kept out or at lea8t sharply regulated. statistics already available 
indicate that mo8t of the regulatory type of labor legislation has been pro-
llOted in the south and southwest. ot a total of .366 charges filed under 
Section 8 (b) (4) during the year 1949, only thirty of the total vere tiled 
in the East North Central Distriot which includes the states of Ohio, Illinois 
Michigan and Wisconsin. 4 The Middle Atlantic territory c0'9'8ring New York, 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania totalled aeventy-six charges. The Paci1'ic area 
including Washington, Oregon and Calitornia disclosed f'itty-six boycott 
violation claims. All of the areas enumerated include the MOst industrialized 
sections in the United States. '!'he balance ot the charged violations occurred 
in regions that vere of little comparative importance, industrially wise. A 
total of' .361 charges vere filed throughout the United States during 1950. 5 
The East North Central area totalled thirty-nine charges, the Middle Atlantic 
disolosed sevent7-four compla ints and the Pacific territory had sixt7-f'iTe 
claims, the balance occuring in the relatively unimportant business areas. In 
1951, the East North Central district only bad nineteen charges filed, the 
4 Fourteenth Annual Report ot the National Lalzgr Relatiop8 Bgard, 
Table 4, 161. 
5 fifteenth AMUt!l ReRon ot the National Jt!bgr RIlations Board, 
Table 4, 223. 
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Middle Atlantic titt.y-tour and the Pacitic territory disolosed thirt,r-nine 
troll a total ot 225, the balance occurring in areas attracting new business. 6 
Thus, the unions may have a POint, especially true since state and tederal 
legislation and court decisions have become more restrictive to labor since 
World War II. Should there be a general business depression and unions tought 
br industry with such tactics evident prior to the Norris-LaGuardia and the 
Wagner Acts, then the secondary boycott may have to be legalized, trom a 
soeisl point ot view, to equalize the power between industry and labor and to 
generall,. increase the purchasing power ot the mas. consumers. Toda,., in 
mo.t instances, unions are 'POVertul and the blanket approval ot all secondary 
activity seau unnec .... ry. 
ot 1... importance is the claimed need tor the secondary boycott 
during collective bargaining disputes. Here, the need is onl,. crucial wh.n 
the .mployer. cannot be "bargained with" brllOre direct and acceptable methods 
Admittedl,., statistics to prove either point ot view is oomplet.ly lacking. I 
cannot be said how -IV" strikes would have been lost but tor the secondary 
boyoott nor how many tailed since the B.L .. R.!. was amended and made the law ot 
the land because ot a union's inabilit,. to rely on the teolmique. Once again, 
the economic realities must be weighed. Business conditions, in general, 
remain excellent at the present date and Mione are getting a good share ot tb 
vealth accruing to the nation as a vhole tor the benetit ot their members. 
6 Sixteenth AMUIll ReP9rt ot the National Labor RelatiOn! Board, 
'fable 4, 296. 
Thus, there isn't any need to legalize the secondary boycott to aid a union 
during a period of negotiation. Should industry faU and, the national income 
drop sharp17, the ba,ycott could become necessary to promote the cause of 
unionism and collective bargaining. 
A. case could be presented for permitting action, admittedly- second-
ary, in specific industries because ot peculiar problems. The ditf'icult 
aspect ot class legislation and constitutionality would be presented and the 
outcome of 8 court decision doubtM. For example, although the construction 
industry, 8S 8 clase, represents a small portion of the wealth ot all of the 
industries in the United states, a large percentage of the total number ot 
unfair labor practice chargee tUed was against unions in the construction 
trades. 7 Since ID8!J1' ot the court decisions concerning the construction indus-
try spplies to the independent contractor problem, it may be advisable to 
legalize boy-cotts when coDtined to the area of the situs of' the building and 
the activity is directed against non-union tradesmen present on the same job. 
The independent contractor theory is a legal fiction in many instances and 
subcontractors emplo,yed are often closely allied with the general employer, 
more so than courts will admit. 
Another proposed solution to the boycott problem is to permit 
7 Fourteenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, 
TIl ble 5, 162. 
11tte.pth AM.l Report of the National Labor Relations Board, 
'l'a ble 5, 224. 
Sixteenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Bg!rd, 
Table 5, 226. 
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secondary picketing when the Dr1mary strike is legally conducted. Should the 
United Auto Workers call a strike against a comoany for higher wages, not in 
violation ot a contract, secondary activity would be permitted against those 
who deal in the products ot the primary employer. Again, the general economic 
situation would be the prime factor. With unions strong, it is a question 
ot balancing the equities and many small business men could be damaged should 
unions be permitted to engage in secondary activity. With unions powertul, 
as they are today, other methods ot economic pressure are available without 
using secondary picketing. In periods at weakened and harrassed unionism, the 
secondary boycott might be necessary. 
Some argue that secondary strikes and picketing should be permitted 
for organizational purposes. A few contend that the secondary boycott has 
never been ettecti .... to organize large industrial groups and the observation 
seems correct since mBD,y ot the basic heaT,Y industries never entered into 
collective bargaining agreements prior to the Wagner Act. However, IIlOst at 
the large industries are unionized today so that permitting organizational 
boycotting must be justified tor another reason. Actually, the organizational 
secondary boycott is a strategy necessary today to organize the non-union 
fringes which are important to la bar to ma tnta in standards and to continue t. 
better the general living conditions ot the masse.. Otten, the secondary 
boycott is the only tactic that is etteetive. An argument against permitting 
organizatioll8l boycotting is that emnleyees may be coerced into joining unions. 
The contention is rather weak, providing the union is chosen b.r a majority at 
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those employees within the proper birgaining. unit, since _ny non-union 
elllployees have ga!ned through the efforts made by' unions in behalf of their 
members, and as a beneficiary of such union 1')ressure, those preferring to 
reJDBin individualists should be made to contribute to the cost of organiza-
tional programs. In addition, both the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley 
additions bave recognized the social desirability of the positive promotion 
o! unions and collective bargaining so that there is some merit to this point 
o! view. 
A strong argwnent can be presented in favor of tl8rmitting union mem-
bers to refuse to work upon or otherwise refuse to handle material from 
"struck" companies. If the ftstruck" .terial is forced upon union labor, they 
are, in a sense, aiding the primary employer. Yet, whether no work should be 
permitted upon those articles made by' companies currently engaged in a labor 
dispute remains debgtable. Turning the tables about, the secondary employer 
would become the ally of the union engaged in the dispute should the secondary 
activity t>e permitted and the boycott could cause great business damage to the 
secondary employer. 
Another solution is the "unity of interest" theory developed by' the 
8 New York Courts in such opinions represented by Goldfinger v. Feintuoh. 
Thus, a retail store which serves as an outlet for non-union products might, 
under certain circUlllStances, be pioketed. The problem here is whether the 







legitimate union interest extends from an ore. mining concern to the retail 
automobile dealer or from the Pillsbury Flour Mills to the 8BIlII grocery store 
In a few words, where does the interest end. As indicated in a previous cbtip-
ter, the original "unity ot interest" theory ad'V'8nced by Goldfinger v. Fein-
tuch has been extended by the New York courts to where the primary and 
secondary employer need not be engaged in the same type ot business. Such a 
solution would be difficult to apply to factual situations and would invite 
administrative and court intervention, a factor not conducive to the advance-
ment of collective bargaining. Possibly, a8 a solution, picketing could be 
permitted where the greater pert of the secondary emplO1er's business is with 
the priBulry concern. There, a definite "unity of interest" could be estab-
lished. 
Where a subsidiary of a large corporation is involved in a labor 
dispute, many argue that the legel fiction of distinct and separate entities 
be cast aside and picketing of the parent corporation permitted since an 
inde-pendent relationehip does not exist in tact between the two com'Pflnies. To 
permit the establishment of subsidiaries is within the statutory purview of 
each individual state. The separate entity theory is nothing more than the 
legal permission to establish separate corporations as an aid or attraction to 
bUSiness corporations. Secondary activity should be permitted against either 
the parent or subsidiary company. There is a definite "unity of interest" to 
8ay the least, and directors appointed to look atter the "child" are otten 
controlled by the 1')8rent company. 
It i8 questionable vhether the primary employer should be permitted 
sdministrstiTe or legal recourse against a union guilty of a seoondary boy-
cott. The employer vould clam that since he is suffering business dallllge 
because of the secondaI"YactiTity, he has 8 direct interest in the union 
action and should be giTen a right of redress. Unions claim that MOst second-
ary boycott 8Uits and charges are filed by the nrimary employer who is the 
cause of allot the ditticulty. On ma~ ocoasions, unions clsa tbBt the 
nrimary employer is subsidizing litigation since there are known incidents 
when fund. are made aT8ilable to the secondary eIJl1,'Jloyer for oourt action, a 
!,raotioe frowned upon by the judiciary. The employer has 8 d.finite interest 
in seoondary union actlTity beoause ot business damage and he should Mve the 
right to ftle a suit tor damages or netition an administrative ageDeY tor 
relief in specific oircumstances. 
A tew contend that the unions shl')uld be P8nitted to us ••• condary 
boycotts :l.t the eurployer is guiltY' of an unfair labor practice. Sinoe the 
eft!ployer has sinned, he 111 seeking reI let without the nec .... ry "clean hands" 
and thus the boyeott should be oermitted. The diffieulty with this type of 
philosophy, admittedly one of "eye for eY'e,. i8 that the publio will eventual-
ly lose thereby a!1d the law of the jungle wUl l)l"n-aU. In addition, the 
courts will be burdened with litigation and the use ot the injunction maY' be 
increased. TVo wrongs are not 8 right and it is better to forbid the union 
and employers the us. of questionable tactic.. In addition, to equalize .uch 
a clause, it would be neoessary to permit an employer to commit an unfair 
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labor 'Orectice if the union was found guilty ()f violating any portion ot 
Section S (b) (4) and this unions would condemn. 
In the garment industry and a few others, it is a common '!lractice I 
to sublet orders during the busy season to small concerns created for that 
~urpo... Perhans secondary boycotts should be permitted when work is let 
during a labor dispute because a union strike could be broken thereby. Here, 
unions can nresent acceptable evidence in favor of permitting secondary 
activity baeause the contractor is not a person wholl,. unconcerned. The 
suggestion could be tempered b.r permitting all boycotts unless the subcontraot-
ing is 8 normal occurrence within the industry and no more work has been let 
during a labor dispute than is the customary procedure. 
Undeniably, the Taft-Hartle,. secondary boycott substantive and ~ro­
cedural provisions should be amended. 'I'he wvrding in Section 8 (b) (4) is 
ambiguous and tar too restrictive if literally applied. The decisions already 
discllssed under the pri..'!lary situs doctrine is due, in part, to the poor 
phraseology ot the Act and the NLRB and courts ot law ha",e had to circumvent 
the real issues in order to arrive at an equitable solution, a device which in 
effect turns the courts and the Board into legislative bodies 8S they are 
nwrit~ law. 'I'he requirement under Section 10 (1) that the Regional 
Attorney secure an injunction when there is sufficient evidence of a labor 
violation should be stricken from the records completely or equalized ~ 
granting the ssme relief to unions. The most obvious reason is that a similar 
provision was not written into the lav when an emplo.yer violates the Act. 
.158 
Then, courts of law with legalistic approech~s and little training in labor 
relations should be left out of labor disputes whenever possible. Personnel 
i8 needed trained in the industrial relations field with sl')8cia1 qualifica-
tions in labor history, economics end labor lew. Only then will the problems 
be understood in their nroper persnective. 
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